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D. Goldstick [64]Daniel Goldstick [48]Danny Goldstick [7]Dan Goldstick [5]
  1.  17
    What Is It Like To …?D. Goldstick - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (1):27-30.
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  2.  37
    Methodological Conservatism.D. Goldstick - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):186 - 191.
  3.  21
    What Are "Purely Qualitative" Terms?Dan Goldstick - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1):71 - 81.
  4.  22
    Truer.D. Goldstick & B. O'Neill - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):583-597.
    When can one say that a new theory is truer than the old one it contradicts, even though neither is absolutely true? We are primarily concerned with the case in which the conflicting theories offer answers to the same questions, and so we do not introduce considerations of "logical width". We propose that part of the new theory is truer than part of the old one when the former part gets right whatever the latter-part got right while the former does (...)
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  5.  14
    Immorality with a Clear Conscience.D. Goldstick - 1980 - American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (3):245 - 250.
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  6.  37
    Three Epistemic Senses of Probability.D. Goldstick - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):59-76.
  7. Why We Might Still Have a Choice.D. Goldstick - 1979 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):305-308.
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  8.  16
    Assessing Utilities.D. Goldstick - 1971 - Mind 80 (320):531-541.
  9.  74
    A New Old Meaning of “Ideology”.Charles W. Mills & Danny Goldstick - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (3):417-.
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  10.  32
    More on Methodological Conservatism.D. Goldstick - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (3):193 - 195.
  11.  45
    Cognitive Reason.D. Goldstick - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):117-124.
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  12.  36
    The Meaning of “Grue”.D. Goldstick - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (1):139 - 141.
  13.  32
    Could God Make a Contradiction True?D. Goldstick - 1990 - Religious Studies 26 (3):377 - 387.
    Was Thomas Aquinas the first major Western philosopher to distinguish systematically between things it would be contradictory to deny and other things? He certainly was willing to give his authority to the proposition that whatever is logically impossible ‘does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence’. In the later Middle Ages, scholastic philosophers came virtually to equate achievable by divine power and free of contradiction free of contradiction and not achievable by divine power ).
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  14.  29
    Against 'Categories'.D. Goldstick - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):337 - 356.
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  15. On Moore's Paradox.D. Goldstick - 1967 - Mind 76 (302):275-277.
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  16.  28
    Beliefs, Desires and Moral Realism.Daniel Goldstick - 2006 - Philosophy 81 (315):153 - 160.
    An argument against the claim that moral realism cannot be sustained because moral beliefs, being affective-conative states, cannot themselves be true or false. In fact moral claims can fail both in terms of a failure of the standard it expresses to be realised by a given agent and also in terms of whatever it commends to be good or bad, right or wrong, in actual fact.
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  17.  67
    The 'Two Hats' Problem in Consequentialist Ethics.D. Goldstick - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (1):108.
    A largely deontological conscience will probably optimize consequences. But Bernard Williams objects to the, if one therefore embraces indirect consequentialism, of. Admittedly the strategy is painful, and a counsel of imperfection at best. But it need not be psychologically impossible, inconsistent, or even self-deceptive, given ethical cognitivism.
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  18.  90
    Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing?D. Goldstick - 1979 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (2):265-271.
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  19.  73
    A Contribution Towards the Development of the Causal Theory of Knowledge.D. Goldstick - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):238-248.
    1 Cf. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind (London, 1968), Chapter 9; 'A Causal Theory of Knowledge' by Alvin I. Goldman, The Journal of Philosophy , Vol. LXIV, No. 12, June 22, 1967. A striking parallelism would appear to exist between 'the causal theory of knowledge' and the orthodox Stoic doctrine regarding the kataleptike phantasia . See, for example, Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.248 (reprinted in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta , edited by H. F. A. von Arnim, Leipzig, 1921, (...)
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  20.  31
    "Soundness" Unsound.Dan Goldstick - 1999 - Informal Logic 19 (1).
  21.  43
    The Truth-Conditions of Counterfactual Conditional Sentences.D. Goldstick - 1978 - Mind 87 (345):1-21.
  22.  31
    Monotheism's Euthyphro Problem.D. Goldstick - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):585 - 589.
    The object here is to develop a moral argument against theism. By “theism” is meant the worship of a omnipotent, all righteous God. An attitude of worship, it may be assumed, would not be an attitude of worship if it did not preclude all doubt as to the worthiness of the object of worship. At any rate, it is only this attitude whose castigation as immoral is meant to be argued for here.There are, of course, as many theisms as there (...)
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  23.  29
    An Alleged Paradox in the Theory of Democracy.D. Goldstick - 1973 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (2):181-189.
  24.  23
    Correspondence.D. Goldstick - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (2):195-197.
    Giving ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ their ordinary senses, can one resist equating truth with correspondence to fact? For, with every variation in facts, there would necessarily be a corresponding variation in what propositions were true. But there would likewise be a corresponding variation in which they were false. Moreover, for any true proposition, the Correspondence Theory is committed also to denying that the existence of the fact believed normally follows just from the existence of the belief.
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  25.  21
    Secondary Qualities.D. Goldstick - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1):145-146.
    LOCKE WAS RIGHT TO SAY PRIMARY QUALITIES "RESEMBLE" OUR\nIDEAS OF THEM IN A WAY SECONDARY QUALITIES DO NOT, BECAUSE\nHAVING THE APPROPRIATE PRIMARY-QUALITY "IDEA" IS LOGICALLY\nSUFFICIENT IN EACH CASE FOR KNOWING HOW SOMETHING MUST BE\n(INTRINSICALLY) IN ORDER FOR THE "QUALITY" TO INHERE IN IT.\nCOMPARE THE WAY A PERSON IS SAID TO "RESEMBLE" A VERBAL\nDESCRIPTION IN THE EVENT OF "ANSWERING TO" IT.
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  26.  18
    Motivations.D. Goldstick - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (3):423-436.
    An exploratory discussion. Call a desire “finitisic” if some conceivable eventuality would fulfil it completely (so that no conceivable eventuality would fulfil it more). That flexibility of behaviour distinguishing the animate from the mindless is accounted for fundamentally by supposing ultimate motivation all infinitistic and outweighable. Decision-making by the counterpoise of such motivation contrasts with algorithmic thinking; and this suggests a non-computational view of mentation, a compatibilist understanding of creative imagination, and (with some additional conceptions) a possible definitional avenue for (...)
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  27.  9
    Cognitive Synonymy.D. Goldstick - 1980 - Dialectica 34 (3):183-203.
    SummaryThe crux of Quine's argument against synonymy— and therewith for a version of pragmatism, and independent/y against mentalism — is his challenge to the other side to explain the behavioural difference between the disposition to employ two predicates, say, interchangeably because of habitually “believing“ them coextensive, and the disposition to do so because of “meaning” the same by each. Since synonymy is taught behaviourally, the distinction in question must make a difference behaviourally, but not necessarily one explainable wholly non‐mentalistically. The (...)
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  28.  8
    Belief.Daniel Goldstick - 1989 - American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (3):231 - 238.
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  29.  19
    Property Identity and 'Intrinsic' Designation.D. Goldstick - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (281):449 - 452.
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  30.  4
    The Welfare of the Dead.D. Goldstick - 1988 - Philosophy 63 (243):111 - 113.
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  31.  47
    Analytic a Posteriori Truth?D. Goldstick - 1972 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (4):531-534.
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  32. Activism and Scientism in the Interpretation of Karl Marx's First and Third Theses on Feuerbach.Dan Goldstick - 1976 - Philosophical Forum 8 (2):269.
     
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  33.  6
    Appendix 2: ‘Desire’.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 327-332.
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  34. A Little-Noticed Feature of "A Priori" Truth.D. Goldstick - 1977 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):131.
  35. A Practical Refutation of Empiricism.Daniel Goldstick - 1969
     
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  36.  6
    Appendix 1: ‘Tautology’.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 321-326.
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  37. But Could I Have Wanted to Do That.D. Goldstick - 1989 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (June):99-104.
     
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  38.  10
    27. ‘Consciencelessness’.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 260-269.
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  39.  3
    Contents.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press.
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  40.  9
    13. Causality and Impermanence.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 127-137.
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  41.  45
    Cans and Ifs: Ability to Will and Ability to Act.D. Goldstick - 2004 - Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (1):105-108.
  42.  51
    Correspondence.D. Goldstick - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000 (2):195 - 197.
    Giving ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ their ordinary senses, can one resist equating truth with correspondence to fact? For, with every variation in facts, there would necessarily be a corresponding variation in what propositions were true. But there would likewise be a corresponding variation in which they were false. Moreover, for any true proposition, the Correspondence Theory is committed also to denying that the existence of the fact believed normally follows just from the existence of the belief.
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  43.  3
    Critical Notice.Dan Goldstick - 1979 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):357-372.
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  44.  27
    Critical Notice of Sebastiano Timpanaro, On Materialism.Dan Goldstick - 1979 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):357-372.
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  45.  26
    Circular Reasoning.D. Goldstick - 2003 - International Studies in Philosophy 35 (4):129-130.
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  46. Cognitive Reason.D. Goldstick - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):117-124.
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  47.  11
    29. Comparing Utilities.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 292-301.
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  48.  6
    33. Conclusion: We Each Sit in Judgment.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 318-320.
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  49.  11
    Determinism and Consciousness in Historical Materialism.Daniel Goldstick - 1988 - Philosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 3:634-637.
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  50.  48
    Does Epistemic “Ought” Imply “Can”?D. Goldstick - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (1):155-158.
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