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  1. Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
    Recasting important questions about truth and objectivity in new and helpful terms, his book will become a focus in the contemporary debates over realism, and ...
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  2. Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
  3. The Reason's Proper Study: Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics.Crispin Wright & Bob Hale - 2001 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Here, Bob Hale and Crispin Wright assemble the key writings that lead to their distinctive neo-Fregean approach to the philosophy of mathematics. In addition to fourteen previously published papers, the volume features a new paper on the Julius Caesar problem; a substantial new introduction mapping out the program and the contributions made to it by the various papers; a section explaining which issues most require further attention; and bibliographies of references and further useful sources. It will be recognized as the (...)
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  4. Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Aberdeen University Press.
  5. Realism, Meaning, and Truth.Crispin Wright - 1993 - Blackwell.
  6.  80
    Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics.Crispin Wright - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
  7. Comment on Paul Boghossian, "What is Inference".Crispin Wright - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):27-37.
    This is a response to Paul Boghossian’s paper: What is inference?. The paper and the abstract originate from a symposium at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA in San Diego in April 2011. John Broome was a co-commentator.
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  8. (Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
  9. Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Critical Philosophy 1 (1):97.
  10. Facts and Certainty.Crispin Wright - 1986 - In Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 71: 1985. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press. pp. 429-472.
  11. On the Coherence of Vague Predicates.Crispin Wright - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):325--65.
  12.  16
    Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.
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  13. Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof.Crispin Wright - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):140-63.
  14. The Perils of Dogmatism.Crispin Wright - 2007 - In Nuccetelli & Seay (eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    "Dogmatism" is a term renovated by James Pryor [2000] to stand for a certain kind of neo-Moorean response to Scepticism and an associated conception of the architecture of basic perceptual warrant. Pryor runs the response only for (some kinds of) perceptual knowledge but here I will be concerned with its general structure and potential as a possible global anti-sceptical strategy. Something like it is arguably also present in recent writings of Burge 1 and Peacocke.2 If the global strategy could succeed, (...)
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  15. Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon.Crispin Wright - 1991 - Mind 100 (1):87-116.
  16. Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon.Crispin Wright - 1991 - Noûs 25 (2):205.
  17.  89
    On Being in a Quandary.Crispin Wright - 2001 - Mind 110 (1):45--98.
    This paper addresses three problems: the problem of formulating a coherent relativism, the Sorites paradox and a seldom noticed difficulty in the best intuitionistic case for the revision of classical logic. A response to the latter is proposed which, generalised, contributes towards the solution of the other two. The key to this response is a generalised conception of indeterminacy as a specific kind of intellectual bafflement-Quandary. Intuitionistic revisions of classical logic are merited wherever a subject matter is conceived both as (...)
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  18.  59
    Rails to Infinity.Crispin Wright (ed.) - 2001 - Harvard University Press.
    This volume, published on the fiftieth anniversary of Wittgenstein's death, brings together thirteen of Crispin Wright's most influential essays on Wittgenstein ...
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  19. Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy.Crispin Wright - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 101-122.
  20.  59
    Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
  21. Wittgensteinian Certainties.Crispin Wright - 2004 - In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge. pp. 22--55.
  22. Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb.Crispin Wright - 2006 - In Patrick Greenough & Michael Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Clarendon Press. pp. 38--60.
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  23. Further Reflections on the Sorites Paradox.Crispin Wright - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):227-290.
  24. A Plurality of Pluralisms.Crispin Wright - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 123.
  25. Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy, and Intention.Crispin Wright - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (11):622-634.
  26. Truth: A Traditional Debate Reviewed.Crispin Wright - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (sup1):31-74.
  27. Rule-Following and Meaning.Alexander Miller & Crispin Wright (eds.) - 2002 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    The rule-following debate, in its concern with the metaphysics and epistemology of linguistic meaning and mental content, goes to the heart of the most fundamental questions of contemporary philosophy of mind and language. This volume gathers together the most important contributions to the topic, including papers by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Graeme Forbes, Warren Goldfarb, Paul Horwich, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Ruth Millikan, Philip Pettit, George Wilson, and José Zalabardo. This debate has centred on Saul Kripke's reading of the rule-following (...)
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  28. Internal—External.Crispin Wright - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):501-517.
  29. On Quantifying Into Predicate Position: Steps Towards a New (Tralist) Perspective.Crispin Wright - 2007 - In Mary Leng, Alexander Paseau & Michael Potter (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 150--74.
  30. Rule-Following Without Reasons: Wittgenstein’s Quietism and the Constitutive Question.Crispin Wright - 2007 - Ratio 20 (4):481–502.
    This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct issues about (...)
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  31. On Putnam's Proof That We Are Not Brains in a Vat.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1):67-94.
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  32. Fear of Relativism? [REVIEW]Crispin Wright - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):379 - 390.
    §1 To many in or on the edges of the Academy, ”Relativism” is a word with overtones of sinister iconoclasm, representing a kind of intellectual and ethical free-for-all in which the traditional investigative virtues of clarity, rigour, objectivity, consistency and the unbiased pursuit of truth are dismissed as illusory and the great scientific constructions of the last two hundred years, together with our deepest moral convictions, rated merely as ‘our way of seeing’ the world, more elaborate and organised but otherwise (...)
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  33. Relativism About Truth Itself: Haphazard Thoughts About the Very Idea.Crispin Wright - 2008 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 157.
  34. Kripke's Account of the Argument Against Private Language.Crispin Wright - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (12):759-78.
  35. Truth in Ethics.Crispin Wright - 1995 - Ratio 8 (3):209-226.
  36. Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws.Crispin Wright - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):155–175.
    The essay addresses the well‐known idea that there has to be a place for intuition, thought of as a kind of non‐inferential rational insight, in the epistemology of basic logic if our knowledge of its principles is non‐empirical and is to allow of any finite, non‐circular reconstruction. It is argued that the error in this idea consists in its overlooking the possibility that there is, properly speaking, no knowledge of the validity of principles of basic logic. When certain important distinctions (...)
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  37. The Metaontology of Abstraction.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2009 - In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 178-212.
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    Implicit Definition and the a Priori.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2000 - In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press. pp. 286--319.
  39. On the Philosophical Significance of Frege's Theorem.Crispin Wright - 1997 - In Richard G. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. Oxford University Press. pp. 201--44.
     
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  40.  45
    Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
    The essays in this companion volume prefigure, elaborate, or defend the proposals put forward in that landmark work.
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  41. A Companion to the Philosophy of Language.Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.) - 1997 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  42. All Things Indefinitely Extensible.Stewart Shapiro & Crispin Wright - 2006 - In Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.), ¸ Iterayo&Uzquiano:Ag. Clarendon Press. pp. 255--304.
  43. New Age Relativism and Epistemic Possibility: The Question of Evidence.Crispin Wright - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):262--283.
    What I am calling New Age Relativism is usually proposed as a thesis about the truth-conditions of utterances, where an utterance is an actual historic voicing or inscription of a sentence of a certain type. Roughly, it is the view that, for certain discourses, whether an utterance is true depends not just on the context of its making—when, where, to whom, by whom, in what language, and so on—and the “circumstances of evaluation”—the state of the world in relevant respects—but also (...)
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  44. Contextualism and Scepticism: Even-Handedness, Factivity and Surreptitiously Raising Standards.Crispin Wright - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):236–262.
    The central contentions of this paper are two: first, that contextualism about knowledge cannot fulfil the eirenic promise which, for those who are drawn to it, constitutes, I believe, its main attraction; secondly, that the basic diagnosis of epistemological scepticism as somehow entrapping us, by diverting attention from a surreptitious shift to a special rarefied intellectual context, rests on inattention to the details of the principal sceptical paradoxes. These contentions are consistent with knowledge-contextualism, of some stripe or other, being true. (...)
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  45. Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi‐Realism. Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, Delivered in Oxford on June 2, 1987.Crispin Wright - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):25-49.
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  46. Talking with Vultures.Filippo Ferrari & Crispin Wright - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):911-936.
  47. Horse Sense.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):85-131.
  48. The Illusion of Higher-Order Vagueness.Crispin Wright - 2009 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
    It is common among philosophers who take an interest in the phenomenon of vagueness in natural language not merely to acknowledge higher-order vagueness but to take its existence as a basic datum— so that views that lack the resources to account for it, or that put obstacles in the way, are regarded as deficient just on that score. My main purpose in what follows is to loosen the hold of this deeply misconceived idea. Higher-order vagueness is no basic datum but (...)
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  49. Reality, Representation and Projection.John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.) - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
    This book is an important collection of new essays on various topics relating to realism and its rivals in metaphysics, logic, metaethics, and epistemology. The contributors include some of the leading authors in these fields and in several cases their essays constitute definitive statements of their views. In some cases authors write in response to the essays of other contributors, in other cases they proceed independently. Although not primarily historical this collection includes discussions of philosophers from the middle ages to (...)
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  50. Is Hume's Principle Analytic?Crispin Wright - 2001 - In Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 307-333.
    This paper is a reply to George Boolos's three papers (Boolos (1987a, 1987b, 1990a)) concerned with the status of Hume's Principle. Five independent worries of Boolos concerning the status of Hume's Principle as an analytic truth are identified and discussed. Firstly, the ontogical concern about the commitments of Hume's Principle. Secondly, whether Hume's Principle is in fact consistent and whether the commitment to the universal number by adopting Hume's Principle might be problematic. Also the so-called `surplus content' worry is discussed, (...)
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