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Daniel M. Hausman [129]Daniel Hausman [31]Dan Hausman [2]Daniel Murray Hausman [2]
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Profile: Daniel Hausman (University of Wisconsin, Madison, London School of Economics)
  1. Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge.Daniel M. Hausman & Brynn Welch - 2010 - Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (1):123-136.
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  2.  27
    The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics.Daniel M. Hausman - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book offers a comprehensive overview of the structure, strategy and methods of assessment of orthodox theoretical economics. In Part I Professor Hausman explains how economists theorise, emphasising the essential underlying commitment of economists to a vision of economics as a separate science. In Part II he defends the view that the basic axioms of economics are 'inexact' since they deal only with the 'major' causes; unlike most writers on economic methodology, the author argues that it is the rules that (...)
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  3.  26
    Causal Asymmetries.Daniel M. Hausman - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book, by one of the pre-eminent philosophers of science writing today, offers the most comprehensive account available of causal asymmetries. Causation is asymmetrical in many different ways. Causes precede effects; explanations cite causes not effects. Agents use causes to manipulate their effects; they don't use effects to manipulate their causes. Effects of a common cause are correlated; causes of a common effect are not. This book explains why a relationship that is asymmetrical in one of these regards is asymmetrical (...)
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  4.  58
    Health, Naturalism, and Functional Efficiency.Daniel M. Hausman - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (4):519-541.
  5.  80
    Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition: A Restatement.Daniel M. Hausman & James Woodward - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):147-161.
    expose some gaps and difficulties in the argument for the causal Markov condition in our essay ‘Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition’ ([1999]), and we are grateful for the opportunity to reformulate our position. In particular, Cartwright disagrees vigorously with many of the theses we advance about the connection between causation and manipulation. Although we are not persuaded by some of her criticisms, we shall confine ourselves to showing how our central argument can be reconstructed and to casting doubt (...)
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  6.  10
    [Book Review] Economic Analysis and Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW]Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson - 1998 - Ethics 109 (1):198-200.
  7.  18
    Health and Functional Efficiency.Daniel M. Hausman - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6):634-647.
    This essay argues that what is central to Christopher Boorse’s biostatistical theory of disease as statistically subnormal part function (BST) are comparisons of the “functional efficiency” of parts and processes and that statistical considerations serve only to pick out a healthy level of functional efficiency. On this interpretation, the distinction between health and pathology is less important than comparisons of functional efficiency, which are entirely independent of statistical considerations. The clarifications or revisions of the BST that this essay offers are (...)
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  8. Hedonism and Welfare Economics.Daniel M. Hausman - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):321-344.
    This essay criticizes the proposal recently defended by a number of prominent economists that welfare economics be redirected away from the satisfaction of people's preferences and toward making people happy instead. Although information about happiness may sometimes be of use, the notion of happiness is sufficiently ambiguous and the objections to identifying welfare with happiness are sufficiently serious that welfare economists are better off using preference satisfaction as a measure of welfare. The essay also examines and criticizes the position associated (...)
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  9. Preference Satisfaction and Welfare Economics.Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-25.
    The tenuous claims of cost-benefit analysis to guide policy so as to promote welfare turn on measuring welfare by preference satisfaction and taking willingness-to-pay to indicate preferences. Yet it is obvious that people's preferences are not always self-interested and that false beliefs may lead people to prefer what is worse for them even when people are self-interested. So welfare is not preference satisfaction, and hence it appears that cost-benefit analysis and welfare economics in general rely on a mistaken theory of (...)
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  10.  67
    What's Wrong with Health Inequalities?Daniel M. Hausman - 2007 - Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (1):46–66.
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  11.  35
    Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy and Public Policy.Daniel Hausman, Michael McPherson & Debra Satz - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book shows through argument and numerous policy-related examples how understanding moral philosophy can improve economic analysis, how moral philosophy can benefit from economists' analytical tools, and how economic analysis and moral philosophy together can inform public policy. Part I explores the idea of rationality and its connections to ethics, arguing that when they defend their formal model of rationality, most economists implicitly espouse contestable moral principles. Part II addresses the nature and measurement of welfare, utilitarianism and cost-benefit analysis. Part (...)
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  12.  94
    Revealed Preference, Belief, and Game Theory.Daniel M. Hausman - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):99-115.
    The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.
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  13.  18
    Protecting Groups From Genetic Research.Daniel Hausman - 2008 - Bioethics 22 (3):157–165.
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  14. Systems Without a Graphical Causal Representation.Daniel M. Hausman, Reuben Stern & Naftali Weinberger - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1925-1930.
    There are simple mechanical systems that elude causal representation. We describe one that cannot be represented in a single directed acyclic graph. Our case suggests limitations on the use of causal graphs for causal inference and makes salient the point that causal relations among variables depend upon details of causal setups, including values of variables.
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  15.  78
    Sympathy, Commitment, and Preference.Daniel M. Hausman - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):33-50.
    While very much in Sen's camp in rejecting revealed preference theory and emphasizing the complexity, incompleteness, and context dependence of preference and the intellectual costs of supposing that all the factors influencing choice can be captured by a single notion of preference, this essay contests his view that economists should recognize multiple notions of preference. It argues that Sen's concerns are better served by embracing a single conception of preference and insisting on the need for analysis of the multiple factors (...)
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  16. Making Fair Choices on the Path to Universal Health Coverage.Ole Frithjof Norheim, Trygve Ottersen, Bona Chitah, Richard Cookson, Norman Daniels, Nir Eyal, Walter Flores, Axel Gosseries, Daniel Hausman, Samia Hurst, Lydia Kapiriri, Toby Ord, Shlomi Segall, Frehiwot Defaye, Alex Voorhoeve & Alicia Yamin - 2014 - World Health Organisation.
    This report by the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage addresses how countries can make fair progress towards the goal of universal coverage. It explains the relevant tradeoffs between different desirable ends and offers guidance on how to make these tradeoffs.
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  17. The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons.Daniel M. Hausman - 1995 - Mind 104 (415):473-490.
  18.  5
    Hedonism and Welfare Economics: Daniel M. Hausman.Daniel M. Hausman - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):321-344.
    This essay criticizes the proposal recently defended by a number of prominent economists that welfare economics be redirected away from the satisfaction of people's preferences and toward making people happy instead. Although information about happiness may sometimes be of use, the notion of happiness is sufficiently ambiguous and the objections to identifying welfare with happiness are sufficiently serious that welfare economists are better off using preference satisfaction as a measure of welfare. The essay also examines and criticizes the position associated (...)
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  19.  27
    Behavioural Economics and Paternalism.Daniel M. Hausman - 2018 - Economics and Philosophy 34 (1):53-66.
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  20.  76
    Causal Relata: Tokens, Types, or Variables?Daniel Murray Hausman - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (1):33-54.
    The literature on causation distinguishes between causal claims relating properties or types and causal claims relating individuals or tokens. Many authors maintain that corresponding to these two kinds of causal claims are two different kinds of causal relations. Whether to regard causal relations among variables as yet another variety of causation is also controversial. This essay maintains that causal relations obtain among tokens and that type causal claims are generalizations concerning causal relations among these tokens.
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  21.  4
    The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics.David Phillips & Daniel M. Hausman - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (2):348.
  22. A Lockean Argument for Universal Access to Health Care.Daniel M. Hausman - 2011 - Social Philosophy and Policy 28 (2):166-191.
    This essay defends the controversial and indeed counterintuitive claim that there is a good argument to be made from a Lockean perspective for government action to guarantee access to health care. The essay maintains that this argument is in some regards more robust than the well-known argument in defense of universal health care spelled out by Norman Daniels, which this essay also examines in some detail. Locke's view that government should protect people's lives, property, and freedom–where freedom is understood as (...)
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  23.  51
    Manipulation and the Causal Markov Condition.Daniel Hausman & James Woodward - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):846-856.
    This paper explores the relationship between a manipulability conception of causation and the causal Markov condition (CM). We argue that violations of CM also violate widely shared expectations—implicit in the manipulability conception—having to do with the absence of spontaneous correlations. They also violate expectations concerning the connection between independence or dependence relationships in the presence and absence of interventions.
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  24.  27
    Probabilistic Causality and Causal Generalizations.Daniel M. Hausman - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 47--63.
  25.  37
    Valuing Health.Daniel M. Hausman - 2006 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (3):246-274.
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  26.  40
    Essays on Philosophy and Economic Methodology.Daniel M. Hausman - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection brings together the essays of one of the foremost American philosophers of economics. Cumulatively they offer fresh perspectives on foundational questions such as: what sort of science is economics? and how successful can economists be in acquiring knowledge of their subject matter?
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  27. Causal Asymmetries.Daniel M. Hausman - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):933-937.
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  28. Egalitarianism Reconsidered.Daniel M. Hausman & Matt Sensat Waldren - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):567-586.
    This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building on discussions by T.M. Scanlon and David Miller, we argue that egalitarianism is better understood in terms of commitments to six egalitarian objectives. A consequence of our view, in contrast to Martin O'Neill's “non-intrinsic egalitarianism,“ is that egalitarianism is better (...)
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  29.  68
    Problems with Realism in Economics.Daniel M. Hausman - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):185.
    This essay attempts to distinguish the pressing issues for economists and economic methodologists concerning realism in economics from those issues that are of comparatively slight importance. In particular I shall argue that issues concerning the goals of science are of considerable interest in economics, unlike issues concerning the evidence for claims about unobservables, which have comparatively little relevance. In making this argument, this essay raises doubts about the two programs in contemporary economic methodology that raise the banner of realism. In (...)
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  30.  11
    On the Econ Within.Daniel M. Hausman - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (1):26-32.
    This essay examines the critique of behavioral economics that Infante, Lecouteaux and Sugden offer in:"Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent.” It identifies and questions three main criticisms that ILS make: a methodological criticism, alleging that there is no psychological basis for the attribution of purified preferences, an epistemological criticism, alleging that there is little evidence for claims about purified preferences, and a normative criticism, arguing that policies should aim to facilitate people’s choices rather than to satisfy purified preferences. The (...)
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  31.  23
    Group Risks, Risks to Groups, and Group Engagement in Genetics Research.Daniel M. Hausman - 2007 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 17 (4):351-369.
    : This essay distinguishes between two kinds of group harms: harms to individuals in virtue of their membership in groups and harms to "structured" groups that have a continuing existence, an organization, and interests of their own. Genetic research creates risks of causing both kinds of group harms, and engagement with the groups at risk can help to mitigate those harms. The two kinds of group harms call for different kinds of group engagement.
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  32.  58
    The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology.Daniel M. Hausman (ed.) - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    An anthology of works on the philosophy of economics, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Completely revamped, this edition contains new selections, a revised introduction and a bibliography. The volume contains 26 chapters organized into five parts: Classic Discussions, Positivist and Popperian Views, Ideology and Normative Economics, Branches and Schools of Economics and Their Methodological Problems and New Directions in Economic Methodology. It includes crucial historical contributions by figures such as Mill, Marx, Weber, Robbins, (...)
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  33. Polling and Public Policy.Daniel M. Hausman - 2004 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14 (3):241-247.
    : This commentary distinguishes five reasons why one might want to conduct a survey concerning people's beliefs about death and the permissibility of harvesting organs: (1) simply to learn what people know and want; (2) to determine if current law and practice conform to the wishes of the population; (3) to determine the level of popular support for or opposition to policy changes; (4) to ascertain the causes and effects of popular beliefs and attitudes; and (5) to provide guidance in (...)
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  34. Causal Asymmetries.Daniel M. Hausman - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):243-246.
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  35. Why Look Under the Hood?Daniel Hausman - 1992 - In Essays in Philosophy and Economic Methodology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 70-73.
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  36.  57
    John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Economics.Daniel M. Hausman - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):363-385.
    John Stuart Mill regards economics as an inexact and separate science which employs a deductive method. This paper analyzes and restates Mill's views and considers whether they help one to understand philosophical peculiarities of contemporary microeconomic theory. The author concludes that it is philosophically enlightening to interpret microeconomics as an inexact and separate science, but that Mill's notion of a deductive method has only a little to contribute.
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  37. Mistakes About Preferences in the Social Sciences.Daniel Hausman - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):3-25.
    Preferences are the central notion in mainstream economic theory, yet economists say little about what preferences are. This article argues that preferences in mainstream positive economics are comparative evaluations with respect to everything relevant to value or choice, and it argues against three mistaken views of preferences: that they are matters of taste, concerning which rational assessment is inappropriate, that preferences coincide with judgments of expected self-interested benefit, and that preferences can be defined in terms of choices.
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  38. Are Markets Morally Free Zones?Daniel M. Hausman - 1989 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (4):317-333.
    Markets are central institutions in societies such as ours, and it seems appropriate to ask whether markets treat individuals justly or unjustly and whether choices individuals make concerning their market behavior are just or unjust. After all, markets influence most important features of our lives from the environment in which we live to the ways in which we find pleasure and fulfillment. Within market life we collectively determine the shape of human existence.<1>.
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  39.  26
    'Testing' Game Theory.Daniel M. Hausman - 2005 - Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (2):211-223.
    This paper considers whether game theory can be tested, what difficulties experimenters face in testing it, and what can be learned from attempts to test it. I emphasize that tests of game theory rely on fallible assumptions concerning particular features of the strategic situation and of the players. These do not render game theory untestable in principle, but they create serious problems. In coping with these problems, experimenters may use game theory to learn what games experimental subjects are playing.
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  40. Philosophy of Economics.Daniel M. Hausman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is a comprehensive anthology of works concerning the nature of economics as a science, including classic texts and essays exploring specific branches and schools of economics. Apart from the classics, most of the selections in the third edition are new, as are the introduction and bibliography. No other anthology spans the whole field and offers a comprehensive introduction to questions about economic methodology.
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  41.  3
    Preference Satisfaction and Welfare Economics: Daniel M. Hausman and Michael S. McPherson.Daniel M. Hausman - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-25.
    The tenuous claims of cost-benefit analysis to guide policy so as to promote welfare turn on measuring welfare by preference satisfaction and taking willingness-to-pay to indicate preferences. Yet it is obvious that people's preferences are not always self-interested and that false beliefs may lead people to prefer what is worse for them even when people are self-interested. So welfare is not preference satisfaction, and hence it appears that cost-benefit analysis and welfare economics in general rely on a mistaken theory of (...)
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  42.  47
    Causation, Agency, and Independence.Daniel M. Hausman - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):25.
    This paper explores versions of agency or manipulability theories of causation and argues that they are unacceptable both for the well-known reasons of their anthropomorphism, limited scope, and circularity and because they are subsumed by an alternative "independence" theory of causation, which is free of these difficulties.
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  43.  36
    Health Inequalities and Why They Matter.Daniel M. Hausman, Yukiko Asada & Thomas Hedemann - 2002 - Health Care Analysis 10 (2):177-191.
    Health inequalities are of concern both becausestudying them may help one learn how to improvehealth and because health inequalities may beunjust. This paper argues that attending tothese reasons why health inequalities may beimportant undercuts the claims of researchersat the World Health Organization in favor offocusing on individual health variation ratherthan on social group health differences. Inequalities in individual health are of littleinterest unless one goes on to study how theyare related to other factors.
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  44. Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare.Daniel M. Hausman - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is about preferences, principally as they figure in economics. It also explores their uses in everyday language and action, how they are understood in psychology and how they figure in philosophical reflection on action and morality. The book clarifies and for the most part defends the way in which economists invoke preferences to explain, predict and assess behavior and outcomes. Hausman argues, however, that the predictions and explanations economists offer rely on theories of preference formation that are in (...)
     
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  45.  21
    Causation and Experimentation.Daniel M. Hausman - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):143 - 154.
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  46.  87
    Equality of Autonomy.Daniel M. Hausman - 2009 - Ethics 119 (4):742-756.
  47.  18
    Social Scientific Naturalism and Experimentation in Economics.Daniel M. Hausman - 2012 - In Uskali Mäki, Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard & John Woods (eds.), Philosophy of Economics. North Holland. pp. 287.
  48.  7
    Rational Choice and Social Theory: A Comment.Daniel M. Hausman - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):96-102.
  49. Capital, Profits, and Prices: An Essay in the Philosophy of Economics.Daniel M. Hausman - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (4):387-392.
     
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  50.  34
    Theory Appraisal in Neoclassical Economics.Daniel M. Hausman - 1997 - Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (2):289-296.
    After answering relatively minor criticisms of The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics by Geert Reuten and Uskali Mäki, this essay grants their main charge that I could not sensibly defend the way economists assess theories while at the same time criticizing their insistence that economic theories be unified and of maximal scope. I should have said that economists are mistaken in their methods of assessment because they focus on the wrong data and because they unjustifiably insist that only unified (...)
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