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Dana Kay Nelkin [23]Dana K. Nelkin [18]
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Dana Kay Nelkin
University of California, San Diego
  1.  69
    Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Nelkin presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately reaffirming our conception of ourselves as agents. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility begins with a defense of the rational abilities view, according to which one is responsible for an action if and only if one acts with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. The view is (...)
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  2. The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.
  3.  69
    So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):376-409.
    According to the classical Doctrine of Double Effect, there is a morally significant difference between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. Versions of DDE have been defended in a variety of creative ways, but there is one difficulty, the so-called “closeness problem”, that continues to bedevil all of them. The problem is that an agent's intention can always be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from almost any situation, including those that have been (...)
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  4.  4
    Duties, Desert, and the Justification of Punishment.Dana Kay Nelkin - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-14.
    In this essay, I assess what I call the “Duty View,” subtly articulated and defended by Victor Tadros in Wrongs and Crimes. According to the Duty View, wrongdoers incur enforceable duties, including the duty to be punished in some circumstances, in virtue of their wrongdoing; therefore, punishment can be justified simply on the ground that wrongdoers’ duties are being legitimately enforced. I argue that, while wrongdoers do incur important duties, these are not necessarily fulfilled by providing protection against future offenses, (...)
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  5. Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility.David O. Brink & Dana K. Nelkin - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 1:284-313.
    This essay explores a conception of responsibility at work in moral and criminal responsibility. Our conception draws on work in the compatibilist tradition that focuses on the choices of agents who are reasons-responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Our conception brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative (...)
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  6. Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):356-378.
    In everyday life, we assume that there are degrees of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. Yet the debate about the nature of moral responsibility often focuses on the “yes or no” question of whether indeterminism is required for moral responsibility, while questions about what accounts for more or less blameworthiness or praiseworthiness are underexplored. In this paper, I defend the idea that degrees of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness can depend in part on degrees of difficulty and degrees of sacrifice required for performing the (...)
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  7.  76
    Three Cheers for Double Effect.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):125-158.
    The doctrine of double effect, together with other moral principles that appeal to the intentions of moral agents, has come under attack from many directions in recent years, as have a variety of rationales that have been given in favor of it. In this paper, our aim is to develop, defend, and provide a new theoretical rationale for a secular version of the doctrine. Following Quinn (1989), we distinguish between Harmful Direct Agency and Harmful Indirect Agency. We propose the following (...)
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  8. Moral Luck.Dana K. Nelkin - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  9. Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism.Dana K. Nelkin - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):181–206.
    In conclusion, then, the situationist literature provides a rich area of exploration for those interested in freedom and responsibility. Interestingly, it does not do so primarily because it is situationist in the sense of supporting the substantive thesis about the role of character traits. Rather it is because it makes us wonder whether we really do act on a regular basis with the particular normative, epistemic,and reactive capacities that are central to our identity as free and responsible agents.
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  10.  93
    Do We Have a Coherent Set of Intuitions About Moral Responsibility?Dana K. Nelkin - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):243–259.
    I believe that the data is both fascinating and instructive, but in this paper I will resist the conclusion that we must give up Invariantism, or, as I prefer to call it, Unificationism. In the process of examining the challenging data and responding to it, I will try to draw some larger lessons about how to use the kind of data being collected. First, I will provide a brief description of some influential theories of responsibility, and then explain the threat (...)
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  11. Freedom and Forgiveness.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - In Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (eds.), Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: pp. 165-188.
    In this paper, I begin with a familiar puzzle about forgiveness, namely, how to distinguish forgiveness from excuse on the one hand and “letting go” on the other. After considering three recent and influential accounts of forgiveness that offer answers to this challenge among others, I develop an alternative model of forgiveness as a kind of personal release from debt or obligation. I argue that this model has a number of distinct advantages, including offering a new explanation of the subtle (...)
     
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  12.  72
    Self-Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe.Dana K. Nelkin - 2002 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):384-406.
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  13. Responsibility and Rational Abilities: Defending an Asymmetrical View.Dana K. Nelkin - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):497-515.
    Abstract: In this paper, I defend a view according to which one is responsible for one's actions to the extent that one has the ability to do the right thing for the right reasons. The view is asymmetrical in requiring the ability to do otherwise when one acts badly or for bad reasons, but no such ability in cases in which one acts well for good ones. Despite its intuitive appeal, the view's asymmetry makes it a target of both of (...)
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  14. Freedom and Determinism.Dana K. Nelkin - 2004 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
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  15.  44
    Desert, Fairness, and Resentment.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-16.
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  16.  41
    Accountability and Desert.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):173-189.
    In recent decades, participants in the debate about whether we are free and responsible agents have tended with increasing frequency to begin their papers or books by fixing the terms “free” and “responsible” in clear ways to avoid misunderstanding. This is an admirable development, and while some misunderstandings have certainly been avoided, and positions better illuminated as a result, new and interesting questions also arise. Two ways of fixing these terms and identifying the underlying concepts have emerged as especially influential, (...)
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  17. The Consequence Argument and the "Mind" Argument.Dana K. Nelkin - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):107-115.
  18.  71
    Psychopaths, Incorrigible Racists, and the Faces of Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):357-390.
    Psychopaths pose a puzzle. The pleasure they take in the pain of others suggests that they are the paradigms of blameworthiness, while their psychological incapacities provide them with paradigm excuses on plausible accounts of moral responsibility. I begin by assessing two influential responses: one that claims that psychopaths are morally blameworthy in one sense and not in another, and one that takes the two senses of blameworthiness to be inseparable. I offer a new argument that psychopaths, as understood in the (...)
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  19.  8
    Responsibility and Ignorance of the Self.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2018 - Social Theory and Practice 44 (2):267-278.
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  20.  13
    Intuitive Probabilities and the Limitation of Moral Imagination.Arseny A. Ryazanov, Jonathan Knutzen, Samuel C. Rickless, Nicholas J. S. Christenfeld & Dana Kay Nelkin - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (S1):38-68.
    There is a vast literature that seeks to uncover features underlying moral judgment by eliciting reactions to hypothetical scenarios such as trolley problems. These thought experiments assume that participants accept the outcomes stipulated in the scenarios. Across seven studies, we demonstrate that intuition overrides stipulated outcomes even when participants are explicitly told that an action will result in a particular outcome. Participants instead substitute their own estimates of the probability of outcomes for stipulated outcomes, and these probability estimates in turn (...)
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  21.  50
    Deliberative Alternatives.Dana K. Nelkin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):215-240.
    There are powerful skeptical challenges to the idea that we are free. And yet, it seems simply impossible for us to shake the sense that we really are free. Some are convinced that the skeptical challenges are insurmountable and resign themselves to living under an illusion, while others argue that the challenges can be met. Even among those who believe that our sense of ourselves as free is at least roughly accurate, there are deep differences of opinion concerning what freedom (...)
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  22.  34
    The Relevance of Intention to Criminal Wrongdoing.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):745-762.
    In this paper, we defend the general thesis that intentions are relevant not only to moral permissibility and impermissibility, but also to criminal wrongdoing, as well as a specific version of the Doctrine of Double Effect that we believe can help solve some challenging puzzles in the criminal law. We begin by answering some recent arguments that marginalize or eliminate the role of intentions as components of criminal wrongdoing [e.g., Alexander and Ferzan, Chiao, Walen ]. We then turn to some (...)
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  23. Good Luck to Libertarians.Dana K. Nelkin - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):173 – 184.
    In this review essay on Mele's Free Will and Luck , I evaluate the 'daring soft libertarian' view presented in the heart of the book, and in particular the way that it provides an answer to the objection that introducing indeterminism into one's view of freedom merely adds an element of luck and so undermines freedom. I also compare the view's strengths and weaknesses to those of traditional libertarian views. Finally, I consider the 'zygote' argument that Mele takes to be (...)
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  24.  2
    The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373.
  25.  36
    Moral Responsibility, Conversation, and Desert: Comments on Michael McKenna's Conversation and Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (1):63-72.
    In this paper, I engage with several of the intriguing theses Michael McKenna puts forward in his Conversation and Responsibility. For example, I examine McKenna’s claim that the fact that an agent is morally responsible for an action and the fact that an agent is appropriately held responsible explain each other. I go on to argue that despite the importance of the ability to hold people responsible, an agent’s being morally responsible for an action is explanatorily fundamental, and in this (...)
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  26. Friendship, Freedom and Special Obligations.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2015 - In Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 226-250.
    Recently, there has been much discussion of two challenging arguments that suggest that if we were to lack free will of the sort required for moral responsibility we would lose one of the most important things that give our lives meaning, namely, valuable human relationships such as friendship. One line of argument, defended by Robert Kane, suggests that freely chosen relationships have an irreplaceable value, and the other, defended by Peter Strawson and recently taken up in a new form by (...)
     
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  27.  67
    Irrelevant Alternatives and Frankfurt Counterfactuals.Dana K. Nelkin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):1-25.
    In rejecting the Principle of AlternatePossibilities (PAP), Harry Frankfurt makes useof a special sort of counterfactual of thefollowing form: ``he wouldn''t have doneotherwise even if he could have''''. Recently,other philosophers (e.g., Susan Hurley (1999,2003) and Michael Zimmerman (2002)) haveappealed to a special class of counterfactualsof this same general form in defending thecompatibility of determinism andresponsibility. In particular, they claim thatit can be true of agents that even if they aredetermined, and so cannot do otherwise, theywouldn''t have done otherwise even if (...)
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  28.  44
    Responsibility, Rational Abilities, and Two Kinds of Fairness Arguments.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):151 – 165.
    In this paper, I begin by considering a traditional argument according to which it would be unfair to impose sanctions on people for performing actions when they could not do otherwise, and thus that no one who lacks the ability to do otherwise is responsible or blameworthy for his or her actions in an important sense. Interestingly, a parallel argument concluding that people are not responsible or praiseworthy if they lack the ability to do otherwise is not as compelling. Watson, (...)
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  29. Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    Siewert identifies a special kind of conscious experience, phenomenal consciousness, that is the sort of consciousness missing in a variety of cases of blindsight. He then argues that phenomenal consciousness has been neglected by students of consciousness when it should not be. According to Siewert, the neglect is based at least in part on two false assumptions: phenomenal features are not intentional and phenomenal character is restricted to sensory experience. By identifying an essential tension in Siewert's characterization of phenomenal consciousness, (...)
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  30.  19
    Replies to Critics.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):123-131.
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  31.  8
    Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (10):564.
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  32.  11
    The Sense of Freedom.Dana K. Nelkin - 2004 - In Joseph K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press. pp. 105.
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  33.  84
    How to Solve Blum's Paradox.Dana K. Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):91-94.
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  34. Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (10):564-576.
  35.  3
    Responsibility and Self-Deception: A Framework.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20).
    This paper focuses on the question of whether and, if so, when people can be responsible for their self-deception and its consequences. On Intentionalist accounts, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves, and it is easy to see how they can be responsible. On Motivationist accounts, in contrast, self-deception is a motivated, but not intentional, and possibly unconscious process, making it more difficult to see how self-deceivers could be responsible. I argue that a particular Motivationist account, the Desire to Believe account, together with (...)
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  36.  27
    Précis of Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):443-450.
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  37.  22
    Replies to Critics.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):476-491.
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  38.  25
    Sher , George . Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness .New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 168. $99.00 (Cloth); $24.95 (Paper). [REVIEW]Dana Kay Nelkin - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):675-680.
  39.  2
    Precis of Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):443-450.
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  40. Rational Deliberation and the Sense of Freedom.Dana Kay Nelkin - 1995 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    In this dissertation, I offer an interpretation and defense of the following argument for the claim that we--together with all rational deliberators--are free: rational deliberators necessarily possess a sense of freedom in virtue of their nature as rational deliberators, and if rational deliberators, in virtue of their nature as rational deliberators, necessarily possess a sense of freedom, then they are free. Therefore, rational deliberators are free. ;I offer two related arguments for , each of which is inspired by the Kantian (...)
     
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  41. The Ethics and Law of Omissions.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (eds.) - 2017 - Oup Usa.
    This volume explores the principles that govern moral responsibility and legal liability for omissions. Contributors defend different views about the ground of moral responsibility, the conditions of legal liability for an omission to rescue, and the basis for accepting a " for omissions in the criminal law.
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