This comprehensive, general introduction to Schelling's philosophy shows that it was Schelling who set the agenda for German idealism and defined the term of its characteristic problems.

Schelling’s “Bruno” provides a provocative illustration of his conviction that early modern science has adopted a radically flawed and impoverished concept of matter, and therefore of nature. The “Bruno” has been read as a settling of scores with Fichte, with whom Schelling had recently quarreled, and as a critique of Kant’s idealism. I propose to look at how the dialogue reveals Schelling’s developing understanding of pantheism, as reflected in the arguments he borrows from Giordano Bruno and then transforms. “Bruno” is (...) a dialogue with four interlocutors, and ranges widely. I will discuss two central sections, in which the two main roles are played by Bruno (Schelling) and Lucian (Fichte). Lucian begins by restating their agreement in an earlier section of the dialogue that when it is considered in the light of the supreme idea, the distinction of knowledge and being is untrue, a tantalizing claim. He then goes on to pose the question of how it can be possible to understand the departure of the finite from the eternal. (shrink)

Peter Cheyne may have understood Coleridge better than the latter understood himself. This book provides an extensive road map to many of the highways and byways Coleridge wandered down in both prose and poetry, and it does so without ever losing sight of the ultimate goal of the journey: a philosophy of contemplative ideas, an ideal-realism that brought together these many disparate influences. For Cheyne, Coleridge is a thinker of the first rank, whose achievement—the philosophy of contemplation, which presents a (...) "view of intuitive reason and its ideas that shape humanity" —could have great value for the future direction of philosophy.Although Cheyne identifies three main periods in Coleridge's intellectual... (shrink)

F.W.J. von Schelling was the philosopher whom Hegel accused of conducting his philosophical education in public, and Joseph Lawrence's title neatly captures and acknowledges a fundamental tension running throughout Schelling's nearly sixty years of philosophical productivity. Schelling was indeed a philosopher of many beginnings, and always returned to a concern with beginnings, in a way one might have thought Kant had rendered permanently unfashionable; yet in many ways the very profusion of his philosophies was, as Heidegger has observed, evidence of (...) his unrelenting and stubborn desire to get to the root of being. What Lawrence calls "die Unvordenklichkeit des Seins" was always Schelling's primary concern. (shrink)

Schelling's 1806 polemic against Fichte, and his last major work on the philosophy of nature. The heat of anger can concentrate the mind. Convinced that he had been betrayed by his former collaborator and colleague, Schelling attempts in this polemic to reach a final reckoning with Fichte. Employing the format of a book review, Schelling directs withering scorn at three of Fichte’s recent publications, at one point likening them to the hell, purgatory, and would-be paradise of Fichtean philosophy. The central (...) bone of contention is the understanding of nature: Fichte sees it as lifeless matter in motion, sheer opposition to be overcome, while Schelling waxes poetic in his defense of a living, organic nature of which humanity is a vital part. Indeed, we do not know ourselves without understanding our connection to nature, argues Schelling, anticipating many thinkers in contemporary environmental ethics. Dale E. Snow’s introduction sets the stage and explains the larger context of the conflict, which was already visible in the correspondence of the two philosophers, which broke off by 1802. Notes are included throughout the text, providing background information and identifying the many references to Fichte. Dale E. Snow is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University of Maryland and the author of Schelling and the End of Idealism, also published by SUNY Press. (shrink)

Over the last few decades, virtue has become increasingly important in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and education. However, as each of these disciplines approaches virtue from a decidedly different perspective, it has proven difficult to come up with an understanding of virtue that satisfies the standards of all four disciplines. In their book, Jennifer Wright, Michael Warren, and Nancy Snow attempt to put forward such an understanding.

Aaron Stalnaker's Mastery, Dependence, and the Ethics of Authority is a significant achievement. The aim of this book is to mine the insights of the early Confucians, or Ru, for enriching Western ethical and political thought on the ethics of authority and dependence. Stalnaker does this through a meticulous and in-depth study that highlights, but is not limited to, the early Confucian thinkers Kongzi, Mengzi, and Xunzu. His focus is on the ways in which their approach to ritual and certain (...) forms of authority/dependence relationships, such as master/student and father/son, have the potential to inform contemporary Western political structures and governance. The Ru thought that by learning certain virtues and... (shrink)

This volume features new findings by nine interdisciplinary teams of researchers on the topics of self, motivation, and virtue. Nine chapters bringing together scholars from the fields of philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and sociology advance our substantive understanding of these important topics, and showcase a variety of research methods of interdisciplinary interest. Essays on Buddhism and the self in the context of romantic relationships, the development of personal projects and virtue, the notion of self-distancing and its moral impact, virtues as self-integrated (...) traits, humility and the self in loving encounter, the importance of nation and faith in motivating virtue in western and non-western countries, roles for the self and virtue in eudaimonic growth, overcoming spiritual violence and sacramental shame in Christian communities, and an investigation into the moral self highlight the range and diversity of topics explored in this volume. The concept of deep integration also characterizes this work: each member of the interdisciplinary teams was fully and equally invested in their project from inception to completion. This approach invites teams to examine their disciplinary assumptions, rethink familiar concepts, and adjust methodologies in order to view their topics with fresh eyes. The result is not only new findings of substantive and methodological interest, but also an interesting glimpse into the thinking of the researchers as they sought interdisciplinary common ground in their research. Self, Motivation, and Virtue will be of interest to scholars in philosophy, moral psychology, neuroscience, and sociology who are working on these topics. (shrink)

Against the backdrop of the recent emergence of disturbing currents of populism in several countries, including the United States, this article argues for a conception of hope as a democratic civic virtue. In section 1, it offers a general overview of hope and sketches an initial conception of hope as a democratic civic virtue. In section 2, the stage is set for further theorizing of this conception in the present American context. Drawing on the work of Ghassan Hage, the article (...) makes the point that the United States is in the process of becoming a nation of worriers in part because of the failure of the government to distribute social hope. Section 3 fleshes out what hope as a democratic civic virtue could look like in the United States today. Section 4 concludes with brief comments about theorizing civic hope in the context of a modified pragmatism. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Definitions The External Sanctions The Internal Sanction Conclusion.

Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch the account of virtue that we think most amenable to virtue measurement. Our account integrates Whole Trait Theory from psychology with a broadly neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue. Our account is ‘ecumenical’ in that it has appeal for a wide range of virtue ethicists. According to WTT, a personality trait is composed of a set of situation-specific trait-appropriate responses, which are produced when certain “social-cognitive” mechanisms are triggered by the perception of trait-relevant (...) stimuli in a person’s external and/or internal environment. Moving from this starting point, we discuss our conception of a virtue and respects in which it both aligns with and diverges from Aristotle’s conception. We discuss roles for practical wisdom and motivation in our conception of virtue, and highlight respects in which WTT provides an amenable empirical framework into which key Aristotelian elements can be integrated. We conclude with brief remarks about our conception as an empirically adequate and measurable account. (shrink)

Dynamin is a GTPase that regulates late events in clathrin‐coated vesicle formation. Our current working model suggests that dynamin is targeted to coated pits in its unoccupied or GDP‐bound form, where it is initially distributed uniformly throughout the clathrin lattice. GTP/GDP exchange triggers its release from these sites and its assembly into short helices that encircle the necks of invaginated coated pits like a collar. GTP hydrolysis, which is required for vesicle detachment, presumably induces a concerted conformation change, tightening the (...) collar. Unlike most of its GTPase cousins that serve as molecular switches, dynamin has a low affinity for GTP, a very high intrinsic rate of GTP hydrolysis and functions as a homo‐oligomer. A concerted conformational change resulting from coordinated GTP hydrolysis by the dynamin oligomer might be sufficient to generate force. In this case, dynamin would be the first GTPase identified that acts as a structural protein with mechano‐chemical function. (shrink)

In a corporate context, would interrupting affect the perceived power, identity traits, job performance, and interpersonal relationships of equally situated male and female speakers? The gender of both the interrupter and the interrupted speaker was varied in hypothetical transcripts of conversations between two corporate vice-presidents. There were no significant effects of interrupting or being interrupted on perceptions of the relative power of men and women speakers. However, the interrupter, regardless of gender, was perceived as more successful and driving, but less (...) socially acceptable, reliable, and companionable than the interrupted speaker. (shrink)

Political and public debate recently has centered on issues of community, family and culture. What are the boundaries of community, and why is community important? What constitutes a family, and is it the fundamental unit of a stable society? What difference does feminism make in our lives and in society? How do racial and cultural minorities affect culture as a whole? In the Company of Others brings together new and previously published essays by nine distinguished philosophers, who argue these questions (...) from a variety of perspectives. Presenting traditional and non-traditional approaches, their essays challenge and refine recent thinking on issues of contemporary social and political importance. (shrink)

I consider whether Mill intends for us to see the arguments that constitute his defense of the “Liberty of Thought and Discussion” in chapter 2 ofOn Libertyas a part of his larger case for the “harm” or “liberty” principle (LP). Several commentators depict this chapter as a digression that interrupts the flow between his introduction of this principle in the first chapter and his exposition and defense of it in the final three. I will argue instead for a reading ofOn (...) Libertyon which chapter 2 is well integrated with the rest of the essay and is in fact where Mill starts constructing his case for LP. (shrink)

Rule consequentialism holds that an action's moral standing depends on its relation to the moral code whose general adoption would have the best consequences. Heretofore rule consequentialists have understood the notion of a code's being generally adopted in terms of its being generally obeyed or, more commonly, its being generally accepted. I argue that these ways of understanding general adoption lead to unacceptable formulations of the theory. For instance, Brad Hooker, Michael Ridge, and Holly Smith have recently offered different answers (...) to the question of what ‘acceptance rate’ we should build into our formulation of rule consequentialism, and all are unsatisfactory. I argue instead for a novel approach to formulating rule consequentialism, ‘uniform-moral-education’ rule consequentialism, on which what it means for a moral code to be generally adopted is not for it to be generally followed or generally accepted, but instead for it to be generally taught. (shrink)

Ethical viewpoints for and against the use of supervised community treatment (SCT), also known as outpatient commitment and community treatment orders, are examined. The perspectives of writers on civil liberties are considered. This paper argues that while civil liberties are an important concern SCT is ethically justifiable in the circumscribed population of ‘revolving door’ patients it applies to. This is on the grounds that it enables individuals to actualise their positive liberty. The issue of insight into mental illness is also (...) considered and it is concluded that a further argument in favour of SCT comes from evidence that insight relates to neurobiological deficits. Limits to the ethical justifiability of SCT are considered with reference to individuals with substance dependency. The paper concludes that SCT is ethically permissible only in those with severe mental illness who have a history of losing capacity to consent to treatment and/or admission. (shrink)

In parts I and II, this article briefly sketches two approaches to virtue ethics – those taken by Aristotle and the contemporary exemplarist moral theory of Linda Zagzebski – with an eye to providing resources for miliary educators. Each section concludes with remarks about the pros and cons of the author’s experiences of teaching these theories to undergraduates. Part III deals with the social articulation of morality and its implications for war crimes. The social articulation of morality is the idea (...) that moral principles cannot be applied in the abstract, but must be interpreted in terms of social backgrounds and norms. This draws on War Crimes: Causes, Excuses, and Blame (2019) by Talbert and Wolfendale, who consider how social articulations of morality led the military in various countries to commit war crimes in the mistaken belief that they were acting in accordance with moral principles. Democratic countries have commitments to free speech that enable us to resist such abuses. The implications for military education are that virtues such as intellectual discernment should be joined with discussions of ethical issues to ensure that future military leaders do not fall prey to false moral narratives. (shrink)

In a way that harks back to Anglo-American philosophy of the 1950s and 1960s, this essay contends that the traditional “free will” problem is a spurious problem generated by systematic misuse of the terms employed in discussing moral responsibility. Illustrations of these misuses from sources old and new are provided, mainly in the footnotes. Attention is called to the proper use of the terms, which allows us to frame the questions pertinent to the determination of someone’s moral responsibility for a (...) particular action or omission. No attempt is made to answer these questions because the justifications for the answers would require reference to the particular facts surrounding any given case, as well as estimations of their relevance and importance. The value of the essay lies rather in redirecting attention away from irrelevant matters and towards those that do count. (shrink)

After critiquing some earlier attempts (including those of Marcus Singer and Frances Howard–Snyder) to ground objections to actual–consequence act utilitarianism (ACAU) on human cognitive limitations, I present two new objections with this same foundation. Both start with the observation that, because human cognitive abilities are not up to the task of reliably recognizing utility–maximizing actions, any agents who are recognizably human – including the best possible humans, morally speaking – are certain to perform many actions every day that ACAU says (...) are immoral, and to perform some actions over the course of their lives that it says are highly immoral. The first objection is that, if Mill's analysis of what it means to call an action wrong is accurate, then ACAU entails a conclusion that no one will accept, viz., that the morally–best humans possible ought to undergo constant punishment. The second objection is that ACAU entails that even the morally–best humans possible are bad moral agents in some respect. This conclusion, while unpalatable, is not so obviously unacceptable as the first. However, I do briefly consider some ways in which it might be possible to demonstrate that it is false and thereby complete a reductio of ACAU. (shrink)

The Epilogue reviews the findings presented by indirect ontology. First, indirect ontology discovers a consistency to The Visible and the Invisible which has been overlooked. Secondly, it provides a resolution to problems which are first uncovered in his Phenomenology of Perception, notably the connection between tacit and spoken cogitos, as well as the relationship of silence to speech. Thirdly, indirect ontology serves as a useful tool in understanding the development of Merleau-Ponty's thought from its beginning in The Structure of Behavior (...) through his ontological phase. Finally, indirect ontology brings to clarity the uniqueness of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy which is often overlooked; this uniqueness points to the fact that Merleau-Ponty's thought seems to move in a direction different from many of his successors and interpreters. ;Chapter four of the dissertation begins a positive delineation of Being by means of the indirect ontology examined in the first three chapters. This chapter situates philosophy within the hyperdialectic, thus showing how philosophy can investigate the world from which thought emerges. Chapter five unites the sequential analyses of the first four chapters in order to provide a detailed account of how the natural world serves as the basis of all human expression. Chapter six builds upon the description of nature provided by indirect ontology; in this chapter the working notes of The Visible and the Invisible are examined in order to discuss the philosophy of history and of culture provided by indirect ontology. ;The first three chapters of the dissertation examine the ontology of Being provided by perception. Chapter one concerns itself with our radical dependence upon perception, our "perceptual faith" in the world. By examining Merleau-Ponty's discussion of traditional ontology the dissertation develops the differences between ontology and the perceptual process. In chapter two the gap between ontology and perception is eliminated by providing an ontology which conforms to the manner in which perception presents itself to the body. This union of perception and human expression is made possible by Merleau-Ponty's implementation of hyper-reflection, the theory that perception is itself a form of originary reflection. Hyper-reflection is used to explain the existence of myself, others, and thinking within a shared visible world. Chapter three investigates the natural dialectic or hyper-dialectic which holds between the perceived world and throught; the result is a view of the dialectic which insists that thought remains attached to the perceived world. ;The goal of this dissertation is to present a sustained examination of The Visible and the Invisible. In contrast to the critical literature on Merleau-Ponty which maintains that the work is fragmentary, the position taken in the dissertation is that The Visible and the Invisible is a consistent and cohesive work. The key to unlocking the inner format of The Visible and the Invisible lies in abandoning the popular assumption that the first three chapters of the work are primarily critiques of other philosophers' positions. The dissertation attempts to replace this assumption by seeking, within the resources of the text itself, a new meaning and order. ;In the working notes accompanying The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty provides the necessary interpretive tool for understanding the work in the form of an "indirect ontology." Indirect ontology is Merleau-Ponty's effort to explain how our perceptual contact with the world is itself the ontological format of all Being. The Visible and the Invisible attempts to account for all phases of human expression through this model. (shrink)

In Ideal Code, Real World, Brad Hooker proposes an account of the relation between his rule-consequentialism and virtue according to which the virtues (1) have intrinsic value and (2) are identical with the dispositions that are of the ideal code. While it is not clear whether Hooker actually intends to endorse this account or only intends to moot it for discussion, I argue that for him to adopt it would be a mistake. Not only would this mean that his moral (...) theory was no longer properly a consequentialist view at all, but it would commit him to inconsistent views about how normative theories are justified. (shrink)

Insofar as John Stuart Mill can be accurately described as a socialist, his is a socialism that a classical liberal ought to be able to live with, if not to love. Mill's view is that capitalist economies should at some point undergo a `spontaneous' and incremental process of socialization, involving the formation of worker-controlled `socialistic' enterprises through either the transformation of `capitalistic' enterprises or creation de novo. This process would entail few violations of core libertarian principles. It would proceed by (...) way of a series of voluntary transactions. Capitalists' property rights would be respected throughout. The process would take place within a national system of laws that permits private ownership of productive property and competition, and would not result in that system's overthrow. And, if we accept some basic tenets of Mill's social philosophy, the outcome at which we should expect the process to arrive is a `patchwork' economy in which capitalistic and socialistic enterprises exist side by side. Key Words: Ludwig von Mises • John Stuart Mill • socialism • capitalism • worker control. (shrink)

In my book J. S. Mill: Moral, Social and Political Thought I explained the absence of a standalone chapter on women's rights by explaining that for Mill no special explanation of why women should have the right to vote, work in the careers of their choice, etc., was needed; they should have these rights for the same reasons as men. The real lacuna, I admitted, was the absence of a chapter on Mill's views on marriage and the family. This chapter (...) remedies that deficiency. (shrink)

This chapter offers an overview of some of the most significant aspects of J. S. Mill’s work in moral, social, and political philosophy and presents a balanced picture of the debates between interpreters over how this work should be understood without remaining strictly neutral. On the reading developed herein, Mill’s moral theory comprises a hedonistic theory of value and a rule-utilitarian theory of obligation. While not a ‘virtue ethicist’ per se, he attaches paramount importance to the development of our distinctly (...) human faculties and the formation of desirable habits. These moral views underlie his social and political philosophy, including his famous ‘liberty’ or ‘harm’ principle, defence of women’s liberation, advocacy of an employee-ownership economy, and call for a system of government that balances democratic and elitist tendencies. Mill’s social and political philosophy is ‘utopian’ inasmuch as it aims at making it possible for virtually everyone to enjoy a genuinely happy life. (shrink)

In The Second-Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall offers an interpretation of P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” according to which the essay advances the thesis that good consequences are the “wrong kind of reason” to justify “practices of punishment and moral responsibility.” Darwall names this thesis “Strawson’s Point.” I argue for a different reading of Strawson, one according to which he holds this thesis only in a qualified way and, more generally, is not the unequivocal critic of consequentialism that Darwall makes (...) him out to be. In fact, I contend, Strawson’s account of the reactive attitudes can potentially be a useful resource for consequentialists. (shrink)