This paper reassesses the question of whether Craig’s theorem poses a challenge to Quine's empirical underdetermination thesis. It will be demonstrated that Quine’s account of this issue in his paper “Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World” (1975) is flawed and that Quine makes too strong a concession to the Craigian challenge. It will further be pointed out that Craig’s theorem would threaten the empirical underdetermination thesis only if the set of all relevant observation conditionals could be shown to (...) be recursively enumerable — a condition which Quine seems to overlook — and it will be argued that, at least within the framework of Quine’s philosophy, it is doubtful whether this condition is satisfiable. (shrink)
I defend and revise the systematic account of normative functions (teleofunctions), as recently developed by Gerhard Schlosser and by W. D. Christensen and M. H. Bickhard. This account proposes that teleofunctions are had by structures that play certain kinds of roles in complex systems. This theory is an alternative to the historical etiological account of teleofunctions, developed by Ruth Millikan and others. The historical etiological account is susceptible to a general ontological problem that has been under-appreciated, and that offers important (...) reasons to adopt the systematic account. However, the systematic account must be revised to allow for two distinct kinds of teleofunctions in order to avoid another ontological problem. (shrink)
Raymond Van Arragon considers my my suggestion that most of those who never have the opportunity to accept Christ during their earthly lives suffer from transworld damnation, and he offers four different interpretations of that notion. He argues that at least three of these interpretations are such that on them the suggestion becomes implausible. I maintain that once my suggestion is properly understood, then, despite Van Arragon’s misgivings, it ought not to be thought implausible even on the first two, boldest (...) interpretations he offers. (shrink)
The hypothesis that God supernaturally raised Jesus from the dead is argued by William Lane Craig to be the best explanation for the empty tomb and postmortem appearances of Jesus because it satisfies seven criteria of adequacy better than rival naturalistic hypotheses. We identify problems with Craig’s criteria-based approach and show, most significantly, that the Resurrection hypothesis fails to fulfill any but the first of his criteria—especially explanatory scope and plausibility.
The publication in theJournal of the American Medical Association of a narrative entitled “It's Over, Debbie,” in which a gynecology resident apparently performs euthanasia, has stirred considerable debate characterized by varying interpretations not only of the ethical issues involved but of the meaning of the text itself. Formal analysis reveals the narrative to be strikingly literary in its ambiguity, its foregrounding of its own textuality, and its dominant structure of repetition and reversal. The analysis points to features that account for (...) some of the varying interpretations in the debate, and it calls into question the relation of the text to whatever events it may represent and to how the resident may have perceived these events. (shrink)
Though deceptively simple and plausible on the face of it, Craig's interpolation theorem (published 50 years ago) has proved to be a central logical property that has been used to reveal a deep harmony between the syntax and semantics of first order logic. Craig's theorem was generalized soon after by Lyndon, with application to the characterization of first order properties preserved under homomorphism. After retracing the early history, this article is mainly devoted to a survey of subsequent generalizations (...) and applications, especially of many-sorted interpolation theorems. Attention is also paid to methodological considerations, since the Craig theorem and its generalizations were initially obtained by proof-theoretic arguments while most of the applications are model-theoretic in nature. The article concludes with the role of the interpolation property in the quest for "reasonable" logics extending first-order logic within the framework of abstract model theory. (shrink)
Though deceptively simple and plausible on the face of it, Craig's interpolation theorem has proved to be a central logical property that has been used to reveal a deep harmony between the syntax and semantics of first order logic. Craig's theorem was generalized soon after by Lyndon, with application to the characterization of first order properties preserved under homomorphism. After retracing the early history, this article is mainly devoted to a survey of subsequent generalizations and applications, especially of (...) many-sorted interpolation theorems. Attention is also paid to methodological considerations, since the Craig theorem and its generalizations were initially obtained by proof-theoretic arguments while most of the applications are model-theoretic in nature. The article concludes with the role of the interpolation property in the quest for "reasonable" logics extending first-order logic within the framework of abstract model theory. (shrink)
Kalam cosmological arguments have recently been the subject of criticisms, at least inter alia, by physicists---Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking---and philosophers of science---Adolf Grunbaum. In a series of recent articles, William Craig has attempted to show that these criticisms are “superficial, iII-conceived, and based on misunderstanding.” I argue that, while some of the discussion of Davies and Hawking is not philosophically sophisticated, the points raised by Davies, Hawking and Grunbaum do suffice to undermine the dialectical efficacy of kalam cosmological arguments.
In mathematical logic, Craig’s Theorem states that any recursively enumerable theory is recursively axiomatizable. Its epistemological interest concerns its possible use as a method of eliminating “theoretical content” from scientific theories.
A semantical proof of Craig's interpolation theorem for the intuitionistic predicate logic and some intermediate prepositional logics will be given. Our proof is an extension of Henkin's method developed in . It will clarify the relation between the interpolation theorem and Robinson's consistency theorem for these logics and will enable us to give a uniform way of proving the interpolation theorem for them.
This dissertation examines the connection between Craig's theorem and scientific instrumentalism. The main question to be answered is whether the former can be used to support the latter. A negative answer to this question is defended in the dissertation. ;The first two chapters present a detailed expository account of the proof of Craig's theorem and also of the process by which theoretical terms are to be eliminated from scientific theories according to the method developed by Craig. Emphasis (...) is placed on those points which are relevant to later discussions. ;There have been several arguments against using the Craigian method of eliminating theoretical terms and against replacing a scientific theory by its Craigian revised theory . The third chapter is devoted to two of those arguments. The first is meant to show that the distinction between observational and theoretical terms is untenable and hence that the Craigian method cannot be used to eliminate theoretical terms. The second is intended to show that a Craigian revised theory does not always preserve the whole inductive power of its original theory and hence that it cannot replace the original theory. Both arguments are analyzed in detail and rejected. ;The fourth chapter argues that Craig's theorem cannot be used to support scientific instrumentalism: it is argued that a Craigian revised theory may lack the explanatory power of its original theory. In the course of arguing the above point, ten outstanding theories of explanation are considered. It is argued that no matter which account of explanation is adopted, a Craigian revised theory cannot always preserve the whole explanatory power of its original theory. ;In the fifth chapter, the "theoretician's dilemma" of Carl G. Hempel's is examined. It is argued that, in virtue of the explanatory shortcoming of the Craigian method, the theoretician's dilemma cannot be used to support scientific instrumentalism. (shrink)
William Lane Craig rejects Platonism (the view that uncreated abstract objects (AOs) exist) in favor of nominalism because he believes Platonism fatally compromises God’s aseity. For Craig, concrete particulars (including essences) exist, but properties do not. Yet, we use property-talk, following Carnap’s “linguistic frameworks.” There is, however, a high cost to Craig’s view. I survey his views and then explore the importance of essences. But, next, I show that his nominalism undermines them. Thus, we have just interpretations (...) of reality. Worse, nominalism undermines creation’s determinacy. Last, I suggest AOs are created, but in a more fundamental sense than Craig considers. (shrink)
The Craig Interpolation Theorem is a fundamental property of rst order logic L!!. What happens if we strengthen rst order logic? Second order logic L 2 satises Craig for trivial reasons but on the other hand, L 2 is not very interesting from a fundational point of view.
Hypotheses about the shape of causal reality admit of both theistic and non-theistic interpretations. I argue that, on the simplest hypotheses about the causal shape of reality—infinite regress, contingent initial boundary, necessary initial boundary—there is good reason to suppose that non-theism is always either preferable to, or at least the equal of, theism, at least insofar as we restrict our attention merely to the domain of explanation of existence. Moreover, I suggest that it is perfectly proper for naturalists to be (...) undecided between these simple hypotheses about the causal shape of reality: contrary to the proponents of cosmological arguments, there are no decisive objections to any of these simple hypotheses. (shrink)
Hypotheses about the shape of causal reality admit of both theistic and non-theistic interpretations. I argue that, on the simplest hypotheses about the causal shape of reality—infinite regress, contingent initial boundary, necessary initial boundary—there is good reason to suppose that non-theism is always either preferable to, or at least the equal of, theism, at least insofar as we restrict our attention merely to the domain of explanation of existence. Moreover, I suggest that it is perfectly proper for naturalists to be (...) undecided between these simple hypotheses about the causal shape of reality: contrary to the proponents of cosmological arguments, there are no decisive objections to any of these simple hypotheses. (I argue this case in detail in connection with objections offered by William Lane Craig; however, I believe that the case holds quite generally.). (shrink)
This article analyzes the origins of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine: the trial of Joseph Dotterweich. That doctrine holds that an officer may be personally liable for the criminal act of a subordinate if the officer was, in some indefinite way, able to prevent the violation. Applying this doctrine, the prosecution of Dotterweich entailed strict liability for a strict liability offense. The underlying offenses—the interstate sale of one misbranded and adulterated drug and one misbranded drug—were said to be strict liability (...) offenses. And then, with respect to Dotterweich as the corporation’s general manager, the government argued that he was strictly liable because he stood in “responsible relation” to the company’s acts. The government never tried to prove that the company, Buffalo Pharmacal, was negligent, nor did it try to prove that Dotterweich was negligent in his supervision of the employees of Buffalo Pharmacal. The prosecutor and judge were candid about this theory throughout the trial, although the judge conceded that it seemed bizarre and unfair. The defense lawyer repeatedly sought to inject what became known throughout the trial as the “question of good faith,” but was circumvented at almost every turn. What would thus seem to be the crux of any criminal trial—the personal fault of the defendant—was carefully shorn from the jury’s consideration. The government’s theory was so at odds with intuitive notions of liability and blame that, as one probes into the case, and looks at the language used in the government’s appellate briefs, imputations of moral fault inevitably crept in. Yet the government was not entitled to make such accusations, as it had pruned moral considerations from the trial. The article argues that the responsible corporate officer doctrine can never enjoy a secure place in our legal system. First, the doctrine is at a minimum in tension with, and often in direct opposition to, basic principles of the criminal law; and second, the doctrine fails, when followed to its logical conclusions, to accord with basic notions of fair play. The article concludes that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is either unnecessary, in cases in which the evidence establishes personal fault, or unjust, in cases in which it creates liability in the absence of personal fault through the unspecified notion of “responsibility.” The Dotterweich case illustrates what is contemplated by the latter possibility, and why it is problematic in any judicial system that purports, in the words of the Model Penal Code, “to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.”. (shrink)
Recent evidence on intertemporal choice suggests that decision-makers may exhibit both increasing and decreasing impatience simultaneously, called inverse-S discounting. This paper introduces trichotomic discounted utility to model inverse-S discounting. Under trichotomic discounted utility the decision-maker distinguishes between short-term delays, medium-term delays, and long-term delays. Exponential discounting holds within each category, but not necessarily across each category. We provide preference foundations for trichotomic discounted utility in the timed outcomes framework and in the consumption streams framework. The key axiom is a weakening (...) of the time consistency axiom that allows for both increasing and decreasing impatience. We also consider a weak, local version of time consistency, and show that this plausible condition is satisfied only by discount functions with exponential “pieces”. (shrink)
Ordinary cases of object seeing involve the visual perception of space and spatial location. But does seeing an object require such spatial perception? An empirical challenge to the idea that it does comes from reflection upon Bálint's syndrome, for some suppose that in Bálint's syndrome subjects can see objects without seeing space or spatial location. In this article, I question whether the empirical evidence available to us adequately supports this understanding of Bálint's syndrome, and explain how the aforementioned empirical challenge (...) can be resisted. (shrink)
The authors of this book show that the failure of public health arises, not from a failure of contemporary medicine, but from a failure of the philosophical assumptions upon which it rests. They suggest an alternative approach to health care that derives from a ecological and holistic philosophy of nature.
[DOI: 10.1097/j.pain.0000000000000765] Amanda Williams and Kenneth Craig, in a recent article in the IASP official journal _Pain_ (DOI: 10.1097/j.pain.0000000000000613), have argued that it is time to revise the IASP's well-entrenched definition of 'pain'. They propose an alternative definition. We critically discuss their proposed revision and argue that it admits clear counterexamples as both sufficient and necessary conditions. We further discuss the wisdom of replacing 'unpleasant' in the IASP definition with 'distress' as Williams and Craig propose. [Craig and (...) Williams respond to our criticism in DOI: 10.1097/j.pain.0000000000000766]. (shrink)
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