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Dana Goswick
University of Melbourne
  1.  57
    The Hard Question for Hylomorphism.Dana Goswick - 2018 - Metaphysics 1 (1):52-62.
    The view that ordinary objects are composites of form and matter ("hylomorphism") can be contrasted with the more common view that ordinary objects are composed of only material parts ("matter only"). On a matter-only view the hard question is modal: which modal profile does that (statue-shaped) object have? Does it have the modal profile of a statue, a lump, a mere aggregate? On a hylomorphic view the hard question is ontological: which objects exist? Does a statue (matter-m + statue-form), a (...)
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  2.  28
    Odd Objects: LEM Violations and Indeterminacy.Dana Goswick - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1615-1633.
    I argue there are some objects which do not respect the Law of the Excluded Middle, i.e., which are such that, for some property F, the disjunction Fo v ~Fo fails to be true. I call such objects “odd objects” and present three examples—fictional objects, nonsort objects, and quantum objects. I argue that each of these objects is best understood as violating LEM. I, then, discuss Jessica Wilson’s account of metaphysical indeterminacy. I show how the indeterminacy which arises with odd (...)
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  3. Bridging the Modal Gap.Dana Goswick - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (8):432-443.
  4.  99
    Writing the Book of the World. [REVIEW]Dana Goswick - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):202-205.
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  5.  80
    Ontology Made Easy.Dana Goswick - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (1):145-149.
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  6.  56
    Why Being Necessary Really Is Not the Same As Being Not Possibly Not.Dana Goswick - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):267-274.
    In standard modal logic, □ ≡ ∼◊ ∼ and ◊ ≡ ∼□∼. I will, first, examine why in tense-logic, Arthur Prior thinks that ∼ ◊ ∼ is weaker than □ and ∼ □ ∼ is weaker than ◊. I will, then, examine whether there are similar motivations in modal logic to take ∼ ◊ ∼ to be weaker than □ and ∼ □ ∼ to be weaker than ◊. The upshot will be that, just as certain metaphysical views within the (...)
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  7.  2
    The Role of Logic in Metaphysical Theorizing.Dana Goswick - 2022 - Metaphysica 23 (1):73-80.
    Most of the most prominent discussions within metaphysics assume without argument that our metaphysical theorizing should be constrained by classical logic. I examine why this is the case and then argue that it should not be. That is, I argue that we should not take our metaphysical theorizing to be constrained by classical logic.
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  8.  34
    Constructivism in Metaphysics.Dana Goswick - 2020 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Constructivism in Metaphysics Although there is no canonical definition of “Constructivism” within analytic metaphysics, here is a good starting definition: Constructivism: Some existing entities are constructed by us in that they depend substantively on us. Exactly what it is for an entity to “depend substantively on us” varies between views. Constructivism is a broad view … Continue reading Constructivism in Metaphysics →.
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  9.  60
    Do Events Have Their Parts Essentially?Paul R. Daniels & Dana Goswick - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (3):313-320.
    We argue that mereological essentialism for events is independent of mereological essentialism for objects, and that the philosophical fallout of embracing mereological essentialism for events is minimal. We first outline what we should consider to be the parts of events, and then highlight why one would naturally be inclined to think that the object-question and the event-question are linked. Then, we argue that they are not. We also diagnose why this is the case and emphasize the upshot. In particular, we (...)
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  10.  79
    The Role of Structure: A Critical Notice of Sider’s Writing the Book of the World. [REVIEW]Dana Goswick - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):129-147.
    I critically evaluate the notion of structure Ted Sider presents in Writing the Book of the World. A prerequisite to understanding Sider's notion of structure is understanding Sider's take on ideology and ontology. In Section II, I discuss this. In Section III, I consider arguments in favor of structure. In Section IV, I examine one debate that is considered by Sider to be nonsubstantive: the debate over modality. I conclude, in Section V, by examining the reception Writing the Book of (...)
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  11.  67
    Philosophical Methodology in Modal Epistemology.Dana Goswick - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):11.
    This paper examines the legitimacy of two common methodologies within philosophy: thought experiments and conceptual analysis. In particular, I examine the uses to which these two methodologies have been put within modal epistemology. I argue that, although both methods can be used to reveal conditional essentialist claims , neither can be used to reveal the de re essentialists claims they’re often taken to reveal.
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  12.  45
    Lewisian-Style Counterfactual Analysis of Causation: A New Solution to the Overdetermination Problem.Dana Goswick - 2010 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (4):461-476.
    Causal overdetermination – i.e. instances in which x, y, and z all occur and intuitively the occurrence of x alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z and the occurrence of y alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z – has long been considered a problem for counterfactual analyses of causation. Intuitively, we want to say both x and y caused z, but standard Lewisian counterfactual analysis yields the result that neither x nor y caused z. David Lewis, himself, (...)
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  13.  32
    The Future of the Philosophy of Time.Dana Goswick - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):851-853.
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