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Diane Proudfoot [15]D. Proudfoot [2]
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Diane Proudfoot
University of Canterbury
  1. Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction.Diane Proudfoot - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (1):9-40.
    The canonical version of possible worlds semantics for story prefixes is due to David Lewis. This paper reassesses Lewis's theory and draws attention to some novel problems for his account.
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  2.  57
    Deviant Encodings and Turing’s Analysis of Computability.B. Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):247-252.
    Turing’s analysis of computability has recently been challenged; it is claimed that it is circular to analyse the intuitive concept of numerical computability in terms of the Turing machine. This claim threatens the view, canonical in mathematics and cognitive science, that the concept of a systematic procedure or algorithm is to be explicated by reference to the capacities of Turing machines. We defend Turing’s analysis against the challenge of ‘deviant encodings’.Keywords: Systematic procedure; Turing machine; Church–Turing thesis; Deviant encoding; Acceptable encoding; (...)
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  3. Temporal Parts and Their Individuation.J. Copeland, H. Dyke & D. Proudfoot - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):289-293.
    Ignoring the temporal dimension, an object such as a railway tunnel or a human body is a three-dimensional whole composed of three-dimensional parts. The four-dimensionalist holds that a physical object exhibiting identity across time—Descartes, for example—is a four-dimensional whole composed of 'briefer' four-dimensional objects, its temporal parts. Peter van Inwagen (1990) has argued that four-dimensionalism cannot be sustained, or at best can be sustained only by a counterpart theorist. We argue that different schemes of individuation of temporal parts are available, (...)
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  4.  50
    On Alan Turing's Anticipation of Connectionism.B. Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot - 1996 - Synthese 108 (3):361 - 377.
    It is not widely realised that Turing was probably the first person to consider building computing machines out of simple, neuron-like elements connected together into networks in a largely random manner. Turing called his networks 'unorganised machines'. By the application of what he described as 'appropriate interference, mimicking education' an unorganised machine can be trained to perform any task that a Turing machine can carry out, provided the number of 'neurons' is sufficient. Turing proposed simulating both the behaviour of the (...)
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  5.  9
    Sylvan's Bottle and Other Problems.Diane Proudfoot - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Logic 15 (2):95-123.
    According to Richard Routley, a comprehensive theory of fiction is impossible, since almost anything is in principle imaginable. In my view, Routley is right: for any purported logic of fiction, there will be actual or imaginable fictions that successfully counterexample the logic. Using the example of ‘impossible’ fictions, I test this claim against theories proposed by Routley’s Meinongian contemporaries and also by Routley himself and his 21st century heirs. I argue that the phenomenon of impossible fictions challenges even today’s modal (...)
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  6. Rethinking Turing’s Test.Diane Proudfoot - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (7):391-411.
  7.  79
    Our Posthuman Future.Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot - 2012 - The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57):73-78.
  8.  74
    Turing, Wittgenstein and the Science of the Mind.Diane Proudfoot & B. Jack Copeland - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):497 – 519.
  9.  37
    On Wittgenstein on Cognitive Science.D. Proudfoot - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (280):189 - 217.
    Cognitive science is held, not only by its practitioners, to offer something distinctively new in the philosophy of mind. This novelty is seen as the product of two factors. First, philosophy of mind takes itself to have well and truly jettisoned the ‘old paradigm’, the theory of the mind as embodied soul, easily and completely known through introspection but not amenable to scientific inquiry. This is replaced by the ‘new paradigm’, the theory of mind as neurally-instantiated computational mechanism, relatively opaque (...)
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  10.  69
    The Implications of an Externalist Theory of Rule-Following Behavior for Robot Cognition.Diane Proudfoot - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):283-308.
    Given (1) Wittgensteins externalist analysis of the distinction between following a rule and behaving in accordance with a rule, (2) prima facie connections between rule-following and psychological capacities, and (3) pragmatic issues about training, it follows that most, even all, future artificially intelligent computers and robots will not use language, possess concepts, or reason. This argument suggests that AIs traditional aim of building machines with minds, exemplified in current work on cognitive robotics, is in need of substantial revision.
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  11. Wittgenstein's Anticipation of the Chinese Room.Diane Proudfoot - 2003 - In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
  12.  71
    What Turing Did After He Invented the Universal Turing Machine.B. Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot - 2000 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (4):491-509.
    Alan Turing anticipated many areas of current research incomputer and cognitive science. This article outlines his contributionsto Artificial Intelligence, connectionism, hypercomputation, andArtificial Life, and also describes Turing's pioneering role in thedevelopment of electronic stored-program digital computers. It locatesthe origins of Artificial Intelligence in postwar Britain. It examinesthe intellectual connections between the work of Turing and ofWittgenstein in respect of their views on cognition, on machineintelligence, and on the relation between provability and truth. Wecriticise widespread and influential misunderstandings of theChurch–Turing thesis (...)
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  13.  42
    The Predictive Mind, by Jakob Hohwy: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, Pp. Ix + 282, £22. [REVIEW]Diane Proudfoot - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):207-208.
  14. The Conjunction Fallacy.Jack Copeland & Diane Proudfoot - 2003 - Logique Et Analyse 46.
     
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  15.  25
    Heavenly Computation: Digital Metaphysics and the New Theology.Diane Proudfoot - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (1):147-153.
  16.  13
    The Logic of the Sociobiological Model Geary-Style.Diane Proudfoot - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):261-261.
    Geary's is the traditional view of the sexes. Yet each part of his argument – the move from sex differences in spatial ability and social preferences to a sex difference in mathematical ability, the claim that the former are biologically primary, and the sociobiological explanation of these differences – requires considerable further work. The notion of a biologically secondary ability is itself problematic.
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  17. Turing and Free Will: A New Take on an Old Debate.Diane Proudfoot - 2017 - In Alisa Bokulich & Juliet Floyd (eds.), Philosophical Explorations of the Legacy of Alan Turing. Springer Verlag.
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