110 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Darrel E. Christensen [56]David Christensen [41]Dr Wayne Christensen [5]Dan Ch Christensen [3]
D. Christensen [2]Duane Christensen [1]Dirk Lund Christensen [1]De Christensen [1]

Not all matches are shown. Search with initial or firstname to single out others.

See also
David Christensen
Brown University
  1. Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
  2. Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
    Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   131 citations  
  3. Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief.David Christensen - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon.
  4. Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism.David Christensen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.
    Responding rationally to the information that others disagree with one’s beliefs requires assessing the epistemic credentials of the opposing beliefs. Conciliatory accounts of disagreement flow in part from holding that these assessments must be independent from one’s own initial reasoning on the disputed matter. I argue that this claim, properly understood, does not have the untoward consequences some have worried about. Moreover, some of the difficulties it does engender must be faced by many less conciliatory accounts of disagreement.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   101 citations  
  5. Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.
    How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps 'epistemic peers' who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   117 citations  
  6.  22
    Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.
    How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps ‘epistemic peers’ who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   98 citations  
  7. Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.
    Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermines rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of total evidence. The two views are often thought to be tightly connected. This paper distinguishes two ways of motivating conciliationism, and two ways that conciliationism may be undermined by permissive accounts of rationality. It shows how conciliationism can flourish under certain strongly permissive accounts of rationality. This (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  8. Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 77.
    It has often been noticed that conciliatory views of disagreement are "self-undermining" in a certain way: advocates of such views cannot consistently maintain them when other philosophers disagree. This leads to apparent problems of instability and even inconsistency. Does self-undermining, then, show conciliationism untenable? If so, the untenablity would extend not only to almost all views of disagreement, but to a wide range of other views supporting what one might call epistemic modesty: roughly, the idea that getting evidence that one (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  9. Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.
  10. Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology.David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.
    Formally-inclined epistemologists often theorize about ideally rational agents--agents who exemplify rational ideals, such as probabilistic coherence, that human beings could never fully realize. This approach can be defended against the well-know worry that abstracting from human cognitive imperfections deprives the approach of interest. But a different worry arises when we ask what an ideal agent should believe about her own cognitive perfection (even an agent who is in fact cognitively perfect might, it would seem, be uncertain of this fact). Consideration (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  11. Disagreement, Drugs, Etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia.David Christensen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):397-422.
    We often get evidence concerning the reliability of our own thinking about some particular matter. This “higher-order evidence” can come from the disagreement of others, or from information about our being subject to the effects of drugs, fatigue, emotional ties, implicit biases, etc. This paper examines some pros and cons of two fairly general models for accommodating higher-order evidence. The one that currently seems most promising also turns out to have the consequence that epistemic akrasia should occur more frequently than (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  12. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays.David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a collective study of the epistemic significance of disagreement: twelve contributors explore rival responses to the problems that it raises for philosophy. They develop our understanding of epistemic phenomena that are central to any thoughtful engagement with others' beliefs.
  13. Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.
  14. Measuring Confirmation.David Christensen - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437-461.
  15.  11
    Measuring Confirmation.David Christensen - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437.
  16. Disagreement and Public Controversy.David Christensen - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    One of Mill’s main arguments for free speech springs from taking disagreement as an epistemically valuable resource for fallible thinkers. Contemporary conciliationist treatments of disagreement spring from the same motivation, but end up seeing the epistemic implications of disagreement quite differently. Conciliationism also encounters complexities when transposed from the 2-person toy examples featured in the literature to the public disagreements among groups that give the issue much of its urgency. Group disagreements turn out to be in some ways more powerful (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  17.  13
    The Rationality of Science.David Christensen & W. H. Newton-Smith - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):471.
  18. Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers.David Christensen - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):450-479.
    The most immediately appealing model for formal constraints on degrees of belief is provided by probability theory, which tells us, for instance, that the probability of P can never be greater than that of (P v Q). But while this model has much intuitive appeal, many have been concerned to provide arguments showing that ideally rational degrees of belief would conform to the calculus of probabilities. The arguments most frequently used to make this claim plausible are the so-called "Dutch Book" (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  19.  8
    Putting Logic in Its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief.David Christensen - 2005 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):534-535.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  20. Epistemic Self-Respect.David Christensen - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):319-337.
  21. Conservatism in Epistemology.David Christensen - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):69-89.
  22. Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the a Priori.David Christensen & Hilary Kornblith - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (1):1-20.
    A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  23. Putting Logic in Its Place. Formal Constraints on Rational Belief.David Christensen - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):143-146.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  24. Diachronic Coherence Versus Epistemic Impartiality.David Christensen - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):349-371.
    It is obvious that we would not want to demand that an agent' s beliefs at different times exhibit the same sort of consistency that we demand from an agent' s simultaneous beliefs; there' s nothing irrational about believing P at one time and not-P at another. Nevertheless, many have thought that some sort of coherence or stability of beliefs over time is an important component of epistemic rationality.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  25.  96
    Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism.David Christensen - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.
    Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representation Theorem arguments which avoids the untenable premises. It then develops a parallel approach to Dutch Book Arguments, and compares the results. In each case (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  26.  26
    John Earman's 'Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory' (Book Review). [REVIEW]David Christensen - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (2):345-347.
  27. Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology.David Christensen - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (4):540-557.
    Much contemporary epistemology is informed by a kind of confirmational holism, and a consequent rejection of the assumption that all confirmation rests on experiential certainties. Another prominent theme is that belief comes in degrees, and that rationality requires apportioning one's degrees of belief reasonably. Bayesian confirmation models based on Jeffrey Conditionalization attempt to bring together these two appealing strands. I argue, however, that these models cannot account for a certain aspect of confirmation that would be accounted for in any adequate (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  28. Putting Logic in Its Place. Formal Constraints on Rational Belief.David Christensen - 2008 - Critica 40 (120):141-148.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  29.  89
    What is Relative Confirmation?David Christensen - 1997 - Noûs 31 (3):370-384.
    It is commonly acknowledged that, in order to test a theoretical hypothesis, one must, in Duhem' s phrase, rely on a "theoretical scaffolding" to connect the hypothesis with something measurable. Hypothesis-confirmation, on this view, becomes a three-place relation: evidence E will confirm hypothesis H only relative to some such scaffolding B. Thus the two leading logical approaches to qualitative confirmation--the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) account and Clark Glymour' s bootstrap account--analyze confirmation in relative terms. But this raises questions about the philosophical interpretation (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  30.  73
    Three Questions About Leplin’s Reliabilism.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):43-50.
    This paper raises three critical questions about Jarrett Leplin's version of reliabilism.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31. Introduction: The Epistemology of Disagreement.David Christensen - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):231-232.
    One of the most salient features of forming beliefs in a social context is that people end up disagreeing with one another. This is not just an obvious fact about belief-formation; it raises interesting normative questions, especially when people become aware of the opinions of others. How should my beliefs be affected by the knowledge that others hold contrary beliefs? In some cases, the answer seems easy. If I have reason to think that my friend is much better informed than (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. The Decoupled Representation Theory of the Evolution of Cognition--A Critical Assessment.Dr Wayne Christensen - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):361-405.
    Sterelny’s Thought in a Hostile World ([ 2003 ]) presents a complex, systematically structured theory of the evolution of cognition centered on a concept of decoupled representation. Taking Godfrey-Smith’s ([ 1996 ]) analysis of the evolution of behavioral flexibility as a framework, the theory describes increasingly complex grades of representation beginning with simple detection and culminating with decoupled representation, said to be belief-like, and it characterizes selection forces that drive evolutionary transformations in these forms of representation. Sterelny’s ultimate explanatory target (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33.  78
    The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping.David Christensen - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.
    The main appeal of the currently popular "bootstrap" account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisions which involve jettisoning bootstrapping's basic approach to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  34. Glymour on Evidential Relevance.David Christensen - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):471-481.
    Glymour's "bootstrap" account of confirmation is designed to provide an analysis of evidential relevance, which has been a serious problem for hypothetico-deductivism. As set out in Theory and Evidence, however, the "bootstrap" condition allows confirmation in clear cases of evidential irrelevance. The difficulties with Glymour's account seem to be due to a basic feature which it shares with hypothetico-deductive accounts, and which may explain why neither can give a satisfactory analysis of evidential relevance.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  35.  78
    Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions.David Christensen - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):301-321.
  36.  10
    The Ørsted-Ritter Partnership and the Birth of Romantic Natural Philosophy.Dan Ch Christensen - 1995 - Annals of Science 52 (2):153-185.
    Summary Kant's critique of corpuscular theory created a tabula rasa situation in natural philosophy and opened up a vast new field of research, particularly related to the study of heat, light, electricity and magnetism. ?rsted introduced Kantian epistemology in Scandinavia and made friends with J. W. Ritter, an outstanding experimenter who was the first to make dynamical philosophy productive. The ?rsted?Ritter partnership aimed at the construction of a cosmology based on dynamical philosophy as well as galvanic interpretations of the Lichtenberg (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  37. The Coherence Theory of Truth.Darrel E. Christensen - 1967 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 5 (2):193-194.
  38.  10
    Skeptical Problems, Semantical Solutions.David Christensen - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):301-321.
    This paper defends the legitimacy of semantical responses to certain skeptical challenges, with a particular focus on Putnam’s treatment of a particular version of Brain-in-Vat skepticism. It argues that while Putnam’s argument does not provide a general reply to Brain-in-Vat skepticism, the general approach it exemplifies is actually crucial in replying to other skeptical challenges that are otherwise hard to rebut.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  39.  62
    The Evolutionary Origins of Volition.Dr Wayne Christensen - 2007 - In Cogprints.
    It appears to be a straightforward implication of distributed cognition principles that there is no integrated executive control system (e.g. Brooks 1991, Clark 1997). If distributed cognition is taken as a credible paradigm for cognitive science this in turn presents a challenge to volition because the concept of volition assumes integrated information processing and action control. For instance the process of forming a goal should integrate information about the available action options. If the goal is acted upon these processes should (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40.  14
    Developing Resolve to Have Moral Courage: A Field Comparison of Teaching Methods.David Christensen, Jeff Barnes & David Rees - 2007 - Journal of Business Ethics Education 4:79-96.
    Ethics research literature often uses Rest’s Four Component Model of ethical behavior as a framework to teach business and accounting ethics. Moral motivation, including resolve to have moral courage, is the third component of the model and is the least-tested component in ethics research. Using a quasi-experimental design with pretest and posttest measurements, we compare the effectiveness of several methods for developing resolve to have moral courage in 211 accounting students during one semester. Results show that traditional, reflection, moral exemplar (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41.  83
    Causal Powers and Conceptual Connections.D. Christensen - 1992 - Analysis 52 (3):163-8.
    In "A Modal Argument for Narrow Content" ("Journal of Philosophy", LXXXVIII, 1991, pp 5-26), Jerry Fodor proposes a necessary condition for the distinctness of causal powers. He uses this condition to support psychological individualism. I show that Fodor's argument relies on inconsistent interpretations of his condition on distinct causal powers. Moreover, on no consistent interpretation does Fodor's condition yield the results claimed for it.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42.  16
    Developing Resolve to Have Moral Courage.David Christensen, Jeff Barnes & David Rees - 2007 - Journal of Business Ethics Education 4:79-96.
    Ethics research literature often uses Rest’s Four Component Model of ethical behavior as a framework to teach business and accounting ethics. Moral motivation, including resolve to have moral courage, is the third component of the model and is the least-tested component in ethics research. Using a quasi-experimental design with pretest and posttest measurements, we compare the effectiveness of several methods for developing resolve to have moral courage in 211 accounting students during one semester. Results show that traditional, reflection, moral exemplar (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43.  45
    Two New Dual-Language Editions of Hegel’s Lectures on The Philosophy of Religion.Karl-Heinz Ilting & Darrel E. Christensen - 1972 - The Owl of Minerva 4 (1):5-6.
    A collaboration has been arranged for the preparation and publication in three dual-language volumes within the Hegel series presently in preparation by Fr. Frommanns Verlag of new critical editions of Hegel’s 1821 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, to be included in one volume with the up to now unpublished first form of his Encyclopedia, and Hegel’s 1824 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, in two volumes. The new German editions are to be prepared by Professor Dr. K.-H. Ilting. The (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  43
    Switched-Words Skepticism: A Case Study in Semantical Anti-Skeptical Argument.David Christensen - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (1):33 - 58.
  45.  43
    Hegel’s Phenomenological Analysis and Freud’s Psychoanalysis.Darrel E. Christensen - 1968 - International Philosophical Quarterly 8 (3):356-378.
  46.  37
    A Hegelian Critique of Peirce.Darrel E. Christensen - 1981 - The Owl of Minerva 13 (1):1-6.
    Darrel E. Christensen presented the following paper to the Charles Sanders Peirce Society meeting held on October 5–7, 1978, at Bloomington, Indiana.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  36
    Hegel and the Contemporary Crisis of Authority.Darrel E. Christensen - 1973 - Idealistic Studies 3 (2):117-132.
    The contemporary crisis of authority is in part to be understood as a reflection of certain philosophical doctrines of the recent past. The emotivist and the existentialist theories of value language, which remain most prevalent today, have contributed to a disposition to regard only the informed decision of the individual as authentic, and to construe moral judgments as without fault except when not fully informed or not one’s own. Where an individual differs from constituted authority, following either of these views, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  27
    Foreword.Darrel E. Christensen - 1970 - The Owl of Minerva 1 (3):1-1.
    In order to acquaint the academic professions with the function and direction of projected development of The Owl of Minerva and the Hegel Society of America, the first three issues have been distributed to departments of philosophy throughout the U. S. and Canada as well as to many individuals and institutions in other countries. The projected enlargement of the scope of the publication makes even more apparent than it would otherwise be the need at this time to restrict distribution to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  27
    Time and Providence: An Essay Based on the Analysis of the Concept of Time in Whitehead and Heidegger.Darrel E. Christensen - 1984 - Idealistic Studies 14 (2):175-176.
    The aim of this work is to elaborate the elements of a doctrine of providence in the light of a modern conception of temporality. It consists of four parts. Part I is a detailed analysis of Whitehead’s concept of time and Part II an analysis of Heidegger’s view. In Part III, the two are compared, and important points of agreement are drawn out. Part IV presents the working out of the doctrine of providence in the light of the concept of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. The Theory of Mental Derangement and the Role and Function of Subjectivity in Hegel.Darrel E. Christensen - 1968 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):433.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 110