108 found
Order:
Disambiguations
David Henderson [63]David K. Henderson [26]David Graham Henderson [4]D. Henderson [2]
D. S. Henderson [2]Deborah Henderson [2]David Konstan Henderson [1]DavidK Henderson [1]

Not all matches are shown. Search with initial or firstname to single out others.

See also
David Henderson
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
David Henderson
University of Warwick
David Henderson
Middlesex University
  1.  57
    The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis.David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Henderson and Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology. They defend the roles of the a priori and conceptual analysis, but with an essential empirical dimension. 'Transglobal reliability' is the key to epistemic justification. The question of which cognitive processes are reliable depends on contingent facts about human capacities.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  2.  27
    Interpretation and Explanation in the Human Sciences.David K. Henderson - 1993 - State University of New York Press.
    Refutes the methodological separatists who hold that the logic of explanation and testing in the human sciences is fundamentally different than in the natural sciences, and develops complementary accounts for interpretation and explanation, ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  3. Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology.David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Epistemic Evaluation aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point or purpose of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological theory in light of such matters. Call this purposeful epistemology. The idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. Several contributions to this volume explicitly address this general methodology, or some version of it. Others focus on (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  4.  83
    Motivated Contextualism.David Henderson - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):119 - 131.
    The concept of knowledge is used to certify epistemic agents as good sources (on a certain point or subject matter) for an understood audience. Attributions of knowledge and denials of knowledge are used in a kind of epistemic gate keeping for (epistemic or practical) communities with which the attributor and interlocutors are associated. When combined with reflection on kinds of practical and epistemic communities, and their situated epistemic needs for gate keeping, this simple observation regarding the point and purpose of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  5.  59
    Epistemic Norms and the "Epistemic Game" They Regulate: The Basic Structured Epistemic Costs and Benefits.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):367-382.
    This paper is a beginning—an initial attempt to think of the function and character of epistemic norms as a kind of social norm. We draw on social scientific thinking about social norms and the social games to which they respond. Assume that people individually follow epistemic norms for the sake of acquiring a stock of true beliefs. When they live in groups and share information with each other, they will in turn produce a shared store of true beliefs, an epistemic (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  6. Epistemic Norms as Social Norms.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 425-436.
    This chapter examines how epistemic norms could be social norms, with a reliance on work on the philosophy and social science of social norms from Bicchieri (on the one hand) and Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin and Southwood (on the other hand). We explain how the social ontology of social norms can help explain the rationality of epistemic cooperation, and how one might begin to model epistemic games.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  22
    Are Epistemic Norms Fundamentally Social Norms?David Henderson - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):281-300.
    People develop and deploy epistemic norms – normative sensibilities in light of which they regulate both their individual and community epistemic practice. There is a similarity to folk's epistemic normative sensibilities – and it is by virtue of this that folk commonly can rely on each other, and even work jointly to produce systems of true beliefs – a kind of epistemic common good. Agents not only regulate their belief forming practices in light of these sensitivities, but they make clear (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8.  42
    The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology.Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.) - 2019 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9.  51
    Gate-Keeping Contextualism.David Henderson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):83-98.
    This paper explores a position that combines contextualism regarding knowledge with the idea that the central point or purpose of the concept of knowledge is to feature in attributions that keep epistemic gate for contextually salient communities. After highlighting the main outlines and virtues of the suggested gate-keeping contextualism, two issues are pursued. First, the motivation for the view is clarified in a discussion of the relation between evaluative concepts and the purposes they serve. This clarifies why one's sense for (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  10. Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Sanford Goldberg & David Henderson - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):600 - 617.
    One of the central points of contention in the epistemology of testimony concerns the uniqueness (or not) of the justification of beliefs formed through testimony--whether such justification can be accounted for in terms of, or 'reduced to,' other familiar sort of justification, e.g. without relying on any epistemic principles unique to testimony. One influential argument for the reductionist position, found in the work of Elizabeth Fricker, argues by appeal to the need for the hearer to monitor the testimony for credibility. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  11.  78
    Iceberg Epistemology.David Henderson & Terrence Horgan - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):497-535.
    Accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a belief commonly carry commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. A concern for the plausibility of such commitments leads to a multi-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epistemologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  12.  11
    Gate-Keeping Contextualism.David Henderson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):83-98.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  13. The A Priori Isn’T All That It Is Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):219-250.
    Alvin Goldman’s contributions to contemporary epistemology are impressive—few epistemologists have provided others so many occasions for reflecting on the fundamental character of their discipline and its concepts. His work has informed the way epistemological questions have changed (and remained consistent) over the last two decades. We (the authors of this paper) can perhaps best suggest our indebtedness by noting that there is probably no paper on epistemology that either of us individually or jointly have produced that does not in its (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  14.  87
    Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality.David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaz Potrc & Hannah Tierney - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):194-225.
    The authors argue in favor of the “nonconciliation” (or “steadfast”) position concerning the problem of peer disagreement. Throughout the paper they place heavy emphasis on matters of phenomenology—on how things seem epistemically with respect to the net import of one’s available evidence vis-à-vis the disputed claim p, and on how such phenomenology is affected by the awareness that an interlocutor whom one initially regards as an epistemic peer disagrees with oneself about p. Central to the argument is a nested goal/sub-goal (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15.  78
    Testimonial Beliefs and Epistemic Competence.David Henderson - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):190–221.
  16.  7
    What’s the Point?David Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-114.
    The chapter rehearses the main outlines of gatekeeping contextualism—the view that it is central to the concept of knowledge that attributions of knowledge function in a kind of epistemic gatekeeping for contextually salient communities. The case for gatekeeping contextualism is clarified within an extended discussion of the character of philosophical reflection. The chapter argues that normatively valenced, evaluative concepts constitute a broad class of concepts for which a sociolinguistic point or purpose may be readily sensed—and for which the intimate connection (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17.  32
    A Refined Account of the "Epistemic Game": Epistemic Norms, Temptations, and Epistemic Coorperation.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):383-396.
    In "Epistemic Norms and the 'Epistemic Game' They Regulate", we advance a general case for the idea that epistemic norms regulating the production of beliefs might usefully be understood as social norms. There, we drew on the influential account of social norms developed by Cristina Bicchieri, and we managed to give a crude recognizable picture of important elements of what are recognizable as central epistemic norms. Here, we consider much needed elaboration, suggesting models that help one think about epistemic communities (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism.David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account of doxastic (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  19.  6
    Introduction: The Point and Purpose of Epistemic Evaluation.David Henderson & John Greco - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-28.
    This introductory chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section characterizes the general approach to epistemology around which the volume revolves—purposeful epistemology—and examines the general motivation for that approach. The guiding idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. The second section explores the approach by characterizing some important versions of it. Several themes and issues that we see running through the volume are here articulated (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20.  68
    Practicing Safe Epistemology.David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.
    Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, reliablists typically (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  21. The Principle of Charity and the Problem of Irrationality (Translation and the Problem of Irrationality).David K. Henderson - 1987 - Synthese 73 (2):225 - 252.
    Common formulations of the principle of charity in translation seem to undermine attributions of irrationality in social scientific accounts that are otherwise unexceptionable. This I call the problem of irrationality. Here I resolve the problem of irrationality by developing two complementary views of the principle of charity. First, I develop the view (ill-developed in the literature at present) that the principle of charity is preparatory, being needed in the construction of provisional first-approximation translation manuals. These serve as the basis for (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  22.  17
    Transglobal Reliabilism.David Henderson & Terence Edward Horgan - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:171-195.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  23. What Is a Priori and What Is It Good For?David Henderson - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):51-86.
    The doctrine is familiar. In a sentence, a priori truths are those that are knowable on the basis of reflection alone (independent of experience) by anyone who has acquired the relevant concepts. This expresses the classical conception of the a priori. Of course, there are those who despair of finding any truths that fully meet these demands. Some of the doubters are convinced, however, that the demands, are somewhat inflated by an epistemological tradition that was nevertheless on to something of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  24.  13
    Abductive Inference, Explicable and Anomalous Disagreement, and Epistemic Resources.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):567-584.
    Disagreement affords humans as members of epistemic communities important opportunities for refining or improving their epistemic situations with respect to many of their beliefs. To get such epistemic gains, one needs to explore and gauge one’s own epistemic situation and the epistemic situations of others. Accordingly, a fitting response to disagreement regarding some matter, p, typically will turn on the resolution of two strongly interrelated questions: whether p, and why one’s interlocutor disagrees with oneself about p. When one has high (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism is Not Just the Poor Person's Coherentism.David K. Henderson - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):627-649.
  26. Risk Sensitive Animal Knowledge.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):599-608.
    A discussion of Sosa's Knowing Full Well. The authors focus on the understood place and significance of animal and reflective knowledge.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27.  91
    Winch and the Constraints of Interpretation: Versions of the Principle of Charity.David K. Henderson - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):153-173.
  28.  14
    Introduction.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):317-322.
    The papers in this issue all concern the normative standards by which we do or should regulate our joint epistemic lives in communities. Plausibly, reflection on how we should regulate ourselves—what one should insist on in one's own practice and that of one's epistemic partners—takes some cues from reflection on what we do insist on. The reverse is plausibly also the case. These papers also, more or less explicitly, suggest that our epistemic sensibilities themselves reflect the demands of epistemic practice (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29.  41
    Let’s Be Flexible: Our Interpretive/Explanatory Toolbox, or In Praise of Using a Range of Tools.David Henderson - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):261-299.
    This paper explores the role and limits of cognitive simulation in understanding or explaining others. In simulation, one puts one's own cognitive processes to work on pretend input similar to that one supposes that the other plausibly had. Such a process is highly useful. However, it is also limited in important ways. Several limitations fall out from the various forms of cognitive diversity. Some of this diversity results from cultural differences, or from differences in individuals' cognitive biographies. Such diversity is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30.  51
    Entitlement in Gutting's Epistemology of Philosophy: Comments on What Philosophers Know.David Henderson - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):121-132.
    In What Philosophers Know, Gary Gutting provides an epistemology of philosophical reflection. This paper focuses on the roles that various intuitive inputs are said to play in philosophical thought. Gutting argues that philosophers are defeasibly entitled to believe some of these, prior to the outcome of the philosophical reflection, and that they then rightly serve as significant (again defeasible) anchors on reflection. This paper develops a view of epistemic entitlement and applies it to argue that many prephilosophical convictions of the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31.  9
    Epistemic Competence And Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism Is Not Just The Poor Person's Coherentism.David K. Henderson - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):627-649.
  32.  17
    Valuing the Stars.David Henderson - 2010 - Environmental Philosophy 7 (1):17-26.
    The night sky has been radically altered by light pollution, artificially produced light that obscures the stars. The effects and costs of this are diverse and poorly appreciated. A survey of the economically quantifiable aspects of this problem demonstrates that the value of the starry sky is immense, and yet it remains stubbornly beyond the ken of the market. The attempts to quantify this value and the ultimate impossibility of the task give lie to the economic pretense that the dollar (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  33.  1
    Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2009 - In Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stueber (eds.), Debating Dispositions. Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 296-319.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34.  64
    Norms, Normative Principles, and Explanation: On Not Getting is From Ought.David Henderson - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):329-364.
    It seems that hope springs eternal for the cherished idea that norms (or normativeprinciples) explain actions or regularities in actions. But it also seems thatthere are many ways of going wrong when taking norms and normative principlesas explanatory. The author argues that neither norms nor normative principles—insofar as they are the sort of things with normative force—is explanatoryof what is done. He considers the matter using both erotetic and ontic models ofexplanation. He further considers various understandings of norms. Key Words: (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  35.  40
    Epistemic Competence.David K. Henderson - 1994 - Philosophical Papers 23 (3):139-167.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  36.  15
    Valuing the Stars: On the Economics of Light Pollution.David Henderson - 2010 - Environmental Philosophy 7 (1):17-26.
    The night sky has been radically altered by light pollution, artificially produced light that obscures the stars. The effects and costs of this are diverse and poorly appreciated. A survey of the economically quantifiable aspects of this problem demonstrates that the value of the starry sky is immense, and yet it remains stubbornly beyond the ken of the market. The attempts to quantify this value and the ultimate impossibility of the task give lie to the economic pretense that the dollar (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37.  47
    Patient-Centred Care: Qualitative Findings on Health Professionals' Understanding of Ethics in Acute Medicine. [REVIEW]Pam McGrath, David Henderson & Hamish Holewa - 2006 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 3 (3):149-160.
    In recent years the literature on bioethics has begun to pose the sociological challenge of how to explore organisational processes that facilitate a systemic response to ethical concerns. The present discussion seeks to make a contribution to this important new direction in ethical research by presenting findings from an Australian pilot study. The research was initiated by the Clinical Ethics Committee of Redland Hospital at Bayside Health Service District in Queensland, Australia, and explores health professionals’ understanding of the nature of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  38.  33
    Simulation Theory Versus Theory Theory: A Difference Without a Difference in Explanations.David K. Henderson - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):65-93.
  39. Explanation and Rationality Naturalized.David Henderson - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (1):30-58.
    Familiar accounts have it that one explains thoughts or actions by showing them to be rational. It is common to find that the standards of rationality presupposed in these accounts are drawn from what would be thought to be aprioristic sources. I advance an argument to show this must be mistaken. But, recent work in epistemology and on rationality takes a less aprioristic approach to such standards. Does the new (psychological or cognitive scientific) realism in accounts of rationality itself significantly (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40.  31
    Norms, Invariance, and Explanatory Relevance.David Henderson - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):324-338.
    Descriptions of social norms can be explanatory. The erotetic approach to explanation provides a useful framework. I describe one very broad kind of explanation-seeking why-question, a genus that is common to the special sciences, and argue that descriptions of norms can serve as an answer to such why-questions. I draw upon Woodward’s recent discussion of the explanatory role of generalizations with a significant degree of invariance. Descriptions of norms provide what is, in effect, a generalization regarding the kind of historically (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41.  13
    Conceptually Grounded Necessary Truths.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 111.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42.  33
    Transglobal Reliabilism.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):171-195.
    We here propose an account of what it is for an agent to be objectively justified in holding some belief. We present in outline this approach, which we call transglobal reliabilism, and we discuss how it is motivated by various thought experiments. While transglobal reliabilism is an externalist epistemology, we think that it accommodates traditional internalist concerns and objections in a uniquely natural and respectful way.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  43. Simulation and Epistemic Competence.David K. Henderson & Terence E. Horgan - 2000 - In H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview.
    Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  44.  18
    Relies to Our Critics.David Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):549-564.
    We respond to the central concerns raised by our commentators to our book, The Epistemological Spectrum. Casullo believes that our account of what we term “low-grade a priori” justification provides important clarification of a kind of philosophical reflection. However he objects to calling such reflection a priori. We explain what we think is at stake. Along the way, we comment on his idea of that there may be an epistemic payoff to making a distinction between assumptions and presumptions. In the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45.  10
    The Birth of Comedy.David Konstan Henderson, Ralph Rosen, Jeffrey Rusten & W. Niall - unknown - The Classical Review 62 (2).
  46.  16
    Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions.Terry Horgan & David Henderson - 2009 - In Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 296-319.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47.  23
    A Solution to Davidson's Paradox of Irrationality.DavidK Henderson - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (3):359 - 369.
  48.  38
    Comments on Rosenberg’s Paper.David K. Henderson - 1996 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1):205-216.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49.  54
    Account for Macro-Level Causation.David K. Henderson - 1994 - Synthese 101 (2):129-156.
    By a macro-level feature, I understand any feature that supervenes on, and is thus realized in, lower-level features. Recent discussions by Kim have suggested that such features cannot be causally relevant insofar as they are not classically reducible to lower-level features. This seems to render macro-level features causally irrelevant. I defend the causal relevance of some such features. Such features have been thought causally relevant in many examples that have underpinned philosophical work on causality. Additionally, in certain typical biological cases, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50.  52
    An Empirical Basis for Charity in Interpretation.David K. Henderson - 1990 - Erkenntnis 32 (1):83 - 103.
    In codifying the methods of translation, several writers have formulated maxims that would constrain interpreters to construe their subjects as (more or less) rational speakers of the truth. Such maxims have come to be known as versions of the principle of charity. W. V. O. Quine suggests an empirical, not purely methodological, basis for his version of that principle. Recently, Stephen Stich has criticized Quine's attempt to found the principle of charity in translation on information about the probabilities of various (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 108