Selection of articles by leading international philosophers: Roger Crisp, Fred Feldman, Göran Hermerén, Derek Parfit, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Michael Smith, Paul Snowdon, Galen Strawson, Larry S. Temkin, Torbjörn Tännsjö, and Michael J. Zimmerman. Published in honour of Ingmar Persson on his fiftieth birthday.
A standard reaction to the problem of evil is to look for a greater good that can explain why God (with the traditional attributes) might have created this world instead of a seemingly better one which has no (or less) evil. This paper proposes an approach we call the Moral Progress Approach: Given the value of progress, a non-perfect world containing evil may be preferable to a perfect world without evil. This makes room for the possibility that this world, with (...) all its evil, may be preferable to a world with less evil. We argue that our proposal is different from apparently similar views such as soul-making theodicy. (shrink)
On a traditional interpretation of the substituted judgement standard a person who makes treatment decisions on behalf of a non-competent patient ought to decide as the patient would have decided had she been competent. I propose an alternative interpretation of SJS in which the surrogate is required to infer what the patient actually thought about these end-of-life decisions. In clarifying SJS it is also important to differentiate the patient's consent and preference. If SJS is part of an autonomy ideal of (...) the sort found in Kantian ethics, consent seems more important than preference. From a utilitarian perspective a preference-based reading of SJS seems natural. I argue that the justification of SJS within a utilitarian framework will boil down to the question whether a non-competent patient can be said to have any surviving preferences. If we give a virtue-ethical justification of SJS the relative importance of consent and preferences depends on which virtue one stresses-respect or care. I argue that SJS might be an independent normative method for extending the patient's autonomy, both from a Kantian and a virtue ethical perspective. (shrink)
In this paper I will defend a kind of human-centered perspective regarding ethical questions wherein the interests of humans and nonhumans alike are involved. Compared to other species, however, the idea that there is something special about being human is commonly vague. For example, it is unclear whether the thought is being a human being is important in itself, or it is important to be like a human being — that is, to have the capacities which a normal adult human (...) being enjoys. I build my defense of human dignity on the claim that we regard a biological human being as a being of intrinsic importance, which is what is about. However, I also consider the ethical implications of, which concerns the moral significance of personhood. I argue that the idea of a special intrinsic value of being a human is applicable only to cases where we deal with nonpersons. I claim that in spite of this qualification, we might defend a substantial principle of human dignity founded upon this generalization. (shrink)
Provocation is an integral part of Socrates’ philosophical method. Does provocation have a similar methodological function in art? My tentative answer is no. In the Socratic method, provocation is used both on an individual level to force a person to think better and on a general level in order to keep a society awake. A society should never rest but “be stirred into life.” Philosophy is a teleological practice with truth or enlightenment as its telos. Art has no well-defined telos, (...) the place and use of provocation in art is therefore debatable. But for art to be something rather than anything, I argue that a provocative work of art has to provide for the aesthetic qualities of how the provocation is performed. Provocation without instrumental qualities is atypical in philosophy, whereas provocation without intrinsic qualities is atypical in art. Using this as a normative guide, we may claim that instrumental success is more important than intrinsic success in philosophy and that the opposite holds for art, as far as provocation is concerned. I conclude by commenting on two Swedish examples of provocation in art from this perspective. (shrink)
We often assume that hypothetical approval – either in the form of preferences or consent – under ideal conditions adds to the legitimacy of an arrangement or act. I want to show that this assumption, reasonable as it may seem, will also give rise to ethical problems. I focus on three problem areas: prudence, euthanasia and coercive psychiatric treatment. If we are to count as prudentially or morally␣relevant those preferences you would have if you were informed and rational, we will (...) run into difficulties in all these areas if your actual and rational preferences are at variance with each other. In the prudential sphere we may question the personal value of satisfying preferences that a person does not actually have. In this case our problem concerns the point of satisfying a rational preference in conflict with an actual one. In the cases of euthanasia and coercive care it concerns instead whether it would be morally right to do such a thing. I doubt there is a simple solution to our problem. In this paper at most I prepare the way for a solution or for wiser decisions in the hard cases, by pointing out what they will have to deal with. (shrink)
In this article I discuss the relationship between the victim’s and the perpetrator’s guilt in a rape situation. Does recognition of the victim’s guilt automatically remove responsibility from the perpetrator? One way of arguing that is does is to lean on an expanded version of the principle that “ought implies can”, which implies that the magnitude of the difficulty involved in abstaining from a certain action will affect the agent’s responsibility for it. This idea is firmly established in both common (...) sense and moral practice, but I believe that it rests on the mistaken view that can is a gradable concept. Can is, I think, vague but categorical. This means that even if the perpetrator were provoked to some degree by his victim, this would not annul his responsibility so far as the expanded version of the principle is concerned. (shrink)