We apply Dienes & Perner's (D&P's) framework to the automatic/nonautomatic processing contrast. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that automatic and nonautomatic processing result in representations that have explicit results. We propose equating consciousness with explicitness of aspects rather than with full explicitness as defined by D&P.
This collects some of the remarks made at the 2016 Pacific APA Memorial session for Patrick Suppes and Jaakko Hintikka. The full list of speakers on behalf of these two philosophers: Dagfinn Follesdal; Dana Scott; Nancy Cartwright; Paul Humphreys; Juliet Floyd; Gabriel Sandu; John Symons.
Research on “improper” linear models has shown that predetermined weighting schemes for the linear model, such as equally weighting all predictors, can be surprisingly accurate on cross-validation. We review recent advances that can characterize the optimal choice of an improper linear model. We extend this research to the understanding of fast and frugal heuristics, particularly to the ecologically rational goal of understanding in which task environments given heuristics are optimal. We demonstrate how to test this model using the Recognition Heuristic (...) and Take the Best heuristic, show how the model reconciles with the ecological rationality program, and discuss how our prescriptive, computational approach could be approximated by simpler mental rules that might be more descriptive. Echoing the arguments of van Rooij et al., we stress the virtue of having a computationally tractable model of strategy selection, even if one proposes that cognizers use a simpler heuristic process to approximate it. (shrink)
Not so long ago, many economists and philosophers felt that their disciplines had no use for experimental methods. An experimental study was, by its nature, ‘not economics’ or ‘not philosophy’ – psychology maybe. Opinion has changed dramatically. This issue of Economics and Philosophy represents a collection of recent contributions to experimental research that explicitly deal with empirical findings or methodological questions in the intersection of the two disciplines. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first such collection dedicated (...) to addressing these common interests. (shrink)
This book provides practical and research-based chapters that offer greater clarity about the particular kinds of teacher reflection that matter and avoids talking about teacher reflection generically, which implies that all kinds of reflection are of equal value.
The goal of the present commentary is to show that past results on automatic numerical processing in different notations are consistent with the idea of an abstract numerical representation. This is done by reviewing the relevant studies and giving alternative explanations to the ones proposed in the target article.
This paper discusses the concept of Dána or charity as the foundation of Indian Social life. Dána has been in vogue in India since the Vedic times, but it was codified by the smritis which prescribe do’s and don’ts of the life of the individual. Limiting its scope to Yagnavalkya smriti the paper analyses the significance of Dána as a regulative principle of accumulation of wealth.
Exegesis, analysis and discussion of an argument deployed by Dana Scott in his 1973 paper ‘Background to Formalization’, rovide an ideal setting for getting clear about some subtleties in the apparently simple idea of conservative extension. There, Scott claimed in respect of two fundamental principles concerning implication that any generalized consequence relation respecting these principles is always extended conservatively by some similarly fundamental principles concerning conjunction and disjunction. This claim appears on the face of it to conflict with cases (...) in the literature in which adding principles governing conjunction or disjunction or both provides a non-conservative extension of the logic to which they are added, even if that logic does satisfy the intuitionistic conditions on implication. We explore the extent to which such cases can be transformed into counterexamples to Scott’s claim. Once one part of this claim is suitably disambiguated, we find no conflict after all, though we also find that Scott occasionally understates what the argument he provides in support of this claim actually establishes. The main goal, apart from getting straight about Scott’s argument, is to give an airing to various issues and distinctions in the general area of conservativity of extensions; as a side benefit, some semantic light will be thrown on a fragmentary intermediate logic of R. A. Bull, which A. N. Prior showed to be extended non-conservatively by the addition of conjunction, governed by the usual axioms. We will see exactly why, despite appearances, this is not a counterexample to Scott’s claim. (shrink)
When you are making up your mind, deciding what to do, you have the idea that you are free in what you are doing. It is hard to shake. You are going to do the one thing, but you can certainly do the other. That is what you think. Rational deliberators, as they can be called, have an inescapable sense of freedom. Dana Nelkin, in the following clear-headed paper, asks if this sense of freedom establishes that determinism is not (...) true. Read on for her answer. She also has things to say about another understanding of the claim that we know we are free when we are making up our minds. Whether or not you agree, you will learn things. Prof. Nelkin is at the University of California at San Diego. (shrink)
: Originally presented during Ethic Rounds at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, this commentary on the case of a patient treated for life-threatening cancer explores the responsibilities of health care providers when addressing the patient's desire to adopt a child.
(2007). Ethics and the Foundations of Education: Teaching Convictions in a Postmodern World. Patrick Slattery and Dana Rapp. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2003. pp. 320. $51.40 (paper). Educational Studies: Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 255-258.
In this article, I will attempt to link altruism, a concern of Positive Psychology, a recent branch of psychology, and dāna, the deeply entrenched aspect of Indian thought. These aspects strive towards a connection with the self and well-being. In addition, an association between Indian psychological attributes, especially with reference to the Mahābhārata, and Positive Psychology will be shown. In the Indian context, dāna or the act of giving involves not merely the act of giving material or tangible goods or (...) objects but also involves doing an act, doing something for others in which one has no stake or claim. In other words, the giving involves giving something from the depths of oneself, for the ‘good’ of another, without expecting anything in return. The cultivation of generosity facilitates a pliancy of mind that allows for the eradication of delusion of a limited self as well as disables greed and hate. In addition to anna-dāna, jala-dāna, bhūmi-dāna, vidyā-dāna and jnana-dāna, the Mahābhārata also talks about sharing with love and affection. A desire for good is a desire for self-satisfaction, bearing a positive therapeutic value for a better, truer, more real self. (shrink)
A secret concealed for centuries, shrouded in myth, silenced by stone. A secret that if unleashed threatens to shake the very foundation of Western civilization. A secret that can remain hidden no longer. The quest begins in Rome, where a grizzly murder and a plundered tomb serve to ignite perhaps the most controversial conflict in human history. Inspector Domenico Conti is charged with the task of recovering the contents of the tomb, but as he delves deeper into the investigation, he (...) is thrust into the center of a centuries-old struggle between truth and those who would stop at nothing to conceal it. But he is not alone. Dr. Dana McCarter, newly appointed director of the Advanced Institute for the Study of Antiquity, finds herself at the heart of the mystery when her considerable expertise in ancient Greek philosophy and her suspect involvement with the black market take her on a journey beginning in her New York University offices and sweeping around the globe—from the dark alleys of Moscow, to the rolling hills of the Italian countryside and the enigmatic relics of an ancient civilization, alive with long-kept secrets. As the search for answers leads them through a labyrinth of conspiracy and intrigue, Dana and Domenico must question everything they believe in and decide how much they are willing to sacrifice to know the truth. (shrink)
In South Asia, the period between 1100 and 1300 CE was a particularly prolific time for theorists from India's three main indigenous religions - Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism - to articulate their views on the face-to-face gift encounter. Their gift theories shaped a cosmopolitan sensibility that shared ethical and aesthetic values that reached across regional, sectarian, and religious boundaries. This book explores the ethical and social implications of unilateral gifts of esteem, offering a perceptive guide to the uniquely South Asian (...) contributors to theoretical work on the gift. (shrink)
I first want to thank John Fischer for his generous appraisal of the book, and for his astute and challenging comments on my treatment of the manipulation argument in Chapter 4. Fischer’s core strategy for resisting this argument is a soft-line reply. Soft-liners claim that in some manipulation cases the agent is not morally responsible, and in others he is. A corollary of the soft-line reply is that there is a plausible compatibilist condition on moral responsibility that has not been (...) met in some of the cases. One prominent response of this sort is that a key condition on basic desert moral responsibility is the absence of intentional manipulation or causal determination . This is not the line Fischer takes. In the response he proposes, intentional causal determination is compatible with moral responsibility in Case 2, that is, in what he calls an initial design case, in which the intentional causation, as in Leibniz’s theological determinism, is confined to the beginning of the agent’s life. But in Case 1, where the intentional manipulation is direct and immediate, the agent is not morally responsible. Fischer’s thought is that Plum’s non-responsibility in Case 1 can be accounted for by the conditions on mechanism-ownership, a feature of the compatibilist account of moral responsibility he and Ravizza developed, which, he correctly points out, I neglect in favor of the reasons-responsiveness component. (shrink)