12 found
Order:
  1.  18
    The Normative Significance of Desires.Dalia Drai - 2012 - Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (4):417-434.
  2.  39
    Reasons Have No Weight.Dalia Drai - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):60-76.
    Practical reasoning is often described as weighing reasons. When one deliberates about what to do one puts all the reasons for the action on one side and all the reasons against the action on the other side. The balance between both sides determines the outcome of the deliberation. Assuming that this description is correct, the next question is how the different reasons for and against the action determine the outcome of the deliberation. This is the place where the notion of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  31
    The Slingshot Argument: An Improved Version.Dalia Drai - 2002 - Ratio 15 (2):194–204.
    In the paper I exploit Frege's notions of sense and synonymity in order to amend the slingshot argument. The main emendation is to replace the assumption about logical equivalence by an assumption about synonymity. While the replaced assumption begs the question about the reference of sentences, the replacing assumption has much more theoretical support from Frege's general conception of sense and reference and the relation between them. In the paper I use a specific notion of synonymity which I believe is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  4.  78
    Supervenience and Moral Realism.Luc Bovens & Dalia Drai - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (1-2):241-245.
    Blackburn argues that moral supervenience in conjunction with the lack of entailments from naturalistic to moral judgments poses a challenge to moral realism. Klagge and McFetridge try to avert the challenge by appealing to synthetically necessary connections between natural and moral properties. Blackburn rejoins that, even if there are such connections, the challenge still remains. We remain agnostic on the question whether there are such connections, but argue against Blackburn that, if there are indeed such connections, then the challenge to (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5.  66
    The Phenomenal Sorites and Response Dependence.Dalia Drai - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):619 – 631.
    Since Nelson Goodman 1951, the assumption that phenomenal indiscriminability is non-transitive is taken generally for granted. Moreover, this assumption was used (by Goodman 1951, Travis 1985, Dummett 1975 and others) to argue against the existence or coherence of subjective and/or observational properties. Recently, however, the assumption has been questioned [Fara 2001] and I agree with Fara that the assumption is much more problematic than was thought, partly because it is not clear what is meant by the relation of phenomenal indiscriminability, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  67
    Externalism and Identity.Dalia Drai - 2003 - Synthese 134 (3):463-475.
    The main aim of this paper is to show that there is one version of supervenience of the mental on the physical which is entailed by token-token identity (I call this version change-supervenience); and to establish that of the other better known versions of supervenience in the literature (which I call difference-supervenience), none are so entailed. One consequence of this is that Burge's thought experiments while successful in refuting difference-supervenience cannot in themselves refute identity thesis. However, the introduction of change (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  37
    Moral Supervenience and Moral Thinking.Dalia Drai - 2000 - Disputatio (8):1-13.
    The paper aims at meeting Blackburn’s challenge to explain the non-reductive supervenience of moral predicates on natural ones. It offers a critical examination of Hare’s model of moral thinking which can be used as a candidate for such an explanation. It is argued that, as it stands, Hare’s model fails to meet Blackburn’s challenge. Yet some revisions of the model are suggested, and it is claimed that the improved version does supply the required explanation. The model suggested in the paper (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  12
    Fregean Facts.Dalia Drai - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):161-168.
    Two important Fregean ideas appear to conflict. The first is that a thought can be decomposed in different ways, and the second is that a thought is constituted by the senses of its constituents. This paper is a defense of Dummett’s suggestion of a way to reconcile between those two theses through the claim that although the same thought can be structured in different ways by different sentences; one of the structures is privileged. My defense focuses on the charge raised (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  9
    Is Love Based On Reasons?Dalia Drai - 2016 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 12 (1):5-26.
    The aim of the paper is to understand what is involved in the claim that a mental state in general and love in particular, is based on reasons. Love, like many other mental states, can be evaluated in various ways: it can be considered appropriate, deserved, enriching, perverse, destructive etc. but this does not mean that love is based on reasons. In this paper I present and defend a test that a mental state has to satisfy if it is to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  20
    What is a Physical Event?Dalia Drai - 1994 - Philosophical Papers 23 (2):129-135.
  11. Supervenience and Realism.Dalia Drai - 1999
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. The Slingshot Argument: An Improved Version.Dalia Drai - 2002 - Ratio 15 (2):194-204.
    In the paper I exploit Frege's notions of sense and synonymity in order to amend the slingshot argument. The main emendation is to replace the assumption about logical equivalence by an assumption about synonymity. While the replaced assumption begs the question about the reference of sentences, the replacing assumption has much more theoretical support from Frege's general conception of sense and reference and the relation between them. In the paper I use a specific notion of synonymity which I believe is (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark