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  1.  18
    Equilibria for Far-Sighted Players.D. Marc Kilgour - 1984 - Theory and Decision 16 (2):135-157.
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  2.  23
    Combining Strength and Uncertainty for Preferences in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution with Multiple Decision Makers.Haiyan Xu, Keith W. Hipel, D. Marc Kilgour & Ye Chen - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (4):497-521.
    A hybrid preference framework is proposed for strategic conflict analysis to integrate preference strength and preference uncertainty into the paradigm of the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) under multiple decision makers. This structure offers decision makers a more flexible mechanism for preference expression, which can include strong or mild preference of one state or scenario over another, as well as equal preference. In addition, preference between two states can be uncertain. The result is a preference framework that is more (...)
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  3.  37
    Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem. [REVIEW]Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (3):263-289.
    A cornerstone of game theory is backward induction, whereby players reason backward from the end of a game in extensive form to the beginning in order to determine what choices are rational at each stage of play. Truels, or three-person duels, are used to illustrate how the outcome can depend on (1) the evenness/oddness of the number of rounds (the parity problem) and (2) uncertainty about the endpoint of the game (the uncertainty problem). Since there is no known endpoint in (...)
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  4.  22
    A Decision Support System for the Graph Model of Conflicts.D. Marc Kilgour, Liping Fang & Keith W. Hipel - 1990 - Theory and Decision 28 (3):289-311.
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  5.  22
    A Taxonomy of All Ordinal 2 X 2 Games.D. Marc Kilgour - 1988 - Theory and Decision 24 (2):99.
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  6.  16
    Approval Elections with a Variable Number of Winners.D. Marc Kilgour - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):199-211.
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  7.  18
    Axioms for Shapley Values in Games with Quarrelling.D. Marc Kilgour - 1977 - Theory and Decision 8 (2):193-207.
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  8.  11
    Canadian Bulk Water Exports: Analyzing the Sun Belt Conflict Using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution.Amer Obeidi, Keith W. Hipel & D. Marc Kilgour - 2002 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 14 (4):145-163.
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  9.  22
    Policy Stable States in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution.Dao-Zhi Zeng, Liping Fang, Keith W. Hipel & D. Marc Kilgour - 2004 - Theory and Decision 57 (4):345-365.
    A new approach to policy analysis is formulated within the framework of the graph model for conflict resolution. A policy is defined as a plan of action for a decision maker (DM) that specifies the DM’s intended action starting at every possible state in a graph model of a conflict. Given a profile of policies, a Policy Stable State (PSS) is a state that no DM moves away from (according to its policy), and such that no DM would prefer to (...)
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  10.  19
    The Use of Costless Inspection in Enforcement.D. Marc Kilgour - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (3):207-232.
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  11.  24
    Fair Division of Indivisible Items Between Two Players: Design Parameters for Contested Pile Methods. [REVIEW]Rudolf Vetschera & D. Marc Kilgour - 2014 - Theory and Decision 76 (4):547-572.
    Contested Pile methods are two-phase procedures for the fair allocation of indivisible items to two players. In the Generation Phase, items over which the players’ preferences differ widely enough are allocated. “Contested” items are placed in the Contested Pile, which is then allocated in the Splitting Phase. Each phase can be carried out using several different techniques; we perform a comprehensive analysis of the resulting design variants using a computational model. The properties of fairness and efficiency, generally achieved in the (...)
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  12.  20
    Theory and Implementation of Coalitional Analysis in Cooperative Decision Making.Haiyan Xu, D. Marc Kilgour, Keith W. Hipel & Edward A. McBean - 2014 - Theory and Decision 76 (2):147-171.
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  13.  43
    National Security Games.Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - 1988 - Synthese 76 (2):185 - 200.
    Issues that arise in using game theory to model national security problems are discussed, including positing nation-states as players, assuming that their decision makers act rationally and possess complete information, and modeling certain conflicts as two-person games. A generic two-person game called the Conflict Game, which captures strategic features of such variable-sum games as Chicken and Prisoners'' Dilemma, is then analyzed. Unlike these classical games, however, the Conflict Game is a two-stage game in which each player can threaten to retaliate (...)
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  14.  16
    Optimal Deterrence.Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - 1985 - Social Philosophy and Policy 3 (1):118.
    1. Introduction The policy of deterrence, at least to avert nuclear war between the superpowers, has been a controversial one. The main controversy arises from the threat of each side to visit destruction on the other in response to an initial attack. This threat would seem irrational if carrying it out would lead to a nuclear holocaust – the worst outcome for both sides. Instead, it would seem better for the side attacked to suffer some destruction rather than to retaliate (...)
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  15.  1
    Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational, and Will Star Wars Help?Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - 1987 - Analyse & Kritik 9 (1-2):62-74.
    Deterrence means threatening to retaliate against an attack in order to deter it in the first place. The central problem with a policy of deterrence is that the threat of retaliation may not be credible if retaliation leads to a worse outcome - perhaps a nuclear holocaust - than a side would suffer from absorbing a limited first strike and not retaliating. - The optimality of deterrence is analyzed by means of a Deterrence Game based on Chicken, in which each (...)
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  16. Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management.Edna Tusak Loehman & D. Marc Kilgour - 2000 - Environmental Values 9 (4):538-540.
     
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