This book explores aspects of William H. Poteat’s philosophical anthropology, which proposes a post-critical alternative to the prevailing dualistic conception of the person and opens a path to recovery of the pre-reflective ontological ground of the person where our personhood can be recovered and re-appropriated.
The problem of what Philosophy is and how it relates to the contemporary concern with thinking and reasoning is one of the first items on the agenda when introducing teachers to Philosophy for Children. Professor Cannon began offering the teachers he trains an overview of these subjects in an attempt to give them a map to some of the areas he and they were to examine during the subsequent workshop. The following is a result of our collaboration in refining (...) this material, which we now use in our teacher training workshops. We offer it in hope that it will be of use to others. (shrink)
The modern critical tradition’s strategy for defeating the demon of self doubt and securing certainty, as Hannah Arendt has written, restricts serious candidates for belief to those whose conditions of truth can be rendered wholly immanent to focal consciousness within a point of view that is simply taken for granted. Thereby it forecloses the possibility of recognizing the partiality of its own perspective vis-a-vis that of others, taking into account the relevant perspectives of other persons, and reaching any kind of (...) sense in common between perspectives. The institutionalization of this strategy in 20th century academic life is amply and insightfully documented in Bruce Wilshire’s Moral Collapse of the University. Michael Polanyi, in his writings, adumbrates a post-critical intellectual ethos in whichthe making of sense in common between persons of differing perspective is central to the enterprise of teaching, learning, and research. Key elements of such an intellectual ethos are articulated and explored. (shrink)
This paper essays an account of William H. Poteat's teaching--both what he taught and how he taught--as an effort to bring his students to a realization of the bankruptcy of the modern critical sensibility and help them negotiate a transition to a post-critical intellectual sensibility. Enigmatic aspects of his teaching become intelligible through considering them in light of traditional disciplines of spiritual formation.
David Naugle’s book, Worldview: The History of a Concept, offers a comprehensive, interdisciplinary history and analysis of the concept of worldview from an Evangelical Reformed perspective with the aim of converting it to Christian use-specifically, to disabuse it from association with historicisnl, relativism, and anti-realism. Despite his theological agenda, his wide ranging discussion provides good food for thought to anyone interested in the nature, history, and developnlent of the concept of worldview and the problems of historicism, relativism, and anti-realism. While (...) his account of Polanyi’s understanding of worldview in connection vvith the natural sciences is sympathetic and sound, he does not draw as fully as he could have on the resources of Polanyi’s thought in developing his own more general understanding of worldview. (shrink)
This article reviews Michael Polanyi’s Post-Critical Epistemology by Andy F. Sanders but goes on to articulate certain crucial aspects of Polanyi’s post-critical understanding of truth that seem to be overlooked in Sanders’ account and which challenge conventional analyses of truth.
This article is a review of Deep Postmodernism by Jerry H. Gill. In this book Gill juxtaposes and compares the philosophies of Whitehead, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Polanyi, and Austin—philosophies that on the surface are very different but, examined closely, are remarkably complementary and convergent in respect of their challenging and revising key assumptions of modern thought relating to topics of reality, linguistic meaning, embodiment, and knowing. Their critiques resonate with several of the critiques of well-known postmodern thinkers but go deeper by (...) reconstructing the key assumptions in question. I compare Gill’s conception of deep postmodern philosophy with Polanyi’s conception of post-critical philosophy. Gill’s book is significant in setting out in one place the beachhead that these five thinkers (and others akin to them) have established in overcoming the philosophically sterile dead-ends that modernist and postmodernist thought have bequeathed us. (shrink)
This paper represents one attempt to implement a post-critical approach to teaching introduction to philosophy, in contrast with the usual approach which serves to re-establish the critical paradigm that Polanyi’s “post-critical philosophy” is meant to challenge and displace. It aims to have students discover their own fiduciary access to reality and rely upon it while slowly building competence in critical analysis of the principal intellectual options in the history of philosophy.
This is a theoretical paper. A little theory goes a long way in history, for me; but it is good to collect as much as is feasible in one paper, so that gaps and inconsistencies can be noticed. I use ‘theory’ in the definite sense of a set of hypothetical statements such that deductions can be made and compared with data, facts, or generalizations obtained in some other way than as derivation from theory. Deductions need not always be rigorous, and (...) there may be two or more ‘solutions’ obtainable, of which the scientist may choose one and discard the rest . I am ignoring the differences between propositions, demonstrations, problems, and the like. Actually there must always be several statements, including rules of procedure, in the set; but often many are assumed and only the new or controversial one is stated as ‘the’ hypothesis of Mr X. (shrink)
These reflections summarize and critically respond to Esther Meek’s Longing to Know: The Philosophy of Knowledge for Ordinary People (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press/Baker Book House, 2003. Pp. 208.$16.99. ISBN 1-58743-060-6). The book seeks to explain on the basis ofthe ideas of Michael Polanyi how ordinary acts of knowing happen to work, how they are indeed instances of genuine knowing, and, incomparison with them, how knowing God can possibly work and be a live possibility. Meek’s argument’s most vulnerable premise is (...) its unquestioned acceptance of Scripture as an authoritative guide, which directly raises the question whether Meek’s position is fully post-critical in the sense identified by Polanyi, and indirectly raises the question how Meek is able to handle religious pluralism. (shrink)
In a number of recent discussions of non-standard, Philosophy programs vaarious ages have been identified as the focus for spontaneous or exceptional interest in philosophising. Such claims, supporting a particular population as naturally suited to philosophical inquiry, are based as often as not, on anecdotes that exhibit telling instances of philosophical activity. Needless to say, such motivated activity occurring spontaneously and outside of a formal classroom may occur in many contexts and at various ages. If professional educators egar to support (...) philsophical programs on the basis of the naturalness of the philosophical enterprise are to warrant their interest on the basis of claims to age-appropriateness, some reasonable attempt at gathering empirical data is required. We offer the questionaire on the following pages as a probe to be used by interested educators and others. (shrink)
This paper presents an empirical test of Schlegel's “interaction interpretation” of the theory of special relativity. Analysis of the UTC time scales maintained at various observatory sites over the world indicates that neither Schlegel's “interaction interpretation” of the theory of relativity nor the conventional “space-time coordinate transformation interpretation” of relativity can significantly improve agreement between the UTC time scales. Instead evidence for the effects of accelerations on clock rates is suggested.