The question of how to distinguish between science and non-science, the so-called ' demarcation problem', is one of the most high-profile, perennial, and intractable issues in the philosophy of science. It is not merely a philosophical issue, however, since it has a significant bearing on practical policy questions and practical decisions. This essay develops a pragmatic approach to the demarcation problem: it argues that while there are some core principles that we can use in distinguishing between science and non-science, particular (...) judgments and decisions about something's scientific status depend, in part, on practical goals and concerns. (shrink)

The precautionary principle holds that we should not allow scientific uncertainty to prevent us from taking precautionary measures in response to potential threats that are irreversible and potentially disastrous. Critics of the principle claim that it deters progress and development, is excessively risk-aversive and is unscientific. This paper argues that the principle can be scientific provided that (1) the threats addressed by the principle are plausible threats, and (2) the precautionary measures adopted are reasonable. The paper also argues that one (...) may use epistemic criteria, such as consistency, coherence and explanatory power, to determine whether a threat is plausible, and that one may use practical considerations, such as effectiveness, proportionality, cost-effectiveness, realism and consistency, to determine whether a response to a threat is reasonable. (shrink)

Contrary to the English title's suggestion, Pieper does not distinguish belief from faith, but rather develops the interpersonal character of an assent to what another says. Philosophically and sensitively, Pieper delineates the facets of an act certain yet never secure, leaping beyond knowledge yet actively presupposing it. The act is completely free because directed more to the person than to what he says, and hence perfectly warranted only if God himself has spoken.--D. B. B.

Civilization and Progress presents an analysis of the development of the idea of progress and continues the tradition with a further development of the idea. The first part of the book is historical; its purpose is to trace the doctrine of progress from its roots to its contemporary expositions. The second part is philosophically creative; its goal is to re-formulate the progressive interpretation of history in a way which takes account of the fact that "the confident reliance that spreading enlightenment (...) alone could achieve social progress has been unsettled in our age by two world wars and the brutal destruction of millions by civilized powers". By accepting traditional interpretations of the doctrine of progress, which hold that the idea emerged in the Renaissance, Tsanoff neglects a thorough analysis of the Greek and Biblical contributions to the idea. For example, he fails to investigate the essential relationship between the Biblical idea of history as the time of the perfectibility of man, and the Renaissance interpretation of history as advancing toward the "perfectibility of men and societies". (shrink)

Part of a series designed to present theology to college students in a relevant and incisive fashion, this particular monograph fails to come to grips with the crucial issues of soteriology raised by a philosophic study of man, and contents itself with a rehearsal of scriptural and doctrinal data. When theological reasoning occurs--as in the final chapter--it is seriously marred by its failure to deal with counterpositions.--D. B. B.

A set of essays in which reason, moral fanaticism, conscience, duty, free responsibility and silent virtue are all shown to be insufficient to counteract the spiritual collapse of modern Europe. Only a concrete ethics based on and in the Christ will succeed where abstract principles or emancipated reason have failed. Some confusion arises concerning the notions of a "real" man, and of "nature" or "natural rights," but matters of definition or "analysis" are perhaps rightly subordinated to the "living truth" with (...) which this work is concerned.--D. B. (shrink)

An examination of the contemporary Italian movement associated with M. P. Sciacca, and the serious application of dialectical and phenomenological methods to unveil the structure of "intentionality" or "spirit." An appraisal of Sciacca together with a sample critique of Dante follows a competent summary of the prevailing positions.--D. B. B.

Intended as a college text, this presentation of Aquinas' teaching on God achieves an admirable clarity of exposition although it dismisses initial epistemological misgivings and contents itself with a systematic gloss of the questions Aquinas asked in the order he raised them. Documentation is ample and a bibliography of Thomistic works on God is appended. --D. B. B.

A brief history of philosophy in western civilization, written primarily for the undergraduate. Not as systematic or as well-documented as Windelband's history, nor as polemic as Russell's, this work is explicitly designed to make philosophical ideas and traditions come alive for the student. Short and somewhat facile chapters on positivism and existentialism bring the volume up to date, but its chief merit lies in its easy digestibility.--D. B.

The author examines literary sources, takes poets as subjects, and allows their philosophical implications to emerge. Man is thought, but thought is figuring. Hence man is the figure who figures. And good figuring works. Sewell selects six modern figures for man: temple, labyrinth, gambler, laboratory, language, machine, showing the partiality of each, only to lead into a detailed examination of the cosmic figures: the universe itself, as pole of the I; suffering and effort, as capabilities of the I; love and (...) death, as man's absolute reach. Though the book as a whole may not work, its somewhat ragged character may well display the true state of our philosophical methods for coming to grips with man.—D. B. B. (shrink)

As a survey of positions on theological language, notably those of Aquinas, Barth and Tillich, this monograph is weighted toward Aquinas, but is generally adequate and up-to-date. Comparative it is: Aquinas wins-"the distinction between modus significandi and res significata is more satisfactory than Barth's... between form and content or Tillich's between literal and symbolic meaning". But critical it is not. The author does not question the modus/res distinction, though Aquinas himself did. Epistemological questions are blanketed by "vague intuition"; semantic and (...) logical issues are avoided.—D. B. B. (shrink)

This study provides a formal framework for considering the so-called "Universalizability Principle" in morality and its relation to such metaphysical theses as "Leibnizianism". That these claims are thought to be ethical and metaphysical in import provides the point of the subtitle. In spite of this, however, Rabinowicz's study is less an examination of the arguments which may be given for or against these claims or the uses which may be made of them in morals or metaphysics, than an attempt on (...) a possible worlds model to frame them clearly and to explore their logical mesh. In the introductory chapter Rabinowicz is concerned first to make clear to us what principle it is which he wishes to designate as the Universalizability Principle and to distinguish it from certain others, e.g., the Golden Rule, Kant's Categorical Imperative, Singer's Generalization Principle, Hare's "thesis of universalizability," and principles of impartiality and fairness, with which it may be confused. Specifically, UP represents a claim that the moral properties of things are essentially independent of what might be called their "individual aspects." In terms of his framework, where w, v, u, and z are possible worlds, E represents an equivalence relation of some unspecified manner of sufficient similarity in non-individual aspects, and D is read as "is a deontic alternative to," UP has the following form: if wEv and wDu, then there is a z such that vDz and uEz. On this formulation we are enabled to see where the main problem with UP lies: E must be specified in such a way as to provide significance for UP, i.e., so as to provide us with a clear, non-trivial, non-vacuous formulation of UP which yet conforms to the intuitions of those ethicists who are "universalists." It is this problem and its proposed solution which constitutes the real theme of this book. For suppose that E is specified in terms of either of the two most intuitively obvious and appealing candidates, namely, "exact similarity" and "morally relevant similarity." Then, on Leibnizianism, the exact-similarity variant becomes trivial, whereas the relevant-similarity variant is, by virtue of the systematic unclarity of the notion of "relevance," confusing and useless. Because he accepts the possibility that Leibnizianism may be true, Rabinowicz conceives of his task as one of inquiring whether some third variant of UP can be framed which slips between the horns of this dilemma. (shrink)