133 found
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  1. A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
    Breaking new ground in the debate about the relation of mind and body, David Armstrong's classic text - first published in 1968 - remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In the preface to this new edition, the author reflects on the book's impact and considers it in the light of subsequent developments. He also provides a bibliography of all the key writings to have appeared in the materialist debate.
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  2. A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...)
  3. What is a Law of Nature?D. M. Armstrong - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Sydney Shoemaker.
    This is a study of a crucial and controversial topic in metaphysics and the philosophy of science: the status of the laws of nature. D. M. Armstrong works out clearly and in comprehensive detail a largely original view that laws are relations between properties or universals. The theory is continuous with the views on universals and more generally with the scientific realism that Professor Armstrong has advanced in earlier publications. He begins here by mounting an attack on the orthodox and (...)
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  4. Universals: an opinionated introduction.D. M. Armstrong - 1989 - Boulder: Westview Press.
    In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong carefully sets out six major theories—ancient, modern, and contemporary—and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each. Recognizing that there are no final victories or defeats in metaphysics, Armstrong nonetheless defends a traditional account of universals as the (...)
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  5. Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory, which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is the most recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book D. M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, modal truths, truths about (...)
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  6. Belief, Truth and Knowledge.D. M. Armstrong - 1973 - London,: Cambridge University Press.
    A wide-ranging study of the central concepts in epistemology - belief, truth and knowledge. Professor Armstrong offers a dispositional account of general beliefs and of knowledge of general propositions. Belief about particular matters of fact are described as structures in the mind of the believer which represent or 'map' reality, while general beliefs are dispositions to extend the 'map' or introduce casual relations between portions of the map according to general rules. 'Knowledge' denotes the reliability of such beliefs as representations (...)
  7.  42
    Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology.D. M. Armstrong & David Lewis - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):77.
    This is a collection of twenty-five papers and reviews by the leading analytic philosopher of our time. It adds to the papers on metaphysics and epistemology to be found in his previous two-volume collection published by Oxford University Press. One previously unpublished paper—“Why Conditionalize?”—is included. Australasian philosophers may note with some pride that eleven of the pieces were first published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  8.  45
    Universals: An Opinionated Introduction.Jerrold Levinson & D. M. Armstrong - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):654.
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  9.  71
    A World of States of Affairs.John Heil & D. M. Armstrong - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):115.
    Despite heroic efforts, philosophers have found it increasingly difficult to evade discussion of metaphysical topics. Take the philosophy of mind. Take, in particular, the mind-body problem in its latest guise: the problem of causal relevance. If mental properties are not reducible to physical properties, how can we reconcile the role such properties seem to have in producing bodily motions that constitute actions with the apparent fact that the very same motions are entirely explicable on the basis of purely physical properties (...)
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  10. Dispositions: a debate.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - New York: Routledge. Edited by C. B. Martin, U. T. Place & Tim Crane.
    Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. IDispositions: A Debate is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation.
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  11. Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?D. M. Armstrong - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (4):417.
  12. In defence of structural universals.D. M. Armstrong - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):85 – 88.
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  13. Meaning and communication.D. M. Armstrong - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (4):427-447.
  14.  17
    Dispositions: A Debate.Tim Crane, D. M. Armstrong & C. B. Martin - 1996 - New York: Routledge. Edited by C. B. Martin, U. T. Place & Tim Crane.
    Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. Dispositions: A Debate is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation.
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  15. What is Consciousness?D. M. Armstrong - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  16. Naturalism, materialism, and first philosophy.D. M. Armstrong - 1978 - Philosophia 8 (2-3):261-276.
    First, The doctrine of naturalism, That reality is spatio-Temporal, Is defended. Second, The doctrine of materialism or physicalism, That this spatio-Temporal reality involves nothing but the entities of physics working according to the principles of physics, Is defended. Third, It is argued that these doctrines do not constitute a "first philosophy." a satisfactory first philosophy should recognize universals, In the form of instantiated properties and relations. Laws of nature are constituted by relations between universals. What universals there are, And what (...)
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  17. Are Quantities Relations? A Reply to Bigelow and Pargetter.D. M. Armstrong - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 54 (3):305 - 316.
  18. Consciousness and Causality.D. M. Armstrong & Norman Malcolm - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):341-344.
     
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  19. Quantities.John Bigelow, Robert Pargetter & D. M. Armstrong - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 54 (3):287 - 304.
  20. Against Ostrich Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. Oxford University Press.
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  21. Properties.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. Oxford University Press.
  22. Classes are states of affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1991 - Mind 100 (2):189-200.
    Argues that a set is the mereological whole of the singleton sets of its members (following Lewis's Parts of Classes), and that the singleton set of X is the state of affairs of X's having some unit-making property.
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  23. An argument against David Lewis' theory of possible worlds.Peter Forrest & D. M. Armstrong - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):164 – 168.
  24. The nature of number.Peter Forrest & D. M. Armstrong - 1987 - Philosophical Papers 16 (3):165-186.
    The article develops and extends the theory of Glenn Kessler (Frege, Mill and the foundations of arithmetic, Journal of Philosophy 77, 1980) that a (cardinal) number is a relation between a heap and a unit-making property that structures the heap. For example, the relation between some swan body mass and "being a swan on the lake" could be 4.
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  25. II—Does Knowledge Entail Belief?D. M. Armstrong - 1970 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70 (1):21-36.
    D. M. Armstrong; II—Does Knowledge Entail Belief?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 21–36, https://doi.org/10.109.
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  26. How Do Particulars Stand to Universals?D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.
     
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  27. The Nature of Possibility.D. M. Armstrong - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (4):575 - 594.
    I want to defend a Combinatorialtheory of possibility. Such a view traces the very idea of possibility to the idea of the combinations – all the combinations which respect a certain simple form – of given, actual, elements. Combination is to be understood widely enough to cover the notions of expansion and contraction. The combinatorial idea is not new, of course. Wittgenstein gave a classical exposition of it in the Tractatus. Perhaps its charter is 3.4: ‘A proposition determines a place (...)
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  28. God’s lottery.Storrs McCall & D. M. Armstrong - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):223 - 224.
  29.  67
    A Theory of Universals: Volume 2: Universals and Scientific Realism.D. M. Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a study, in two volumes, of one of the longest-standing philosophical problems: the problem of universals. In volume I David Armstrong surveys and criticizes the main approaches and solutions to the problems that have been canvassed, rejecting the various forms of nominalism and 'Platonic' realism. In volume II he develops an important theory of his own, an objective theory of universals based not on linguistic conventions, but on the actual and potential findings of natural science. He thus reconciles (...)
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  30. Causes and laws.Adrian Heathcote & D. M. Armstrong - 1991 - Noûs 25 (1):63-73.
  31. Going through the open door again: Counterfactual versus singularist theories of causation.D. M. Armstrong - 2001 - In Gerhard Preyer & Frank Siebelt (eds.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 163--176.
  32.  37
    The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (2):272.
  33.  18
    Dispositions.D. M. Armstrong - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):246-248.
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  34.  95
    A Naturalist Program: Epistemology and Ontology.D. M. Armstrong - 1999 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (2):77 - 89.
  35.  33
    Critical notice.D. M. Armstrong - 1958 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):128 – 145.
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  36. Smart and the secondary qualities.D. M. Armstrong - 1987 - In John Jamieson Carswell Smart, Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & Jean Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart. Blackwell.
     
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  37. Nominalism and Realism: Volume 1: Universals and Scientific Realism.D. M. Armstrong - 1978 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This is a study, in two volumes, of one of the longest-standing philosophical problems: the problem of universals. In volume I David Armstrong surveys and criticizes the main approaches and solutions to the problems that have been canvassed, rejecting the various forms of nominalism and 'Platonic' realism. In volume II he develops an important theory of his own, an objective theory of universals based not on linguistic conventions, but on the actual and potential findings of natural science. He thus reconciles (...)
     
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  38.  47
    Berkeley's Theory of Vision.D. M. Armstrong - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (16):472-473.
  39. The scope and limits of human knowledge.D. M. Armstrong - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):159 – 166.
    This paper argues that the foundations of our knowledge are the bed-rock certainties of ordinary life, what may be called the Moorean truths. Beyond that are the well-established results within the empirical sciences, and whatever has been proved in the rational sciences of mathematics and logic. Otherwise there is only belief, which may be more or less rational. A moral drawn from this is that dogmatism should be moderated on all sides.
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  40. Acting and trying.D. M. Armstrong - 1973 - Philosophical Papers 2 (1):1-15.
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  41. Difficult Cases in the Theory of Truthmaking.D. M. Armstrong - 2000 - The Monist 83 (1):150-160.
    Analyzes difficult case in the theory of truthmaking. Account on the notion of a truthmaker by philosopher Bertrand Russell; Context of the correspondence theory of truth; Requisites of a truthmaker; Discussion on negative truths, universally quantified truths and modal truths.
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  42. Introspection.D. M. Armstrong - 1994 - In Quassim Cassam (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 109--117.
    This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. I t won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the (...)
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  43.  79
    Reply to Heil.D. M. Armstrong - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):245 – 247.
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  44.  70
    Reply to Van Fraassen.D. M. Armstrong - 1988 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):224 – 229.
  45.  74
    The secondary qualities.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):225 – 241.
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  46.  49
    Reply to Martin.D. M. Armstrong - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):214 – 217.
    Totality states of affairs (Russell's 'general facts') are defended against Martin's criticisms. Although higher-order, they are not 'abstract in Quine's sense. If space-time is the whole of being, and if it can be seen as a vast conjunction of states of affairs, then the state of affairs that this is the totality of lower-order states of affairs is not additional to, but completes, space-times. If totality states of affairs are admitted, then there seems no need for any further negative states (...)
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  47.  84
    Towards a Theory of Properties: Work in Progress on the Problem of Universals.D. M. Armstrong - 1975 - Philosophy 50 (192):145-155.
    Many philosophers have declared that everything which exists is a particular. There is a weak interpretation of this doctrine which I believe to be a true proposition, and a strong one which I believe to be false.
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  48. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume 1: Nominalism and Realism; Volume 2: A Theory of Universals.D. M. Armstrong - 1982 - Noûs 16 (1):133-142.
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  49. Truthmakers for negative truths, and for truths of mere possibility.D. M. Armstrong - 2007 - In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag. pp. 99.
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  50.  92
    Materialism, Properties and Predicates.D. M. Armstrong - 1972 - The Monist 56 (2):163-176.
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