Gilbert and colleagues point out the discrepancy between the limited empirical data illustrating changes in personality following implantation of deep brain stimulating electrodes and the vast number of conceptual neuroethics papers implying that these changes are widespread, deleterious, and clinically significant. Their findings are reminiscent of C. P. Snow’s essay on the divide between the two cultures of the humanities and the sciences. This division in the literature raises significant ethical concerns surrounding unjustified fear of personality changes in the context (...) of DBS and negative perceptions of clinician-scientists engaged in DBS. These concerns have real world implications for funding future innovative, DBS trials aimed to reduce suffering as well as hampering true interdisciplinary scholarship. We argue that the philosophical tradition of pragmatism and the value it places on empirical inquiry, experiential knowledge, and inter-disciplinary scholarship – reflecting diverse ways of knowing – provides a framework to start to address the important questions Gilbert and colleagues raise. In particular, we highlight the importance of expert clinician knowledge in contributing to the neuroethical questions raised by Gilbert and colleagues. Finally, we provide illustrative examples of some of our interdisciplinary empirical research that demonstrate the iterative cycle of inquiry characteristic of pragmatism in which conceptual neuroethics questions have led to empirical studies whose results then raise additional conceptual questions that give rise to new empirical studies in a way that highlights the contributions of the humanities and the sciences. (shrink)
Gilbert and colleagues point out the discrepancy between the limited empirical data illustrating changes in personality following implantation of deep brain stimulating electrodes and the vast number of conceptual neuroethics papers implying that these changes are widespread, deleterious, and clinically significant. Their findings are reminiscent of C. P. Snow’s essay on the divide between the two cultures of the humanities and the sciences. This division in the literature raises significant ethical concerns surrounding unjustified fear of personality changes in the context (...) of DBS and negative perceptions of clinician-scientists engaged in DBS. These concerns have real world implications for funding future innovative, DBS trials aimed to reduce suffering as well as hampering true interdisciplinary scholarship. We argue that the philosophical tradition of pragmatism and the value it places on empirical inquiry, experiential knowledge, and inter-disciplinary scholarship – reflecting diverse ways of knowing – provides a framework to start to address the important questions Gilbert and colleagues raise. In particular, we highlight the importance of expert clinician knowledge in contributing to the neuroethical questions raised by Gilbert and colleagues. Finally, we provide illustrative examples of some of our interdisciplinary empirical research that demonstrate the iterative cycle of inquiry characteristic of pragmatism in which conceptual neuroethics questions have led to empirical studies whose results then raise additional conceptual questions that give rise to new empirical studies in a way that highlights the contributions of the humanities and the sciences. (shrink)
Gilbert and colleagues point out the discrepancy between the limited empirical data illustrating changes in personality following implantation of deep brain stimulating electrodes and the vast number of conceptual neuroethics papers implying that these changes are widespread, deleterious, and clinically significant. Their findings are reminiscent of C. P. Snow’s essay on the divide between the two cultures of the humanities and the sciences. This division in the literature raises significant ethical concerns surrounding unjustified fear of personality changes in the context (...) of DBS and negative perceptions of clinician-scientists engaged in DBS. These concerns have real world implications for funding future innovative, DBS trials aimed to reduce suffering as well as hampering true interdisciplinary scholarship. We argue that the philosophical tradition of pragmatism and the value it places on empirical inquiry, experiential knowledge, and inter-disciplinary scholarship – reflecting diverse ways of knowing – provides a framework to start to address the important questions Gilbert and colleagues raise. In particular, we highlight the importance of expert clinician knowledge in contributing to the neuroethical questions raised by Gilbert and colleagues. Finally, we provide illustrative examples of some of our interdisciplinary empirical research that demonstrate the iterative cycle of inquiry characteristic of pragmatism in which conceptual neuroethics questions have led to empirical studies whose results then raise additional conceptual questions that give rise to new empirical studies in a way that highlights the contributions of the humanities and the sciences. (shrink)
Once a neural implant has shown some efficacy during initial research trials, it begins to enter the world of clinical application. This culminates when the implant becomes approved for a particular indication. However, the ethical challenges continue as the technology is adopted as a standard of practice. Patient eligibility criteria, as documented by inclusion and exclusion criteria with any new treatment, are not always clearly quantified and defined. These vagaries can result in considerable debate regarding who should or should not (...) proceed with surgery. There is often considerable room for clinical judgment that can result in extension of the treatment to a wider range of patients. The ethical questions that arise in clinical decisionmaking differ significantly from those inherent in engineering design and research development. (shrink)
Objective: To examine changes in patients’ desired control of the deep brain stimulator and perception of global life control throughout DBS.Methods: A consecutive cohort of 52 patients with Parkinson’s disease was recruited to participate in a prospective longitudinal study over three assessment points. Semi-structured interviews assessing participants’ desire for stimulation control and perception of global control were conducted at all three points. Qualitative data were coded using content analysis. Visual analog scales were embedded in the interviews to quantify participants’ perceptions (...) of control over time.Results: Participants reported significant increases in their perception of global control over time and significant declines in their desired control of the stimulation. These changes were unrelated to improvements in motor symptoms. Improvements in global control were negatively correlated with a decline in desired stimulation control. Qualitative data indicate that participants have changed, nuanced levels of desired control over their stimulators. Increased global life control following DBS may be attributed to increased control over PD symptoms, increased ability to engage in valued activities, and increased overall self-regulation, while other domains related to global control remained unaffected by DBS.Conclusions: There are few empirical data documenting patients’ desire for stimulation control throughout neuromodulation and how stimulation control is related to other aspects of control despite the growing application of neuromodulation devices to treat a variety of disorders. Our data highlight distinctions in different types of control and have implications for the development of patient-controlled neurostimulation devices. (shrink)