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  1. Organisms, Agency, and Evolution.D. M. Walsh - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    The central insight of Darwin's Origin of Species is that evolution is an ecological phenomenon, arising from the activities of organisms in the 'struggle for life'. By contrast, the Modern Synthesis theory of evolution, which rose to prominence in the twentieth century, presents evolution as a fundamentally molecular phenomenon, occurring in populations of sub-organismal entities - genes. After nearly a century of success, the Modern Synthesis theory is now being challenged by empirical advances in the study of organismal development and (...)
     
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  2.  45
    Variance, Invariance and Statistical Explanation.D. M. Walsh - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (S3):469-489.
    The most compelling extant accounts of explanation casts all explanations as causal. Yet there are sciences, theoretical population biology in particular, that explain their phenomena by appeal to statistical, non-causal properties of ensembles. I develop a generalised account of explanation. An explanation serves two functions: metaphysical and cognitive. The metaphysical function is discharged by identifying a counterfactually robust invariance relation between explanans event and explanandum. The cognitive function is discharged by providing an appropriate description of this relation. I offer examples (...)
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  3. Fitness and Function.D. M. Walsh - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):553-574.
    According to historical theories of biological function, a trait's function is determined by natural selection in the past. I argue that, in addition to historical functions, ahistorical functions ought to be recognized. I propose a theory of biological function which accommodates both. The function of a trait is the way it contributes to fitness and fitness can only be determined relative to a selective regime. Therefore, the function of a trait can only be specified relative to a selective regime. Apart (...)
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  4.  46
    Chasing Shadows: Natural Selection and Adaptation.D. M. Walsh - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (1):135-53.
  5.  60
    Organisms as Natural Purposes: The Contemporary Evolutionary Perspective.D. M. Walsh - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (4):771-791.
    I argue that recent advances in developmental biology demonstrate the inadequacy of suborganismal mechanism. The category of the organism, construed as a ’natural purpose’ should play an ineliminable role in explaining ontogenetic development and adaptive evolution. According to Kant the natural purposiveness of organisms cannot be demonstrated to be an objective principle in nature, nor can purposiveness figure in genuine explain. I attempt to argue, by appeal to recent work on self-organization, that the purposiveness of organisms is a natural phenomenon (...)
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  6.  76
    The Scope of Selection: Sober and Neander on What Natural Selection Explains.D. M. Walsh - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):250 – 264.
  7.  8
    Chasing Shadows: Natural Selection and Adaptation.D. M. Walsh - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 31 (1):135-153.
  8.  7
    Organisms as Natural Purposes: The Contemporary Evolutionary Perspective.D. M. Walsh - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (4):771-791.
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  9.  68
    Bookkeeping or Metaphysics? The Units of Selection Debate.D. M. Walsh - 2004 - Synthese 138 (3):337 - 361.
    The Units of Selection debate is a dispute about the causes of population change. I argue that it is generated by a particular `dynamical'' interpretation of natural selection theory, according to which natural selection causes differential survival and reproduction of individuals and natural selection explanations cite these causes. I argue that the dynamical interpretation is mistaken and offer in outline an alternative, `statistical'' interpretation, according to which natural selection theory is a fancy kind of `bookkeeping''. It explains by citing the (...)
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  10. The Struggle for Life and the Conditions of Existence : Two Interpretations of Darwinian Evolution.D. M. Walsh - 2012 - In Martin H. Brinkworth & Friedel Weinert (eds.), Evolution 2.0: Implications of Darwinism in Philosophy and the Social and Natural Sciences. Springer.
     
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  11.  35
    Editor's Introduction: D. M. Walsh.D. M. Walsh - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:1-21.
    The papers collected in this volume are the proceedings of the 1999 Royal Institute of Philosophy conference: the theme of the conference, the same as the title of this collection, Naturalism, Evolution and Mind. The essays collected here cover a wide array of disparate themes in philosophy, psychology, evolutionary biology and the philosophy of science. They range in subject matter from the mind/body problem and the nature of philosophical naturalism, to the naturalization of psychological norms to the naturalization of phenomenal (...)
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  12.  8
    Causes of Adaptation and the Unity of Science.D. M. Walsh - unknown
    Evolutionary Biology has two principal explananda, fit and diversity (Lewontin 1978). Natural selection theory stakes its claim to being the central unifying concept in biology on the grounds that it demonstrates both phenomena to be the consequence of a single process. By now the standard story hardly needs reiterating: Natural selection is a force that operates over a population, preserving the better fit, culling the less fit, and along the way promoting novel solutions to adaptive problems. Amundson’s historical survey of (...)
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  13.  12
    Titles and Abstracts for the Pitt-London Workshop in the Philosophy of Biology and Neuroscience: September 2001.Karen Arnold, James Bogen, Ingo Brigandt, Joe Cain, Paul Griffiths, Catherine Kendig, James Lennox, Alan C. Love, Peter Machamer, Jacqueline Sullivan, Gianmatteo Mameli, Sandra D. Mitchell, David Papineau, Karola Stotz & D. M. Walsh - manuscript
    Titles and abstracts for the Pitt-London Workshop in the Philosophy of Biology and Neuroscience: September 2001.
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  14.  7
    Alex Rosenberg. Darwinian Reductionism: Or, How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology. X + 263 Pp., Illus., Table, Bibl., Index. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. $40. [REVIEW]D. M. Walsh - 2007 - Isis 98 (4):886-887.
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  15.  5
    Preface.D. M. Walsh - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:v-v.
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  16. Naturalism, Evolution and Mind.D. M. Walsh (ed.) - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of original essays covers a wide range of issues in current naturalised philosophy of mind. Particular attention is paid to the ways in which concepts drawn from evolutionary biology might enhance our understanding of the place of mind in the natural world. Issues covered include the advantages of construing the mind as an adaptation, the naturalisation of intentional and phenomenal content, the evolution of means-end reasoning, rationality and higher-order intentionality, methodological issues in cognitive ethology and evolutionary psychology.
     
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