AI-developers face a challenge when seeking to use models that aim to be culturally sensitive. While we agree that culture is an emergent reality, there is always the risk of creating algorithms that treat culture as objective to account for various facets of the social realm. As a result, culture becomes prepackaged and autonomous. Nonetheless, culture is not only emergent but dialogically and socially invented. In this article, the point is to advance the discussion about culture by addressing a crucial (...) philosophical issue and proposing some practical themes on how to avoid culturalism in AI development. (shrink)

In this paper I defend a ‘culturalist’ but nevertheless non-relativistic moral theory, taking Charles Taylor’s writings on this topic as my guide.1 Taylor is a realist concerning natural sciences, the ontology of persons and the ontology of goods (or meanings, significances or values). Yet, his realisms in these three areas differ significantly from one another, and therefore one has to be careful not to presuppose too rigid views of what realism must be like. Taylor’s moral realism can be called culturalist, (...) phenomenological, hermeneutical or even ‘expressivist’.2 According to culturalist moral realism, cognitivism is the correct view of our ordinary moral and evaluative reactions and responses to situations. In the realm of evaluative judgements, genuinely correct and incorrect (and better and worse) judgements are possible. These judgements can be implicit in our moral emotions and tacit agent’s knowledge, or more explicit in different articulations (section 1). What makes evaluative judgements correct are evaluative properties or ‘imports’ of the situation, and both the evaluative features of situations and our correct responses to them can be further understood in terms of a plurality of (conflicting and incommensurable) goods, ideals or values (section 2). The evaluative realm is not accessible from a disengaged perspective, but only from within an engaged, lifeworldly perspective. Evaluative properties are not merely a matter of subjective projection nor merely a matter of objective properties independent of valuers. Evaluative properties are relational, and neither the objective nor the subjective pole has priority (Section 3). The evaluative realm is in some sense dependent on social forms (concepts and practices), which are historically changing. Yet the validity of goods is (potentially) universal, goods that are valid in our culture would be valid in other cultures as well and vice versa. The correctness of evaluative judgements is not restricted by one’s own (or one’s culture’s) evaluations, framework or orientation (i.e.. (shrink)

Proceeding from the debate opened by Beck, Giddens and Lash’s Reflexive Modernization, this paper seeks to clear the way for a more consistent and coherent concept of reflexivity in relation to the cultural-symbolic foundations of society. Seeing that Lash in his contribution to the debate inadvertently raises a key problem, i.e., the broad cognitive problem, the paper develops a critique of his hermeneutic culturalism. It focuses on the disparity between the position explicitly put forward in the debate with Beck (...) and Giddens and the cognitive one which more or less implicitly comes into play throughout his relevant essays. The disparity shows up already in his treatment of the problem of mediation, but it comes graphically to a head in his appropriation of Bourdieu. To lend the analysis some profile and depth, the argument is supported by elements of a socio-cognitive theory which has been gaining visibility in both social theory and the philosophy of social science. While the paper is critical of Lash, its overall aim is to strengthen his contribution to the debate. (shrink)

Cultural accounts of scientific ideas and practices have increasingly come to be welcomed as a corrective to previous—and still widely held—theories of scientific knowledge and practices as universal. The editors caution, however, against the temptation to overgeneralize the work of culture, and to lapse into a kind of essentialism that flattens the range and variety of scientific work. The book refers to this tendency as culturalism. The contributors to the volume model a new path where historicized and cultural accounts (...) of scientific practice retain their specificity and complexity without falling into the traps of culturalism. They examine, among other issues, the potential of using notions of culture to study behavior in financial markets; the ideology, organization, and practice of earthquake monitoring and prediction during China's Cultural Revolution; the history of quadratic equations in China; and how studying the "glass ceiling" and employment discrimination became accepted in the social sciences. Demonstrating the need to understand the work of culture as a fluid and dynamic process that directly both shapes and is shaped by scientific practice, Cultures without Culturalism makes an important intervention in science studies. Contributors. Bruno Belhoste, Karine Chemla, Caroline Ehrhardt, Fa-ti Fan,Kenji Ito, Evelyn Fox Keller, Guillaume Lachenal, Donald MacKenzie, Mary S. Morgan, Nancy J. Nersessian, David Rabouin, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Claude Rosental, Koen Vermeir. (shrink)

It is tempting to think of liberal democracy in terms of immortality. Democracies have survived wars and depressions, Nazis and communists – so much so that at the end of the Cold War Francis Fukuyama famously declared the “end of history.” In The Culturalist Challenge to Liberal Republicanism, Michael Lusztig assesses the risks that multiculturalism and other forms of culturalism pose to liberal democracy. Establishing the nature of the current regime and exploring the emergence of a cogent theory of (...) justice grounded in both liberal and republican theory, Lusztig demonstrates the inconsistencies between liberal republicanism and culturalist theories of justice. Exploring both the institutional and cultural effects of the tension between culturalism and liberal republicanism, he seeks a balanced view that falls somewhere between Fukuyama’s optimism for regime mortality and the pessimism inherent in the work of more conservative theorists like Samuel Huntington. Lusztig concludes that the narrowness of liberal republican justice is ameliorated by multiculturalism, but the hidden danger is that multiculturalism can serve as a stalking horse for more pernicious agendas. Given the increasing cultural diversity faced by North American and European nations, The Culturalist Challenge to Liberal Republicanism has important implications for political stability in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

E. Machery, R. Mallon, S. Nichols and S. Stich, have argued that there is empirical evidence against Kripke’s claim that names are not descriptive. Their argument is based on an experiment that compares the intuitions about proper name use of a group of English speakers in Hong Kong with those of a group of non-Chinese American students. The results of the experiment suggest that in some cultures speakers use names descriptively. I argue that such a conclusion is incorrect, for the (...) experiment does not prove what it is purported to prove. (shrink)

ExcerptTrends in the Political Critique of Modernity The political critique of modernity appears to have gained momentum in Europe in recent years. However, as with so many trends, it is a rather diverse movement, encompassing populist nationalist and national-conservative parties in Western Europe (including the Danish People's Party), a fascistoid Christian-nationalist revival (as seen in Serbia), and a number of trends that are directly incompatible with liberal democracy. A sinister connection between the cultural Right and centers of religious power may (...) not exist in Western Europe the way it does in Serbia, but a variation of the…. (shrink)

Catherine Lu | : Is the discrepancy between the cultural and linguistic rights of immigrants on the one hand and national groups on the other justified, with the latter group typically enjoying a fuller set of such rights than the former category? Patten presents a case for accepting some modest departures from neutrality in the treatment of immigrants’ cultural rights and that of majority and minority national groups. I challenge his thesis by asking whether such departures are justified with respect (...) to already settled immigrants; whether the situational argument for unequal treatment is inconsistent with the theory of culture offered earlier in the book; and whether contexts of historical injustice against immigrant groups might complicate judgements about the national minority/immigrant dichotomy with respect to minority cultural rights. | : L’opposition entre les droits culturels et linguistiques des immigrants, d’une part, et ceux des groupes nationaux, d’autre part, est-elle justifiée, considérant que ces derniers apprécient un ensemble plus complet de tels droits que ne le font les immigrants? Patten pose que de modestes écarts de neutralité seraient acceptables dans le traitement des droits culturels des immigrants et ceux de la majorité ainsi que ceux de groupes nationaux minoritaires. Je critique sa thèse en demandant si de tels écarts sont justifiés eu égard aux immigrants déjà installés ; si l’argument pour les traitements inégaux n’est pas incompatible avec la théorie de la culture offerte auparavant dans le livre; enfin si les contextes d’injustice historique contre les groupes d’immigrants ne compliquent pas les jugements sur la dichotomie entre minorité nationale et immigrants lorsqu’il s’agit des droits des minorités culturelles. (shrink)

Investigating the neo-Kantian origins of structuralism and culturalism, this article analyses the development of Cassirer's thought by following his intellectual progression from knowledge to culture, and from culture to praxis. The article is in two parts. In the first part, the author presents an analysis of Cassirer's relational conception of knowledge. In the second part, the critique of knowledge is superseded by a critique of culture. The author analyses Cassirer's anthropological philosophy of symbolic forms and critically compares it to (...) Simmel's vitalist theory of culture. The article ends with a plea for a practical sociology inspired by Cassirer's return to Kant's practical philosophy. (shrink)

Extrapolation of Steels & Belpaeme's (S&B) results show that colour is a culturalist category. Populations will only share the category of colour if it is built into the system. If “left to themselves” different populations may or may not stumble on the colour category. Populations that do not share a colour category may still be able to communicate in a wide variety of environments.

A commentary on Whitney Davis's essay 'Visuality and Vision: Questions for a Post-culturalist Art History' published in the same issue of Estetika.

In order to protect the indigenous population of the Americas from slavery and war, Bartolomé de Las Casas carries out a cultural turn in the understanding of what is considered “natural”. The idea that there are slaves by nature was explained in the colonial period by recourse to Aristotle and in view of the inhabitants of the West Indies. A warlike subjugation of disobedient and rebellious slaves was therefore a “natural” affair - like the entire European expansion. Drawing on Aristotle’s (...) understanding of ethos and Aquinas’ considerations of human beings’ natural knowledge of God, Las Casas initiates a culturalist interpretation of human nature. In this way, the indicators that are supposed to qualify the Indians as homunculi and slaves by nature are re-qualified as indicators of authentic humanity. The article reconstructs Las Casas’ innovative cultural argumentation. (shrink)

This article works out the main characteristics of `practice theory', a type of social theory which has been sketched by such authors as Bourdieu, Giddens, Taylor, late Foucault and others. Practice theory is presented as a conceptual alternative to other forms of social and cultural theory, above all to culturalist mentalism, textualism and intersubjectivism. The article shows how practice theory and the three other cultural-theoretical vocabularies differ in their localization of the social and in their conceptualization of the body, mind, (...) things, knowledge, discourse, structure/process and the agent. (shrink)

The successive announcements concerning the “end” of ideology or its “return” fail to register the major shift in its use as a concept in social theory: its redefinition in a culturalist perspective. The article begins by recalling the Marxist definition of the concept, comprising three ideas: the distortion of reality, the legitimation of domination, and the loosening of ideological “hold” through its critique. The article then notes the gradual abandoning of the term, before looking at the terms which presided over (...) its culturalist redefinition. The article then examines the contours of a possible renewal of the critical concept paving the way for a renewed critique of ideology. Such a reconstruction is notably based on the theory of recognition. It locates in the idea of the loosening or undoing of ideological hold the thrust of an internal critique. (shrink)

In this article, the Zerubavelian culturalist cognitive paradigm which comprises an emerging Rutgers School of Sociology is presented. This perspective employs a comparative cognitive pluralist approach to the study of cognition and takes as its central premise that the mind is social. The key roots of the perspective in Simmelian classical sociology and in the twentieth-century sociology of knowledge approaches of Fleck, Mannheim, Berger and Luckmann and others are outlined. The key concepts and parameters of the field and its concern (...) with perception, attention, classification, meaning-making, memory, time and identity are discussed. Finally, its methodological approach is outlined and it is suggested that the Zerubavelian perspective provides a unique analytic literacy that cuts across the various subfields of contemporary sociology. (shrink)

The topicality of Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought is reflected in his critique of mass culture, society and the state, and scientific methods, which later had a significant impact on modern discourse. Mass culture is the foundation of modern social reality as a force of decadence and nihilism that degrades the authentic and creates a mediocre culture. Nietzsche opposed a “culture” that implies a transcendence and sublimation of “nature” into the forms of “moral” ideals, and he called for a natural life without (...) harmful cultural influences that are an obstacle to a healthy human life. The idea of nihilism present in culture is relevant to our time because it manifests as a loss of depth or meaning in life itself, which, like nature, is chaos, without structure or empirical evidence. To understand the scientific revolution and its impressively devastating pace in the high-tech laboratories of our global research ecosystem, relevant is Nietzsche’s perspective aimed at demystifying science, especially positivism and naturalism, which seek to impose truth based on scientifically verified knowledge. Scientific interpretations and constructions are efforts to control and “humanise” nature by adapting chaos to our anthropomorphic expectations, needs, and concerns and making chaotic nature predictable. The paper shows that Nietzsche’s critique of culturalism and naturalism is based on the vision of the life of the “last man human” who rejects the culture of self-overcoming and dismantles reduces the fear of the uncertain and sudden and lives enframed in reality as presented by the scientific community. In the life of the contemporary human being, the will to live is merely maintained because he lacks the will to power. (shrink)

The article that discusses the issue of culturalism as an element of the idea of representation tries to examine a concept, which claims to represent reality through conceptualization, from scratch, or by going to the bottom in a manner of excavation. Foucault's archaeology was chosen as the most suitable method for this excavation activity. Because the archaeological method does not make a historical or meta-historical claim beyond the truth; it does not impose the necessary violence of the method on (...) its object. It grasps its object in its singularity, and most importantly, it thinks and suggests that the truth is no more than an invention. This archaeological study on the concept of culture tries to reveal the difference between the current meaning of the concept and its etymological origin and to grasp it in its singularity. In this way, the problematic relationship between the concepts that man invented and applied while engaging in understanding things that are happening around him will be revealed. Conceptualization is inherent in the idea of truth, which is based on absolutism and is no more than an invention, while ultimately subordinating the particular to the universal. While the article reveals the intolerance of the act of dichotomous thinking, which operates as a product of the effort to represent the truth, as in the nature-culture distinction, it acts according to the approach known as deconstruction in social sciences. In a representative thought, truth is what can actually be represented, presenting itself to the observer as an object of display. The fact that the understanding of truth is based on essentialist principles such as absolute, unchangeable, fixed, universal thanks to Plato makes an idealized representation inevitable. In fact, intellectual endeavors such as conceptualization, abstraction, and generalization mean the idealization of the concrete, singular, and unique by detaching it from its context. It can be said that underlying the idea of representation is the belief that the human mind can grasp the essence of things and therefore can represent them in thought, depending on the idea that truth is rational. As is, it is a thought that tries to keep realism in its hands, blesses it, and strives with all its might to declare its divine absolutism. Ultimately, while the mechanism of representation operates for the stable, it acts with the aim of establishing dominance. The distinction between the representative and the represented is ultimately the product of an anthropocentric perspective. Thanks to this distinction, it is inevitable that everything except the observer subject becomes the object of study. This point of view, believed to be one and universal, requires the fixation of the object of study. It can be said that the idea of representation, which signifies the ideal of absolute truth, underlies today's issues that are based on differences, such as language, religion, race, and gender, that have always been on the world agenda. As the products of representative thought, both binary categorization based on distinction such as nature and culture, and the concept that implies a direct relationship between thought and the outside world, realism is a state of alienation in which whatever is related to the human being ceases to belong to it and is used against it. The reification made possible by the distinction between the representative and the represented is actually nothing but alienation. It can be said that the rooted problem of the world of thought and the peoples of the world since Platonism is that reification and commodification have become so universal that they seem almost like natural, organic entities, and forms. The attempt of representative thought, which confines external reality to the conceptual world, to impose a framework on reality, breaks the connection with reality, and moreover, by being guided by concepts and abstractions, it builds iron cages around the human being. The insistence of Western thought on representation, no matter if it is true or false, no matter it is accepted or not, has led to the radical consequence of the abolition of certainty over reality. Today, the world of thought has evolved from the representation of the truth, which implies the idea that there is a necessary connection between the order of things and the order of words, to the reality of representation, where the boundary between reality and image is abolished, the reality is aestheticized and transformed into images, and society ultimately becomes cultural. With an entry into the cultural turn, everything has become cultural and conventional in the postmodern period. (shrink)

Abstract Nancy Fraser raises serious doubts about the critical potential of identity theories of recognition on the ground that they encourage the reduction of personal identity to cultural identity. Based on a comparative analysis of Charles Taylor's and Axel Honneth's theories of recognition, this paper argues that Fraser's critique is justified with respect to some aspects of Taylor's theory of identity, but not with respect to his conception of recognition, or to Honneth's conception of both identity and recognition. Taylor's theory (...) of identity recognition is vulnerable to Fraser's critique because under certain conditions of pathological socialization it cannot prevent the normative subordination of strong evaluation to whatever dominant goods are acquired through acculturation. Honneth's theory of identity recognition overcomes this normative weakness in three ways. First, Honneth differentiates between three types of self-relation that cannot be reduced to cultural identity. Second, he operates with a mixed, attributive?responsive model of recognition that normatively underwrites all these types of self-relation. Third, he makes the condition of reciprocity in recognition the criterion for successful self-realization that enables one to distinguish between misrecognition and non-normative experiences of human suffering. (shrink)

Breaking with discriminatory views and segregated education for children with disabilities, regions often referred to as Confucian Heritage Regions (CHRs) have been moving towards inclusive education. Although some of these regions have been at the centre of attention in global education recently, there is a lack of research and information about how they ‘do’ inclusive education. Considering that reinforcing legislative foundations is of foremost importance for its fulfillment, this study examines legislation on the education of children with disabilities in four (...) neighbouring CHRs: the Chinese Mainland, Japan, South Korea and China's Taiwan. The core principles that frame such legislation were analyzed and cross-compared. The findings show that despite the common Confucian heritage that is attributed to them systematically in studies of inclusive education – which is often said to influence the way disability is perceived and dealt with – the four Regions treat inclusion differently in terms of legislation. While some CHRs are clearly influenced by e.g. the USA, others are trying to design a specific perspective on inclusive education. The authors argue that the complex example of these CHRs can serve as an important template for studies on both inclusive and comparative education. The article also calls for the careful treatment of inclusive education beyond an essentialist and somewhat simplistic perspective that could reduce certain regions to a monolith. (shrink)

J Harvey; Stereotypes and Group-claims: epistemological and moral issues, and their implications for multi-culturalism in education, Journal of Philosophy of Ed.

J Harvey; Stereotypes and Group-claims: epistemological and moral issues, and their implications for multi-culturalism in education, Journal of Philosophy of Ed.

Plessner’s philosophical anthropology is presented as a non-naturalistic philosophy of nature. Such a position is attractive and indispensable, for instance, to all debates concerning personhood and human dignity. Plessner’s work rests on a conception of philosophy that distinguishes without exception the contents of possible experiences from their conditions of possibility. Thus, Plessner’s anthropology is a theory of categorial contents, but not in the aprioric sense according to which they would be assumed to be prior to all experience. Plessner avoids such (...) a misconception by structuring his philosophy in a reflexive way. Therefore his basic philosophical category or idea—eccentric positionality—doesn’t mean a property of human or any natural beings, but the categorial frame called personhood which is in use when we identify empirical properties of humans. The challenge in understanding personhood as conceptually independent of empirical properties consists in distinguishing between the contingency of personhood and arbitrariness. (shrink)

In applied health care research, an essentialised notion of culture is often used when studying ethnic disparities in health and health care access between the majority populations of Western countries and migrants, with ethnic backgrounds that differ from majority population. This notion of culture, however, is considered highly problematic in anthropology and ethnic studies. Therefore, in our research on Dutch illness certification practices, we employed a dynamic conceptualisation of culture. Our research shows that, in practice, when clients fail to meet (...) the implicit norms of this practice, doctors ascribe this nonconformity differently when the client is a migrant than when he or she is a Dutch client. More specifically, when migrants fail to meet the norms, doctors are inclined to automatically ascribe this nonconformity to the assumed cultural background of the client. Consequently, these doctors feel less able to use the tools they normally use to coach their clients. This, in turn, results in more problematic and longer reintegration trajectories for migrants in comparison to Dutch clients in similar circumstances. In other words, framing the problems of migrants in terms of culture results in greater sick leave rates for migrants than for Dutch people. Clearly, culturalistic perspectives on ethnic differences have negative consequences. We therefore implore the application of a dynamic notion of culture in applied research. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical commentary on the essentialist concept of ethnicity, which, it is argued, underpins the discourse of transcultural health‐care. Following a consideration of the difficulties that ensue from the way in which ethnicity has been theorised within transcultural nursing in particular, the paper turns to a consideration of alternative ways of thinking about ethnicity, which have emerged from more recent social anthropology and postmodernism. It addresses the question of how to therorise ethnicity in a way that does (...) not entail its reification as a set of fixed cultural properties, and makes some tentative suggestions for the possibility of a critical culturalist approach to difference and healthcare practice, which must include a consideration of racisms. (shrink)