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D. Goldstick [66]Daniel Goldstick [49]Danny Goldstick [8]Dan Goldstick [5]
  1.  49
    Methodological Conservatism.D. Goldstick - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):186 - 191.
  2.  34
    Truer.D. Goldstick & B. O'Neill - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):583-597.
    When can one say that a new theory is truer than the old one it contradicts, even though neither is absolutely true? We are primarily concerned with the case in which the conflicting theories offer answers to the same questions, and so we do not introduce considerations of "logical width". We propose that part of the new theory is truer than part of the old one when the former part gets right whatever the latter-part got right while the former does (...)
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  3.  25
    What Are "Purely Qualitative" Terms?Dan Goldstick - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1):71 - 81.
  4.  9
    Reason, Truth and Reality.Daniel Goldstick (ed.) - 2009 - University of Toronto Press.
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  5.  31
    Against 'categories'.D. Goldstick - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):337 - 356.
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  6.  19
    Cognitive Synonymy.D. Goldstick - 1980 - Dialectica 34 (3):183-203.
    SummaryThe crux of Quine's argument against synonymy— and therewith for a version of pragmatism, and independent/y against mentalism — is his challenge to the other side to explain the behavioural difference between the disposition to employ two predicates, say, interchangeably because of habitually “believing“ them coextensive, and the disposition to do so because of “meaning” the same by each. Since synonymy is taught behaviourally, the distinction in question must make a difference behaviourally, but not necessarily one explainable wholly non‐mentalistically. The (...)
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  7.  19
    Immorality with a Clear Conscience.D. Goldstick - 1980 - American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (3):245 - 250.
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  8.  23
    What Is It Like To …?D. Goldstick - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (1):27-30.
    Les philosophes parlent de «l’effet que cela fait» d’avoir une expérience particulière, sans tenir compte des variations sémantiques de la phrase. La «vision aveugle» manque de détails.
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  9.  21
    Towards a Defensible Nominalism.Daniel Goldstick - 2023 - International Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):109-117.
    Only concreta are causative, though other things can play a passive part in enabling them to do the causing that they do. Nonconcreta—platonic universals included—are just the instrumental and ethical values of concreta. There is no sense of the word in which both concreta and nonconcreta “exist”; but, coining one, we can say nothing “exists,” in that coined sense, over and above concreta, their vicissitudes and their values. That is nominalism.
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  10. A Little-noticed Feature of "A Priori" Truth.D. Goldstick - 1977 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):131.
  11.  20
    Assessing utilities.D. Goldstick - 1971 - Mind 80 (320):531-541.
  12.  41
    Three epistemic senses of probability.D. Goldstick - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):59-76.
  13. A New Old Meaning of “Ideology”.Charles W. Mills & Danny Goldstick - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (3):417-.
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  14.  15
    Can a Thought's Whole Subject-Matter Be Itself? The Case of Pain.D. Goldstick - 2024 - Dialogue 63 (1):139-145.
    RésuméLa croyance que l'on est (ou pas) dans un état de douleur est singulière en ceci qu'elle semble pouvoir être qualifiée d'infaillibilité ou d'incorrigibilité logique, de même que le cogito. Mais comment se peut-il que l'existence d'une croyance (vraie) et l'existence du fait qui est l'objet de cette croyance puisssent constituer la même existence? Je propose ici une réponse à cette question. Parfois, une croyance peut être un désir.
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  15.  91
    A contribution towards the development of the causal theory of knowledge.D. Goldstick - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):238-248.
    1 Cf. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind (London, 1968), Chapter 9; 'A Causal Theory of Knowledge' by Alvin I. Goldman, The Journal of Philosophy , Vol. LXIV, No. 12, June 22, 1967. A striking parallelism would appear to exist between 'the causal theory of knowledge' and the orthodox Stoic doctrine regarding the kataleptike phantasia . See, for example, Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.248 (reprinted in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta , edited by H. F. A. von Arnim, Leipzig, 1921, (...)
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  16.  75
    The 'Two Hats' Problem in Consequentialist Ethics.D. Goldstick - 2002 - Utilitas 14 (1):108.
    A largely deontological conscience will probably optimize consequences. But Bernard Williams objects to the, if one therefore embraces indirect consequentialism, of. Admittedly the strategy is painful, and a counsel of imperfection at best. But it need not be psychologically impossible, inconsistent, or even self-deceptive, given ethical cognitivism.
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  17.  18
    Belief.Daniel Goldstick - 1989 - American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (3):231 - 238.
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  18.  39
    Could God Make a Contradiction True?D. Goldstick - 1990 - Religious Studies 26 (3):377 - 387.
    Was Thomas Aquinas the first major Western philosopher to distinguish systematically between things it would be contradictory to deny and other things? He certainly was willing to give his authority to the proposition that whatever is logically impossible ‘does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence’. In the later Middle Ages, scholastic philosophers came virtually to equate achievable by divine power and free of contradiction free of contradiction and not achievable by divine power ).
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  19.  52
    Cognitive reason.D. Goldstick - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):117-124.
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  20.  38
    More on methodological conservatism.D. Goldstick - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (3):193 - 195.
  21.  39
    The meaning of “grue”.D. Goldstick - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (1):139 - 141.
  22.  41
    The tolerance of Rudolf Carnap.D. Goldstick - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):250 – 261.
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  23.  54
    The truth-conditions of counterfactual conditional sentences.D. Goldstick - 1978 - Mind 87 (345):1-21.
  24. Why is there something rather than nothing?D. Goldstick - 1979 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (2):265-271.
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  25. Why we might still have a choice.D. Goldstick - 1979 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):305-308.
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  26.  25
    Moral Responsibility and Character Formation.D. Goldstick - 2022 - Philosophical Papers 51 (3):357-365.
    A common philosophical view holds that moral assessments of people will depend entirely upon their possession or not of a sufficiently good will or character1—arguably, indeed, the moral assessment...
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  27. Reply to professor Rollin.D. Goldstick - 1974 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):598-600.
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  28. Laws of nature and physical existents.D. Goldstick - 1993 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (3):255 – 265.
    Abstract Nominalists, denying the reality of anything over and above concreta, are committed to a reductive account of any law of nature, explaining its necessity?the fact that it not only holds for all actual instances, but would hold for any additional ones?in, for example, epistemic terms (its likelihood/certainty of holding beyond the already observed instances). Nominalists argue that the world would be no different without irreducible modalities. ?Modal realists? often object that this parallels a common phenomenalist argument against believing in (...)
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  29.  33
    Beliefs, Desires and Moral Realism.Daniel Goldstick - 2006 - Philosophy 81 (315):153 - 160.
    An argument against the claim that moral realism cannot be sustained because moral beliefs, being affective-conative states, cannot themselves be true or false. In fact moral claims can fail both in terms of a failure of the standard it expresses to be realised by a given agent and also in terms of whatever it commends to be good or bad, right or wrong, in actual fact.
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  30.  22
    Property Identity and 'Intrinsic' Designation.D. Goldstick - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (281):449 - 452.
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  31.  13
    The Welfare of the Dead.D. Goldstick - 1988 - Philosophy 63 (243):111 - 113.
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  32.  33
    An alleged paradox in the theory of democracy.D. Goldstick - 1973 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (2):181-189.
  33.  68
    Analytic a posteriori truth?D. Goldstick - 1972 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (4):531-534.
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  34. Activism and Scientism in the Interpretation of Karl Marx's First and Third Theses on Feuerbach.Dan Goldstick - 1976 - Philosophical Forum 8 (2):269.
     
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  35.  8
    Appendix 2: ‘Desire’.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 327-332.
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  36.  4
    A Practical Refutation of Empiricism.Daniel Goldstick - 1969
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  37.  11
    Appendix 1: ‘Tautology’.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 321-326.
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  38.  4
    But could I have wanted to do that.D. Goldstick - 1989 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (June):99-104.
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  39.  35
    Correspondence.D. Goldstick - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (2):195-197.
    Giving ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ their ordinary senses, can one resist equating truth with correspondence to fact? For, with every variation in facts, there would necessarily be a corresponding variation in what propositions were true. But there would likewise be a corresponding variation in which they were false. Moreover, for any true proposition, the Correspondence Theory is committed also to denying that the existence of the fact believed normally follows just from the existence of the belief.
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  40.  18
    27. ‘Consciencelessness’.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 260-269.
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  41.  8
    Contents.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press.
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  42.  15
    13. Causality and Impermanence.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 127-137.
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  43.  48
    Cans and ifs: Ability to will and ability to act.D. Goldstick - 2004 - Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (1):105-108.
  44.  54
    Correspondence.D. Goldstick - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 6 (2):125-130.
    Giving ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ their ordinary senses, can one resist equating truth with correspondence to fact? For, with every variation in facts, there would necessarily be a corresponding variation in what propositions were true. But there would likewise be a corresponding variation in which they were false. Moreover, for any true proposition, the Correspondence Theory is committed also to denying that the existence of the fact believed normally follows just from the existence of the belief.
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  45.  5
    Critical notice.Dan Goldstick - 1979 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):357-372.
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  46.  36
    Circular Reasoning.D. Goldstick - 2003 - International Studies in Philosophy 35 (4):129-130.
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  47.  6
    Cognitive Reason.D. Goldstick - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):117-124.
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  48.  19
    29. Comparing Utilities.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 292-301.
  49.  8
    33. Conclusion: We Each Sit in Judgment.Daniel Goldstick - 2009 - In Reason, Truth and Reality. University of Toronto Press. pp. 318-320.
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  50.  16
    Determinism and Consciousness in Historical Materialism.Daniel Goldstick - 1988 - Philosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 3:634-637.
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1 — 50 / 121