[D. H. Mellor] Kant's claim that our knowledge of time is transcendental in his sense, while false of time itself, is true of tenses, i.e. of the locations of events and other temporal entities in McTaggart's A series. This fact can easily, and I think only, be explained by taking time itself to be real but tenseless. /// [J. R. Lucas] Mellor's argument from Kant fails. The difficulties in his first Antinomy are due to topological confusions, not the tensed nature (...) of time. Nor are McTaggart' s difficulties due to the tensed nature of time. The ego-centricity of tensed discourse is an essential feature of communication between selves, each of whom refers himself as 'I', and is required for talking about time as well as experience and agency. Arguments based on the Special Theory are misconceived. Some rest on a confused notion of 'topological simultaneity'. In the General Theory a cosmic time is defined, as also in quantum mechanics, where a natural present is defined by a unique hyperplane of collapse into eigen-ness. (shrink)
The vast body of Lawrence scholarship has veered between the extremes of uncritical celebration and violent denigration. This first extended study of Lawrence's aesthetics draws on a number of modern critical approaches to present an original and balanced analysis of Lawrence's literary and art criticism, and of the complex cultural context from which it emerged. -/- Emphasising the influence on this most`English' of writers of a German intellectual and cultural heritage, Anne Fernihough focuses on Lawrence's connections with the völkisch ideologies (...) prevalent in Germany from 1910-1930, from which both Heideggerian philosophy and Nazism emerged. The deep-seated affinities between Lawrentian and Heideggerian aesthetics are examined for the first time, and the author highlights Lawrence's `green' critique of industrialization. New light is shed on Lawrence's hostility towards Freud, contrasting the two writers' thinking on art and the unconscious. The book's reassessment of Lawrence's relationship with Bloomsbury opposes the received view that Lawrence and the Bloomsbury art critics were poles apart. -/- This fascinating and lucid study reveals Lawrence's art criticism as pluralistic and anti-authoritarian, a necessary antidote to his sometimes brutally authoritarian politics and to the dogma and rigidity that pervades so many other areas of Lawrence's thought. (shrink)
This text brings together a collection of new essays by a number of philosophers to honor Hugh Mellor's contribution to philosophy. The collection stands as an original exploration of some of the most central issues in philosophy.
This article contains a detailed discussion of the friendship and the intellectual collaboration between D. H. Lawrence and Bertrand Russell during the spring and summer of 1915. The questions it seeks to answer are why Russell initially was inclined to treat Lawrence's philosophical thought with respect, even to the extent of becoming an evangelist on its behalf; why he subsequently rejected Lawrence's outlook and distanced himself from Lawrence's political program; and what similarities and dissimilarities exist in Russell's thought and Lawrence's (...) as represented by Russell's Principles of Social Reconstruction and Lawrence's essays "Study of Thomas Hardy" and "The Crown." Both writers, it is suggested, were centrally concerned with the possibility of transcending the "prison" of the self, but the ideas each developed as to how this should be done were radically divergent, so much so that each could, in the end, regard the other as the very personification of the kind of egoism they sought to transcend. (shrink)
This essay explains how D. H. Lawrence occupies an unusual place in 20th century ethical discourse—between Heidegger’s privileging of strength-in-aloneness and his ethics of “letting be,” and Levinas’ privileging of the experience of otherness as the fundamental moment of ontology. Lawrence’s rhetoric, especially in his essays, seems to advocate a Heideggerian ethical position; however, by examining The Rainbow and Women in Love, this essay demonstrates how Lawrence’s fiction pushed him towards the acknowledgement that otherness is the fundamental basis for ethics.
My object in this paper is to consider what relevance, if any, current analyses of probability have to problems of religious belief. There is no doubt that words such as ‘probable’ are used in this context; what is doubtful is that this use can be analysed as other major uses of such words can. I shall conclude that this use cannot be so analysed and hence, given the preponderance of the other uses that can, that it is misleading.
We show the relative consistency of ℵ1 satisfying a combinatorial property considered by David Fremlin (in the question DU from his list) in certain choiceless inner models. This is demonstrated by first proving the property is true for Ramsey cardinals. In contrast, we show that in ZFC, no cardinal of uncountable cofinality can satisfy a similar, stronger property. The questions considered by D. H. Fremlin are if families of finite subsets of ω1 satisfying a certain density condition necessarily contain all (...) finite subsets of an infinite subset of ω1, and specifically if this and a stronger property hold under MA + ¬CH. Towards this we show that if MA + ¬CH holds, then for every family ? of ℵ1 many infinite subsets of ω1, one can find a family ? of finite subsets of ω1 which is dense in Fremlins sense, and does not contain all finite subsets of any set in ?.We then pose some open problems related to the question. (shrink)
In his contribution to socialist thought G.D.H. Cole adopted and revised Rousseau’s concept of the general will. During his early guild socialist phase Cole drew on the general will in his scheme for a functional, associational democracy. In the late 1920s Cole began to question whether the socially oriented element of individual will might be expressed in the existing social and economic circumstances. In the 1930s he combined social democratic and Marxist tenets. Nevertheless, his interest in Rousseau persisted. Will was, (...) for him, crucial to socialism. He made a significant, if neglected, contribution to the socialist tradition of Rousseau scholarship. (shrink)
Frank Plumpton Ramsey was born in February 1903, and he died in January 1930—just before his 27th birthday. In his short life he produced an extraordinary amount of profound and original work in economics, mathematics and logic as well as in philosophy: work which in all these fields is still, over sixty years on, extremely influential.
How does the study of society relate to the study of the people it comprises? This longstanding question is partly one of method, but mainly one of fact, of how independent the objects of these two studies, societies and people, are. It is commonly put as a question of reduction, and I shall tackle it in that form: does sociology reduce in principle to individual psychology? I follow custom in calling the claim that it does ‘individualism’ and its denial ‘holism’.
THERE WAS A TIME when many philosophers agreed that metaphysics was dead. Anyone aquatinted with the works of D.H. Mellor knows that the subject is alive and well. Two young philosophers who are familiar with his work, Anna-Sofia Maurin and Johannes Persson, met him in Cambrige for an interview.
Entities of many kinds, not just material things, have been credited with parts. Armstrong, for example, has taken propositions and properties to be parts of their conjunctions, sets to be parts of sets that include them, and geographical regions and events to be parts of regions and events that contain them. The justification for bringing all these diverse relations under a single ‘part–whole’ concept is that they share all or most of the formal features articulated in mereology. But the concept (...) has also prompted an ontological thesis that has been expressed in various ways: that wholes are ‘no ontological addition’ to their parts ; that to list both a whole and its parts is ‘double counting’; and that there is ‘no more’ to a whole than its parts: for example, that there is no more to a conjunction than the conjuncts that are its parts, and whose truth or falsity determines whether it is true or false. For brevity, I shall express the thesis in the last of these ways, as the claim that entities with parts are ‘nothing but’ those parts. (shrink)
Our knowledge of the world comes to us, one way or another, through our senses. I know there's a table here, because I see it, and that there's traffic outside, because I hear it. And similarly for our other senses. I know when it's cold, because I feel it; when there's sugar in my tea, because I taste it; smoke in the air, because I smell it; and so on.
My study aims to offer a Schopenhauerian reading of Henry James's The Portrait of a Lady and D. H. Lawrence's The White Peacock. Throughout the dissertation, I am driven by two goals. First, I aim to examine the selected novels by considering Schopenhauer's philosophy. Secondly, I shall investigate why characters, especially the heroines, having recognised that their marriage was basically a mistake, still remained in their tormented relationships. Why it is important to answer this question and what makes this a (...) unique concern, especially in James's novel, is the possibility that previous studies and many other critiques have questioned the destiny of these heroines in regard to the novelists' anti-feminist tendencies or their social and personal concerns, while I believe that by using Schopenhauer's philosophy I can provide a deeper conceptualisation of the novels' ending. In so doing, in the second chapter I will describe the reception of Schopenhauer's philosophy in England, and the direct and indirect presence of his philosophy in Lawrence's and James's Works. In the third chapter, I concentrate on Schopenhauer's concept of freedom, morality and the will in James's novel. My fourth chapter considers Lawrence's philosophy of love and reveals how his philosophy differs from Schopenhauer's. Furthermore, it draws his readers' attention to the Schopenhauerian notion of the will-to-live, acknowledged in Lawrence's novel. (shrink)
This is a field-based disguised case which describes a dilemma faced by the protagonists; do they continue to do business with a land developer who has assisted them in the past when now the developer chooses to, against their recommendations, also do business with their ex-business partner? The problem for the characters in question is whether or not to work on a project that will yield them a net profit of $4 million dollars given the fact it would require them (...) to work in the same development as their former business associate. The central characters are afraid that their ex-partner will be a destabilizing factor in the development of the project and that their work sites will be in jeopardy of being vandalized. Several factors complicate this situation including: the developer’s desire for a quick land purchase, the developer’s changing the discount rate from 20% to 10% perhaps based upon difficulties that surrounded the first land deal, the protagonists’ plans to build their own homes in this new development, and the negative relationship between the protagonists and the ex-business partner. The case has a difficulty level appropriate for a sophomore or junior level course. The case is designed to be taught in one class period and is expected to require between three to five hours of outside preparation by students. (shrink)
A complete reconstruction of Lehmer’s ENIAC set-up for computing the exponents of p modulo two is given. This program served as an early test program for the ENIAC (1946). The reconstruction illustrates the difficulties of early programmers to find a way between a man operated and a machine operated computation. These difficulties concern both the content level (the algorithm) and the formal level (the logic of sequencing operations).
Cela fait maintenant dix ans que Nicola Lacey nous a livré cette saisissante biographie de l’illustre juriste britannique H.L.A. Hart, intitulée A Life of H.L.A. Hart, the Nightmare and the Noble Dream. La tâche n’était pas aisée. D’une part, Hart est sans doute le juriste le plus lu du monde anglo-saxon, et comme certains ont pu le remarquer, il est parfois compliqué d’écrire sur Hart étant donné que tout le monde a débuté ses études de droit avec la lecture du (...) Concept de droit. Pour cette... (shrink)
The Eton Latin Grammar, For Use in the Higher Forms. By Francis Hay Rawlins, M.A., and William Ralph Inge. London: Murray, 1888. 6s.The Revised Latin Primer. By Benjamin Hall Kennedy, D.D. Longmans, 1888. 2s. 6d.The New Latin Primer. Edited by J. P. Postgate, M.A., and C. H. Vince, M.A. Cassell, 1888. 2s. 6d.The Shorter Latin Primer, by Dr. Kennedy. Longmans, 1888. 1s.
The following brief memoir of Wittgenstein needs a few preliminary words of explanation. Among those who attended his lectures and discussions in the years it covers was D. G. James, who later became Professor of English at Bristol University and then Vice-Chancellor of Southampton University. I met him both in Bristol and Southampton, and on one occasion suggested to him that some of us who had known Wittgenstein, but who had not become professional philosophers, might write down our recollections of (...) him, and that he and I should start. What prompted the suggestion was, I think, the publication of Norman Malcolm's book, and a feeling that the non-professionals might have something to contribute to the assessment of Wittgenstein, particularly as a person. I wrote a preliminary draft and sent it to James; but he never responded, there was much else to do, I let the matter rest, and now James is dead. I wrote in about the year 1960 on holiday and away from any books of reference and from my own notes of Wittgenstein's lectures and conversations. I have shown the typescript to a few interested people, but because of its preliminary and unfinished nature have not previously thought of publication. It has recently been suggested to me that it might be of more general interest, and I publish it now as it was written, with one or two trifling alterations. I am well aware of its limitations. It was intended to give an impression of Wittgenstein as a person rather than as a philosopher, and the rather miscellaneous collection of remarks in section 3 have that in view rather than any more strictly ‘philosophical’ intention. Others may well question some of the detail and disagree with some of the opinions expressed. And there are some things which I might put rather differently today. But if the memoir has any interest it is best left as it was written. (shrink)
En 1986, H.T. Engelhardt justifiait l'autonomie de la bioéthique à l'égard des éthiques religieuses en partant du fait que les hommes de notre temps sont « moralement des étrangers », les uns pour les autres. En 1991, il entreprit de mieux discerner les relations entre éthiques séculière et religieuse, en gardant la même orientation de pensée, mais en s'attaquant à l'idéologie d'un humanisme athée. Il cherche à établir sur les bases d'une rationalité universelle un « cadre de référence neutre », (...) commun à l'ensemble des partenaires du débat éthique contemporain, mais qui laisserait la place à une pluralité de visions philosophiques, religieuses et morales. Car ce serait ruiner toute éthique que de vouloir fonder la bioéthique sur le seul recours au consentement libre et éclairé du malade et sur le respect de son autonomie, à l'exclusion de toute recherche de « buts transcendants ». – La pensée d'Engelhardt n'est pas exempte d'ambiguïtés sinon de contradictions : il ne dit pas comment son humanisme séculier donnera satisfaction aux partisans des éthiques religieuses ni quel sera le statut institutionnel de ce cadre de référence commun ni quelle issue il propose entre le nihilisme et le relativisme moral ni sur quelle base pourrait se faire une hiérarchisation des valeurs dans une bioéthique séculière. Sa pensée devrait se prolonger en direction des droits de l'homme, mieux distinguer entre principes premiers et principes dérivés, creuser davantage le concept de subjectivité.In 1986 H. T Engelhardt justified the autonomy of bioethics as regards religious ethics by starting with the fact that people in our day are “moral strangers” in regard to each other. In 1991 he studied further the relations between secular and religious ethics while keeping the same line of thougbt, but in attacking the ideology of atheistic humanism. He is trying to establish, on the basis of a universal rationality, a “neutral framework “ that would be shared by all those debating contemporaneous ethics. It would leave room for a plurality of philosophical, religious, and moral visions, For it would destroy all ethics if one wished to base bioethics only on trying to get a free and enlightened agreement from the patient and on the respect of his autonomy, in exclusion of every search.for « transcendental ends ». The thougbt of Engelhardt is not free from ambiguities, if not contradictions: he doesn't say how his secular humanism will give satisfaction to the supporters of religious ethics; nor what the institutional status of tbis common framework would be; nor what he proposes as the way out between nihilism and moral relativism; nor on what basis a hierarchy of values could be created in secular bioethics. His ideas call for further reflection : found etbics on the rights of man; distinguish more clearly between first principles and principles that are derived ; and dig deeper into the concept of subjectivity. (shrink)
Among the very many questions we might wish to ask of any particular science, two of them concern the nature of the objects of the science and the character of the laws which describe the behaviour of those objects. What I wish to do is to raise those two questions about historical materialism. That is, I want to ask what it is that one studies in Capital for example, and in what ways of behaving does the nomic or lawlike behaviour (...) of those objects consist. Both are ontological questions of a sort, and, in particular, questions about what I call social ontology, although it is usual to restrict the term ‘ontological’ to the former question alone. The first question asks about the objects to whose existence historical materialism is committed; the second asks about the characteristic ways of behaving of those objects. (shrink)
H. B. D. Kettlewell's field experiments on industrial melanism in the peppered moth, Biston betularia, have become the best known demonstration of natural selection in action. I argue that textbook accounts routinely portray this research as an example of controlled experimentation, even though this is historically misleading. I examine how idealized accounts of Kettlewell's research have been used by professional biologists and biology teachers. I also respond to some criticisms of David Rudge to my earlier discussions of this case study, (...) and I question Rudge's claims about the importance of purely observational studies for the eventual acceptance and popularization of Kettlewell's explanation for the evolution of industrial melanism. (shrink)
H.B.D. Kettlewell is best known for his pioneering work on the phenomenon of industrial melanism, which began shortly after his appointment in 1951 as a Nuffield Foundation research worker in E.B. Ford's newly formed sub-department of genetics at the University of Oxford. In the years since, a legend has formed around these investigations, one that portrays them as a success story of the 'Oxford School of Ecological Genetics', emphasizes Ford's intellectual contribution, and minimizes reference to assistance provided by others. The (...) following essay reviews the important influence Ford, E.A. Cockayne, and P.M. Sheppard played in Kettlewell's research, leading up to his most famous experiments in 1953. It documents several reasons for doubting that Ford was as intellectually involved in the design of these investigations as he has previously been portrayed. It clarifies Kettlewell's intellectual contribution to the investigations for which he is famous, as well as the pivotal roles Cockayne and Sheppard played in the design, execution and interpretation of these investigations. (shrink)
In this paper it is shown that, in spite of their intuitive starting points, Kuipers' accounts lead to counterintuitive consequences. The counterintuitive results of Kuipers' account of H-D confirmation stem from the fact that Kuipers explicates a concept of partial (as opposed to full) confirmation. It is shown that Schurz-Weingartner's relevant-element approach as well as Gemes' content-part approach provide an account of full confirmation that does not lead to these counterintuitive results. One of the unwelcome results of Kuipers' account of (...) nomic truthlikeness is the consequence that a theory Y, in order to be more truthlike than a theory X (where Y and X are incompatible), must imply the entire nomic truth. It is shown how the relevant-element approach to truthlikeness avoids this result. (shrink)