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  1.  75
    Expressing Disagreement: A Presuppositional Indexical Contextualist Relativist Account.Dan López de Sa - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):153-165.
    Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement. Contextualism is a characteristically moderate implementation of the relativistic attempt to endorse such appearances. According to an often-voiced objection, although it straightforwardly accounts for the faultlessness, contextualism fails to respect “facts about disagreement.” With many other recent contributors to the debate, I contend that the notion of disagreement—“genuine,” “real,” “substantive,” “robust” disagreement—is indeed very flexible, and in particular can be constituted by contrasting attitudes. (...)
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  2.  80
    Disjunctions, Conjunctions, and Their Truthmakers.Dan López de Sa - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):417-425.
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) argues against attempts to preserve the entailment principle (or a restriction of it) while avoiding the explosion of truthmakers for necessities and truthmaker triviality. In doing so, he both defends the disjunction thesis--if something makes true a disjunctive truth, then it makes true one of its disjuncts--, and rejects the conjunction thesis--if something makes tue a conjunctive truth, then it makes true each of its conjuncts. In my discussion, I provide plausible counterexamples to the disjunction thesis, and (...)
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  3.  39
    Rigidity for Predicates and the Trivialization Problem.Dan López de Sa - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-13.
    According to the simple proposal about rigidity for predicates, a predicate is rigid (roughly) if it signifies the same property across the relevant worlds. Recent critics claim that this suffers from a trivialization problem: any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be trivially rigid, according to the proposal. In this paper a corresponding "problem" for ordinary singular terms is considered. A natural solution is provided by intuitions concerning the actual truth-value of identity statements involving them. The simple proposal for predicates (...)
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  4.  63
    The Over-Generalization Problem: Predicates Rigidly Signifying the "Unnatural".Dan López de Sa - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):263 - 272.
    According to the simple proposal, a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property across the different possible worlds. The simple proposal has been claimed to suffer from an over-generalization problem. Assume that one can make sense of predicates signifying properties, and assume that trivialization concerns, to the effect that the notion would cover any predicate whatsoever, can be overcome. Still, the proposal would over-generalize, the worry has it, by covering predicates for artifactual, social, or evaluative properties, such as (...)
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  5. Values Vs Secondary Qualities.Dan López de Sa - 2006 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):197-210.
    McDowell, responding to Mackie’s argument from queerness, defended realism about values by analogy to secondary qualities. A certain tension between two inter- pretations of McDowell’s response is highlighted. According to one, realism about val- ues would indeed be vindicated, but at the cost of failing to provide an appropriate response to Mackie’s argument; whereas according to the other, McDowell does pro- vide an adequate response, but evaluative realism is jeopardized.
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  6.  37
    Rigidity, General Terms, and Trivialization.Dan López de Sa - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):117 - 123.
    The simple proposal for a characterization of general term rigidity is in terms of sameness of designation in very possible world. Critics like Schwartz (2002) and Soames (2002) have argued that such a proposal would trivialize rigidity for general terms. Martí (2004) claims that the objection rests on the failure to distinguish what is expressed by a general term and the property designated. I argue here against such a response by showing that the trivialization problem reappears even if one pays (...)
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  7.  74
    The Case Against Evaluative Realism.Dan López de Sa - 2006 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (57):277-294.
    In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitibve causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.
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  8.  45
    Por Qué la Aposterioridad No (Basta, Según Kripke, Ni) Basta (Why Aposteriority is Not (Enough According to Kripke, nor is) Enough).de Sa Dan López - 2006 - Theoria 21 (3):245-255.
    Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the (...)
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  9. The Non-Circularity Constraint: Peacocke Vs. Peacocke.Dan López de Sa - 2003 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-2):85-93.
    According to the view that Peacocke elaborates in A Study of Concepts (1992), a concept can be individuated by providing the conditions a thinker must satisfy in order to possess that concept. Hence possessions conditions for concepts should be specifiable in a way that respects a non-circularity constraint. In a more recent paper “Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality” (1998a) Peacocke argues against his former view, in the light of the phenomenon of rationally accepting principles which do not follow from what (...)
     
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  10. Relativismo y operadores.Dan López de Sa - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):81-94.
    Critical notica (in Spanish) of *Relativism and Monadic Truth* (OUP 2009), by Cappelen and Hawthorne.
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  11. Non-Objective Truths: Comments on Kölbel's Criterion for Objectivity.Dan López de Sa - 2000 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 15 (38):209-228.
     
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  12. Defending “Restricted Particularism” From Jackson, Pettit & Smith.Dan Lopez de Sa - 2009 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 23 (2):133-143.
    According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith, “restricted particularism” is not affected by their supervenience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this objection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive similarities (...)
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  13. Vagueness as Semantic Indecision: Metaphysical Vagueness Vs Indeterminate Reference.Dan López de Sa - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (2):197-209.
    After presenting a negative characterization of metaphysical vagueness and the main tenets of the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, the paper critically discusses the objection that such a view requires that at least some vagueness not be just constituted by semantic indecision—but rather by the metaphysical vagueness of some semantic relations themselves submitted by Trenton Merricks and, more recently, Nathan Salmon.
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