Has the Internet changed the pattern of social relations? More specifically, have social relations undergone any systematic change during the recent widespread diffusion of new communications technology? This question is addressed using a unique longitudinal survey that bookends the entire period of Internet diffusion in two African nations and one Indian state. We analyze data on nine professional linkages reported by a population of agricultural and environmental scientists in Kenya, Ghana, and Kerala over a sixteen-year period. Factor analysis reveals two (...) clusters of relationships, one interpretable as traditional scientific exchange, the other indicating mediated forms of collaboration. While collaboration increases in frequency, friendship declines. We interpret this shift as a consequence of communications technology that facilitates formal projects, reducing the affective dimension of professional association. (shrink)

John is currently thinking that the sun is bright. Consider his occurrent belief or judgement that the sun is bright. Its content is that the sun is bright. This is a truth- evaluable content (which shall be our main concern) because it is capable of being true or false. In virtue of what natural, scientifically accessible facts does John’s judgement have this content? To give the correct answer to that question, and to explain why John’s judgement and (...) other contentful mental states have the contents they do in virtue of such facts, would be to naturalize mental content. (shrink)

Introduction There are some exceptions, which we shall see below, but virtually all theories in psychology and cognitive science make use of the notion of representation. Arguably, folk psychology also traffics in representations, or is at least strongly suggestive of their existence. There are many different types of things discussed in the psychological and philosophical literature that are candidates for representation-hood. First, there are the propositional attitudes – beliefs, judgments, desires, hopes etc. (see Chapters 9 and 17 of this volume). (...) If the propositional attitudes are representations, they are person-level representations – the judgment that the sun is bright pertains to John, not a subpersonal part of John. By contrast, the representations of edges in V1 of the cerebral cortex that neuroscientists talk about and David Marr’s symbolic representations of “zero-crossings” in early vision (Marr 1982) are at the “sub-personal” level – they apply to parts or states of a person (e.g. neural parts or computational states of the visual system). Another important distinction is often made among perceptual, cognitive, and action-oriented representations (e.g. motor commands). Another contrast lies between “stored representations” (e.g. memories) and “active representations” (e.g. a current perceptual state). Related to this is the distinction between “dispositional representations” and “occurrent representations.” Beliefs that are not currently being entertained are dispositional, e.g. your belief that the United States is in North America - no doubt you had this belief two minutes ago, but you were not consciously accessing it until you read this sentence. Occurrent representations, by contrast, are active, conscious thoughts or perceptions. Which leads us to another important distinction: 1 between conscious and non-conscious mental representations, once a bizarre-sounding distinction that has become familiar since Freud (see Chapter 4 of this volume). I mention these distinctions at the outset to give you some idea of the range of phenomena we will be considering, and to set the stage for our central “problem of representation”: what is a mental representation, exactly, and how do we go about deciding whether there are any? We know there are public representations of various kinds: words, maps, and pictures, among others.. (shrink)

Conventional medical ethics and the law draw a bright line distinguishing the permitted practice of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from the forbidden practice of active euthanasia by means of a lethal injection. When clinicians justifiably withdraw life-sustaining treatment, they allow patients to die but do not cause, intend, or have moral responsibility for, the patient's death. In contrast, physicians unjustifiably kill patients whenever they intentionally administer a lethal dose of medication. We argue that the differential moral assessment of these two (...) practices is based on a series of moral fictions – motivated false beliefs that erroneously characterize withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in order to bring accepted end-of-life practices in line with the prevailing moral norm that doctors must never kill patients. When these moral fictions are exposed, it becomes apparent that conventional medical ethics relating to end-of-life decisions is radically mistaken. (shrink)

Das Volksmärchen L’Arbre du Bœuf vom Typ ATU 511 [Ein-, Zwei-, Dreiäuglein] ist nach P. Delarue und M.-L. Tenèze das einzige französische Märchen, welches dem Subtyp AT 511 A [Kleiner Roter Ochse] angehört. L’Arbre du Bœuf ist darüber hinaus aufgrund einiger Motive besonders interessant, weil sie vermutlich aus archaischen Glaubensvorstellungen stammen: So ist die mystische „Reise zur Sonne“ ein bestimmendes Thema, welches seinen Ursprung im indoeuropäischen Mythos findet. Der Weltbaum als Axis Mundi und die Seelenbrücke sind Verbindungen zwischen dem Dies- (...) und Jenseits, die der Märchenheld ebenso wie der Schamane bei seiner ekstatischen Reise in die lichte Himmelswelt benutzt. Magische Tier- und Helferwesen treten im Zaubermärchen auf und sind integrale Bestandteile schamanistischer Glaubenswelten. Wenn im Märchen auf oder aus dem geopferten Ochsen als heiliges Tier der Weltbaum sprießt, so findet dieses Sujet Entsprechungen in urtümlichen Kosmogonien. Damit ideell verwandt ist vielleicht das Motiv vom „Tierhorn als Weltbaum“, welches sich in archaischen kosmologischen Vorstellungen findet und sich von da her womöglich ebenso in die Märchenwelten eingemischt hat. Le conte populaire L’Arbre du Bœuf du type ATU 511 [Un Œil, Deux Yeux, Trois Yeux] d’après P. Delarue et M.-L. Tenèze est le seul conte de fées français appartenant au sous-type AT 511 A [Petit Bœuf Rouge]. En outre, L’Arbre du Bœuf est particulièrement intéressant en raison de certains motifs probablement issus de croyances archaïques : Le « voyage mystique au soleil » est un thème déterminant qui tire son origine du mythe indo-européen. L’Arbre du Monde en tant qu’Axis Mundi et le pont d’autre monde sont des liens entre l’ici et l’au-delà, que le héros de conte et le chaman utilisent dans leur voyage extatique dans le ciel lumineux. Les animaux magiques et les êtres auxiliaires apparaissent dans le conte de fées et font partie intégrante du monde de croyances chamaniques. Tout comme dans le conte de fées, l’Arbre du Monde pousse sur ou bien du bœuf sacrifié et sacré, ce motif trouve des correspondances dans les anciennes cosmogonies. Le motif de la « corne animale en tant qu’Arbre du Monde » est peut-être associé à ce concept mythique. Il se trouve dans les conceptions cosmologiques archaïques et s’est mêlé de là au monde des contes de fées. The folk tale L’Arbre du Bœuf of the type ATU 511 [One Eye, Two Eyes, Three Eyes] is according to P. Delarue and M.-L. Tenèze the only French fairy tale that belongs to the subtype AT 511 A [Little Red Ox]. In addition, L’Arbre du Bœuf is particularly interesting due to some of the motifs that probably stem from archaic beliefs: The mystical “journey to the sun” is a determining theme, which finds its origin in the Indo-European myth. The World Tree as Axis Mundi and the Soul Bridge are connections between this world and the hereafter which are harnessed by the fairy tale hero as well as the shaman in his ecstatic journey into the bright world of heaven. Magical animals and helping entities appear in the fairy tale and are fundamental parts of shamanistic beliefs. The World Tree as it sprouts on or out of the sacrificed and sacred ox finds its equivalent in ancient cosmogonies. Perhaps ideally related to this is the motif of the “animal horn as the World Tree”, which is present in archaic cosmological conceptions and has possibly interfered with the fairytale worlds as well. (shrink)

In Jacobsen, M.H. (ed.): Sociologies of the Unnoticed. Palgrave/Macmillan, 2008.

What follows is a brief commentary to Dan Sperber's plenary lecture at ECAP7 "The deconstruction of social unreality". Sperber's main criticism to Searle's socia lontology is that Searle attributes a causal role to mere Cambridge properties. Sperber then argues that declarations do not create institutional facts causally, criticizes the Serlean theory of recognition/acceptance and put forward his thesis using the concept cognitive causal chains.

In Subjectivity and Selfhood Dan Zahavi presents the fruits of his thinking on a nexus of issues regarding the experiential structure of consciousness and its relation to selfhood. The central theme of the book is that the “notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness, and consequently it is indispensable to a variety of disciplines such as philosophy of mind, social philosophy, psychiatry, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience”. Proceeding, as in his previously published work, on the assumption (...) that the study of consciousness can benefit from insights to be found in phenomenology, Zahavi defends his thesis largely by way of an investigation of the work of an array of phenomenologists, including Heidegger, Sartre, and, most notably, Husserl. In what follows I will not comment on the full range of topics dealt with in Subjectivity and Selfhood—e.g., reflection and attention, self and other, theory of mind —but will instead focus on two of the book’s more prominent strands of argument: that all conscious states are tacitly self-aware, and that the self is to be understood as an “experiential dimension.”. (shrink)

Professor Dan Markel was an expert criminal lawyer at Florida State University. He was murdered in broad daylight at his home. Here is a part of a hypothesis that no one has yet to dispute or otherwise.

Modern aesthetic Minimalism is neither a flight to abstract spirituality, nor an extracting process of a primordial essence. It is concerned, rather, with the aesthetic object as pure refiguration and the production of “concrete universality”, of form as content and possibility of itself. This becomes especially apparent in the Minimalism of the 1960s. The main focus of this paper will be on Dan Flavin’s luminous minimalism. The latter is characterised by a style that, though simple in appearance, introduced a higher (...) level of complexity with regard to the relation between form and matter, concept and thing, in artistic production. Neither sculptures nor paintings, Flavin’s works fall right under Donald Judd’s category of “specific objects”. Nevertheless, his luminous creations are not particularly specific, just as they are not strictly speaking objects. Their main material – colour-light – is as intangible and diffuse, as its origin – the fluorescent lamp – is commonplace and artificial. Drawing on such influential theorists of art as Theodor W. Adorno, Peter Bürger, Clement Greenberg and Jacques Rancière, this paper studies the lessons that philosophy can learn from Flavin's light minimalism, most notably in relation to the notions of aesthetic materiality and sublimation. (shrink)

L’émergence de l’installation au milieu du xxe siècle se fait de manière concomitante avec l’art de la performance et de la vidéo. Les artistes de l’installation se sont donc emparés de l’image en mouvement et ont développé des dispositifs au caractère performatif vis-à-vis du visiteur. Dans les années 1970, Dan Graham révèle la visibilité et la perception d’un « invu », à savoir le temps comme matière et l’espace comme vecteur proprioceptif dans ses installations vidéographiques reposant sur l’effet de time (...) delay. Face à l’enregistrement et à la retransmission en décalé de sa propre image, le visiteur prend conscience de son existence et de son rapport aux autres. Plus récemment, les installations « post-cinématographiques » ont permis de renouveler ces questionnements. L’exposition Servitudes de Jesper Just témoigne de ce dialogue entre installation audiovisuelle, espace architectural et perception du visiteur. Projeté sur des écrans, disséminé dans les sous-sols du Palais de Tokyo, le film de Just n’est visible que par fragments, le visiteur devenant le « monteur » d’une narration ambiguë et hétérodoxe, et devant pour cela se déplacer à travers les enchevêtrements de rampes métalliques, créant une « architecture spectatorielle de l’installation ». The emergence of installation art in the middle of the twentieth century is concomitant with the art of performance and video. The artists therefore took possession of the moving image and developed devices with a performative character vis-à-vis the visitor. In the 1970s, Dan Graham manifests the visibility and the perception of an “invu” which is time as matter and space as a proprioceptive vector in his video installations based on the effect of time delay. Faced with the recording and retransmission of his/her own image, the visitor becomes aware of his/her existence and its relationship to others. More recently, the “post-cinematographic” installations made it possible to investigate anew these questions. The exhibition Servitudes by Jesper Just testify of this dialogue between an audiovisual installation, an architectural space and the visitor’s perception. Shown on screens, scattered in the basements of the Palais de Tokyo, the film of Just was visible only in fragments. Hence the visitor became the “editor” of an ambiguous and heterodox narration. To do so he/she had to move through the entanglements of metal ramps, creating a “spectatorial architecture of the installation”. (shrink)

A critique of the view of "cognitive liberalism," as articulated in recent papers by Dan Lloyd , is presented. The main arguments are directed at Lloyd's claim that representational capacities may be found in organisms as simple as marine mollusks and at his formal analysis of cognitive representation as a type of information-bearing conditional dependency. An alternative interpretation-based view of cognitive representation is then briefly sketched.

On Dan Zahavi’s Husserlian account of the subject, the self-temporalization of subjectivity presupposes what he calls an “immediate impressional self-manifestation.” It follows from this view that self-awareness is an inherent power of the one who will be subject, rather than a product of sociality introduced into life from without. In this paper, I argue against Zahavi’s position by going over the development of Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, examining the positions Husserl takes and the reasons that he comes to these positions. (...) Once we reach Husserl’s ultimate account, it becomes evident that Zahavi’s position is untenable. (shrink)

In order to carry out “a great and important piece of work, and that in a complete and lasting way”, Kant claims that one must join one’s “effort with that of the author”. The reading of a work, therefore, must try to embrace “the articulation or structure of the system, which yet matters most when it comes to judging its unity and soundness”. This structure and articulation, however, may not be so easily accessible; it may, rather, be latent under “ (...) class='Hi'>bright colours [that] paint over and make unrecognizable” the argument’s essence, often confusing the reader, who “cannot quickly enough attain a survey of the whole”. Now, it would be expected, then, that Kant, condemning such “ornaments”, would not employ those resources I n his writings. However, it is curious that not infrequently he makes use of such “bright colours”. The present paper aims at pointing out some passages of Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy in which it is possible to identify such “colouring”. (shrink)

Daniel Hausman’s book ‘Valuing Health’ is a valuable contribution to our understanding of QALYs and DALYs and to moving health economics to adopting a broader perspective than that taken in conventional cost-effectiveness analysis. Hausman’s attempt at constructing a public value table for health states without having recourse to data from population preferences studies is also a fascinating read. But I have serious concerns about his resulting table. Hausman’s views on which dimensions of health a benevolent liberal state should care about (...) are essentially not different from what has long been emphasized in health economists’ work on valuations of health outcomes. His table would have been helpful as a sketch if it was the first attempt in health economics to quantify numerically the societal value of different types and degrees of health improvement. But research in the field has gone far beyond that. Multi-attribute utility instruments with much more accurate health classification systems than Hausman’s sketch are now at hand. Available also are models of societal valuations of QALYs that are broadly consistent with general population values, incorporate wider concerns than Hausman’s table does and do not have the questionable numerical properties that characterize Hausman’s sketch. (shrink)

The claim of this paper is to present Spinoza’s view on self-esteem and positive reciprocity, which replaces the human being in a monistic psycho-dynamical affective framework, instead of a dualistic pedestal above nature. Without naturalising the human being in an eliminative materialistic view as many recent neuro-scientific conceptions of the mind do, Spinoza finds an important entry point in a panpsychist and holistic perspective, presenting the complexity of the human being, which is not reducible to the psycho-physiological conditions of life. (...) From a panpsychist point of view, qualities and values emerge from the world, in a situation similar to what could be seen in animism, or early childhood psychology, where the original distance between the mind and the exterior thing is reduced ad minima, and both can even interrelate in a confusing manner. Human reality is nevertheless a social reality, it supposes a basis for shared competencies, that we will present as grounded on the one hand of the sustaining character of the essence of the animal-man as will-to-power. Negatively speaking we all share same asocial tendencies and affects. This aspect is not only negative but it is also a will to develop and master the environment, because values have an onto-metaphysical immanent dimension in nature, not because there is an individual bottom-up will to survive, but rather a will to live in harmony with the surrounding world. On the other hand, we shall see that Spinoza understood and described perfectly the power of the mind over the power of the affects, as a co-constituting dimension, which is alienating natural dependencies, leaving an inner space for the objectification of ethical values, not related to mere compensation mechanisms. (shrink)

One might interpret the locution “the phenomenological mind” as a declaration of a philosophical thesis that the mind is in some sense essentially phenomenological. Authors Gallagher & Zahavi appear to have intended it, however, to refer more to the phenomenological tradition and its methods of analysis. From the subheading of this book, one gains an impression that readers will see how the resources and perspectives from the phenomenological tradition illuminate various issues in philosophy of mind and cognitive science in particular. (...) This impression is reinforced upon finding that many analytic philosophers’ names appear throughout the book. That appearance notwithstanding, as well as the distinctiveness of the book as an introduction, the authors do not sufficiently engage with analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The diversity and complexity of the arguments and criticisms among philosophers on the question of the actual existence of the self can be condensed into two contrasting issues: The self is an experienced phenomenon that is generalized into a concept to assign to the cognitive subject as a tool for identification, or the self has its own existence as a transcendental entity that is activated and developed through interactions between the cognitive subject and the environment. Dan Zahavi summed up the (...) endless controversy over the formation of the self in phenomenology, existentialism, and new insights in neuroscience to conclude that the existence of the self is only meaningful when it is "the experiential self." My article will focus on two issues: firstly, the self is formed by the interaction between the subject and the object in which the object is actively engaged in the control space of the subject; secondly, the understanding of the subject’s self-perception process, through the perspective of neuroscience, is triggered by the subject seeing itself in the other person. (shrink)

Dan Zahavi presents a rich new study of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. What kind of philosophical project was Husserl engaged in? What is ultimately at stake in so-called phenomenological analyses? In this volume Zahavi makes it clear why Husserl had such a decisive influence on 20th-century philosophy.

This collection of previously published essays attempts to rescue the classical orthodoxy of Milton's theology from the oft-repeated charge of Arianism. With the discovery of Milton's theological essay Christian Discourses in 1823, scholars concluded that Milton's theological orthodoxy was questionable; he was suspected of the heresy of Arianism. Paradise Lost was then reinterpreted in the light of this widely accepted charge. This interpretation has lasted for over 100 years. Beginning in the 1950's, and quite independently, the authors of these essays (...) published papers attempting to show that the charge of Arianism was a misinterpretation: which conclusion, at the same time, required a reinterpretation of Paradise Lost. The issues to be resolved centered around the role of Christology in the trinity, and whether or not Milton subordinated the second person of the trinity in an unacceptable and heretical way. In order to restore Milton to the tradition of Orthodoxy, the authors were called upon to investigate the theological and philosophical vocabulary surrounding the language of essence, substance, person, and hypostaseis; [[sic]] and to analyze their philosophical relevance including the meaning of ousia as developed by Aristotle and the Stoics. It was also necessary to investigate the history of Christian thought, including both Reformation and Renaissance orthodoxy and the relationships of Milton to such traditions. They thereby traced Milton's orthodoxy back to Tertullian, to the orthodoxy of the creed of Nicea and its long dispute over Homoousia, as well as to a pre-Nicean orthodoxy. They found in pre-Nicean orthodoxy a doctrine of subordination which is not Arian and with which Milton is quite compatible. In view of Milton's role as the poet of the Logos, they investigated the Logos concept in Platonic and Neo-Platonic sources-noting the continuity, but also the differences, between Milton and such Neo-Platonism. They also distinguish Milton from the antitrinitarians among his contemporaries. One major section is devoted to the relationship of the Son to God; and another, to the relationship of the Son to man and the Universe: for not only did the authors need to establish the proper relationship within the Godhead, but they needed, as well, to escape the inclination toward pantheism. Finally the authors are able to reinterpret Paradise Lost in the light of Milton as a non-Arian, suggesting that his poetic solution of the problems of his age allowed him to reconcile orthodox dogma with poetic drama. Although the authors do not attempt here to reply to the responses which have already appeared to these articles since they were originally published, it is clear they have discovered a new Milton who deserves a voice. This collection will be a significant aid to students of literature and intellectual history in making a case for the Milton or orthodoxy available in a single volume.--H. A. D. (shrink)

This collection of previously published essays attempts to rescue the classical orthodoxy of Milton's theology from the oft-repeated charge of Arianism. With the discovery of Milton's theological essay Christian Discourses in 1823, scholars concluded that Milton's theological orthodoxy was questionable; he was suspected of the heresy of Arianism. Paradise Lost was then reinterpreted in the light of this widely accepted charge. This interpretation has lasted for over 100 years. Beginning in the 1950's, and quite independently, the authors of these essays (...) published papers attempting to show that the charge of Arianism was a misinterpretation: which conclusion, at the same time, required a reinterpretation of Paradise Lost. The issues to be resolved centered around the role of Christology in the trinity, and whether or not Milton subordinated the second person of the trinity in an unacceptable and heretical way. In order to restore Milton to the tradition of Orthodoxy, the authors were called upon to investigate the theological and philosophical vocabulary surrounding the language of essence, substance, person, and hypostaseis; [[sic]] and to analyze their philosophical relevance including the meaning of ousia as developed by Aristotle and the Stoics. It was also necessary to investigate the history of Christian thought, including both Reformation and Renaissance orthodoxy and the relationships of Milton to such traditions. They thereby traced Milton's orthodoxy back to Tertullian, to the orthodoxy of the creed of Nicea and its long dispute over Homoousia, as well as to a pre-Nicean orthodoxy. They found in pre-Nicean orthodoxy a doctrine of subordination which is not Arian and with which Milton is quite compatible. In view of Milton's role as the poet of the Logos, they investigated the Logos concept in Platonic and Neo-Platonic sources-noting the continuity, but also the differences, between Milton and such Neo-Platonism. They also distinguish Milton from the antitrinitarians among his contemporaries. One major section is devoted to the relationship of the Son to God; and another, to the relationship of the Son to man and the Universe: for not only did the authors need to establish the proper relationship within the Godhead, but they needed, as well, to escape the inclination toward pantheism. Finally the authors are able to reinterpret Paradise Lost in the light of Milton as a non-Arian, suggesting that his poetic solution of the problems of his age allowed him to reconcile orthodox dogma with poetic drama. Although the authors do not attempt here to reply to the responses which have already appeared to these articles since they were originally published, it is clear they have discovered a new Milton who deserves a voice. This collection will be a significant aid to students of literature and intellectual history in making a case for the Milton or orthodoxy available in a single volume.--H. A. D. (shrink)

It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger, was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic. The continuing publication of Husserl’s manuscripts has made it necessary to revise such an interpretation. Drawing upon (...) both Husserl’s published works and posthumous material, Husserl’s Phenomenology incorporates the results of the most recent Husserl research. It is divided into three parts, roughly following the chronological development of Husserl’s thought, from his early analyses of logic and intentionality, through his mature transcendental-philosophical analyses of reduction and constitution, to his late analyses of intersubjectivity and lifeworld. It can consequently serve as a concise and updated introduction to his thinking. (shrink)

This paper describes differences in two perspectives on the idea of virtue as a theoretical foundation for positive organizational ethics (POE). The virtue ethics perspective is grounded in the philosophical tradition, has classical roots, and focuses attention on virtue as a property of character. The positive social science perspective is a recent movement (e.g., positive psychology and positive organizational scholarship) that has implications for POE. The positive social science movement operationalizes virtue through an empirical lens that emphasizes virtuous behaviors. From (...) a virtue ethics perspective, a behaviorally based account of virtue is a weak theory of virtue. Observations are suggested for integrating the two perspectives. First, virtue should always be understood as an excellence and is often an optimal point between extreme dysfunctions on continuum of potential states. Second, an empirical exploration of virtue needs to account for character and context. Finally, the properties of organization-level virtue need to be further specified and explored. Implications and directions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe aim of this narrow-focused text is to argue against the claim that the appresentation of unperceived features of objects that is implied in perceptual intentionality presupposes a reference to perceptions other subjects could have of these objects. This claim, as it has been defended by Dan Zahavi, rests upon an erroneous supposition about the modal status of the perceptual possibilities to which the perceived object refers, which shall not be interpreted as effectively realizable but as mere de jure possibilities, (...) perceptions that could have been realized in principle, but that are maybe beyond one’s reach considering one’s concrete factual powers and opportunities. Horizontal intentionality is better accounted for in terms of perceptions that one could have had because of one’s embodied character and the always open possibility of occupying another position with respect to the object. This modal ubiquity which is inherent to one’s being-in-space is what supports the field of de jure possibil... (shrink)

Virtuousness refers to the pursuit of the highest aspirations in the human condition. It is characterized by human impact, moral goodness, and unconditional societal betterment. Several writers have recently argued that corporations, in addition to being concerned with ethics, should also emphasize an ethos of virtuousness in corporate action. Virtuousness emphasizes actions that go beyond the “do no harm” assumption embedded in most ethical codes of conduct. Instead, it emphasizes the highest and best of the human condition. This research empirically (...) examines the buffering and amplifying effects of virtuousness in organizations. The study hypothesizes that virtuousness has a positive effect on organizations because amplifying dynamics make subsequent virtuous action more likely, and buffering dynamics reduce the harmful effects of downsizing. The study reveals that two types of virtuousness – tonic and phasic – are associated with these effects. (shrink)