7 found
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  1.  27
    Universal First‐Order Definability in Modal Logic.R. E. Jennings, D. K. Johnston & P. K. Schotch - 1980 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 26 (19-21):327-330.
  2.  26
    Universal First‐Order Definability in Modal Logic.R. E. Jennings, D. K. Johnston & P. K. Schotch - 1980 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 26 (19‐21):327-330.
  3.  91
    Propositions and propositional acts.D. K. Johnston - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 435-462.
    Suppose that John asks, ‘Is the window open?’ and Mary replies, ‘The window is open.’ Then John and Mary have produced two distinct utterances, and in doing so, they have performed two different kinds of speech act. But clearly there is something that these utterances have in common. According to the standard theory of speech acts, in these utterances different illocutionary forces have been applied to the same propositional content. Similarly, if John and Mary both believe that roses are red, (...)
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  4.  63
    The paradox of indicative conditionals.D. K. Johnston - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):93 - 112.
    In his 1987 book _Conditionals, Frank Jackson presents an argument to the effect that the indicative conditionals of natural language have the same truth conditions as the material conditional of truth-functional logic. This Jackson refers to as the "paradox of indicative conditionals." I offer a solution to this paradox by arguing that some conditionals that appear to be in the indicative mood are actually subjunctives, to which the paradox does not apply. I support this proposed solution with some historical observations (...)
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  5.  28
    The $n$-adic first-order undefinability of the Geach formula.R. E. Jennings, P. K. Schotch & D. K. Johnston - 1981 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (4):375-378.
  6. Paradox-tolerant logic.Raymond E. Jennings & D. K. Johnston - 1983 - Logique Et Analyse 26 (3):291-308.
     
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  7.  67
    The natural history of fact.D. K. Johnston - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):275 – 291.
    The article provides an example of the application of the techniques and results of historical linguistics to traditional problems in the philosophy of language. It takes as its starting point the dispute about the nature of facts that arose from the 1950 Aristotelian Society debate between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. It is shown that, in some cases, expressions containing the noun fact refer to actions and events; while in other cases, such expressions do not have a referring (...)
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