29 found
Order:
See also
Dana Kay Nelkin
University of California, San Diego
  1.  90
    Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Nelkin presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately reaffirming our conception of ourselves as agents. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility begins with a defense of the rational abilities view, according to which one is responsible for an action if and only if one acts with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. The view is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  2. Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):356-378.
    In everyday life, we assume that there are degrees of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. Yet the debate about the nature of moral responsibility often focuses on the “yes or no” question of whether indeterminism is required for moral responsibility, while questions about what accounts for more or less blameworthiness or praiseworthiness are underexplored. In this paper, I defend the idea that degrees of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness can depend in part on degrees of difficulty and degrees of sacrifice required for performing the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  3.  91
    So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):376-409.
    According to the classical Doctrine of Double Effect, there is a morally significant difference between intending harm and merely foreseeing harm. Versions of DDE have been defended in a variety of creative ways, but there is one difficulty, the so-called “closeness problem”, that continues to bedevil all of them. The problem is that an agent's intention can always be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from almost any situation, including those that have been (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  4.  10
    Guilt, Grief, and the Good.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1):173-191.
    :In this essay, I consider a particular version of the thesis that the blameworthy deserve to suffer, namely, that they deserve to feel guilty to the proper degree. Two further theses have been thought to explicate and support the thesis, one that appeals to the non-instrumental goodness of the blameworthy receiving what they deserve, and the other that appeals to the idea that being blameworthy provides reason to promote the blameworthy receiving what they deserve. I call the first "Good-Guilt" and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5.  98
    Three Cheers for Double Effect.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):125-158.
    The doctrine of double effect, together with other moral principles that appeal to the intentions of moral agents, has come under attack from many directions in recent years, as have a variety of rationales that have been given in favor of it. In this paper, our aim is to develop, defend, and provide a new theoretical rationale for a secular version of the doctrine. Following Quinn (1989), we distinguish between Harmful Direct Agency and Harmful Indirect Agency. We propose the following (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  6. Moral Responsibility for Unwitting Omissions: A New Tracing View.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2017 - In The Ethics and Law of Omissions. New York, NY, USA: pp. 106-129.
    Unwitting omissions pose a challenge for theories of moral responsibility. For commonsense morality holds many unwitting omitters morally responsible for their omissions (and for the consequences thereof), even though they appear to lack both awareness and control. For example, some people who leave dogs trapped in their cars outside on a hot day (see Sher 2009), or who forget to pick something up from the store as they promised (see Clarke 2014) seem to be blameworthy for their omissions. And yet, (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  7. The Ethics and Law of Omissions.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (eds.) - 2017 - Oup Usa.
    This volume explores the principles that govern moral responsibility and legal liability for omissions. Contributors defend different views about the ground of moral responsibility, the conditions of legal liability for an omission to rescue, and the basis for accepting a " for omissions in the criminal law.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  8. Freedom and Forgiveness.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - In Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (eds.), Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: pp. 165-188.
    In this paper, I begin with a familiar puzzle about forgiveness, namely, how to distinguish forgiveness from excuse on the one hand and “letting go” on the other. After considering three recent and influential accounts of forgiveness that offer answers to this challenge among others, I develop an alternative model of forgiveness as a kind of personal release from debt or obligation. I argue that this model has a number of distinct advantages, including offering a new explanation of the subtle (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  9.  95
    Psychopaths, Incorrigible Racists, and the Faces of Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):357-390.
    Psychopaths pose a puzzle. The pleasure they take in the pain of others suggests that they are the paradigms of blameworthiness, while their psychological incapacities provide them with paradigm excuses on plausible accounts of moral responsibility. I begin by assessing two influential responses: one that claims that psychopaths are morally blameworthy in one sense and not in another, and one that takes the two senses of blameworthiness to be inseparable. I offer a new argument that psychopaths, as understood in the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  10.  61
    Desert, Fairness, and Resentment.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-16.
    Responsibility, blameworthiness in particular, has been characterized in a number of ways in a literature in which participants appear to be talking about the same thing much of the time. More specifically, blameworthiness has been characterized in terms of what sorts of responses are fair, appropriate, and deserved in a basic way, where the responses in question range over blame, sanctions, alterations to interpersonal relationships, and the reactive attitudes, such as resentment and indignation. In this paper, I explore the relationships (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  11.  24
    Duties, Desert, and the Justification of Punishment.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):425-438.
    In this essay, I assess what I call the “Duty View,” subtly articulated and defended by Victor Tadros in Wrongs and Crimes. According to the Duty View, wrongdoers incur enforceable duties, including the duty to be punished in some circumstances, in virtue of their wrongdoing; therefore, punishment can be justified simply on the ground that wrongdoers’ duties are being legitimately enforced. I argue that, while wrongdoers do incur important duties, these are not necessarily fulfilled by providing protection against future offenses, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12.  22
    Desert, Free Will, and Our Moral Responsibility Practices.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - Journal of Ethics 23 (3):265-275.
    In this paper, I assess a challenging argument made by McKenna that free will might be important in justifying our moral responsibility practices even if free will is not important insofar as it is required for desert of blame and praise. I offer an alternative picture, according to which while we can justify our practices of moral responsibility in terms that appeal to free will without using terms that explicitly appeal to desert, desert is necessarily implicated nevertheless by the very (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13.  21
    Responsibility and Self-Deception: A Framework.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20).
    This paper focuses on the question of whether and, if so, when people can be responsible for their self-deception and its consequences. On Intentionalist accounts, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves, and it is easy to see how they can be responsible. On Motivationist accounts, in contrast, self-deception is a motivated, but not intentional, and possibly unconscious process, making it more difficult to see how self-deceivers could be responsible. I argue that a particular Motivationist account, the Desire to Believe account, together with (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  14.  50
    Moral Responsibility, Conversation, and Desert: Comments on Michael McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (1):63-72.
    In this paper, I engage with several of the intriguing theses Michael McKenna puts forward in his Conversation and Responsibility. For example, I examine McKenna’s claim that the fact that an agent is morally responsible for an action and the fact that an agent is appropriately held responsible explain each other. I go on to argue that despite the importance of the ability to hold people responsible, an agent’s being morally responsible for an action is explanatorily fundamental, and in this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15.  24
    Responsibility and Ignorance of the Self.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2018 - Social Theory and Practice 44 (2):267-278.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16.  30
    Frontotemporal Dementia and the Reactive Attitudes: Two Roles for the Capacity to Care?Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (5):817-837.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  21
    Thinking Outside the (Traditional) Boxes of Moral Luck.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):7-23.
    Midwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  49
    The Relevance of Intention to Criminal Wrongdoing.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):745-762.
    In this paper, we defend the general thesis that intentions are relevant not only to moral permissibility and impermissibility, but also to criminal wrongdoing, as well as a specific version of the Doctrine of Double Effect that we believe can help solve some challenging puzzles in the criminal law. We begin by answering some recent arguments that marginalize or eliminate the role of intentions as components of criminal wrongdoing [e.g., Alexander and Ferzan, Chiao, Walen ]. We then turn to some (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Friendship, Freedom and Special Obligations.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2015 - In Andrei Buckareff, Carlos Moya & Sergi Rosell (eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 226-250.
    Recently, there has been much discussion of two challenging arguments that suggest that if we were to lack free will of the sort required for moral responsibility we would lose one of the most important things that give our lives meaning, namely, valuable human relationships such as friendship. One line of argument, defended by Robert Kane, suggests that freely chosen relationships have an irreplaceable value, and the other, defended by Peter Strawson and recently taken up in a new form by (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20.  52
    Responsibility, Rational Abilities, and Two Kinds of Fairness Arguments.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):151 – 165.
    In this paper, I begin by considering a traditional argument according to which it would be unfair to impose sanctions on people for performing actions when they could not do otherwise, and thus that no one who lacks the ability to do otherwise is responsible or blameworthy for his or her actions in an important sense. Interestingly, a parallel argument concluding that people are not responsible or praiseworthy if they lack the ability to do otherwise is not as compelling. Watson, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21.  56
    Precis of Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):443-450.
  22.  30
    Replies to Critics.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):476-491.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23.  26
    Replies to Critics.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):123-131.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. Fine Cuts of Moral Agency: Dissociable Deficits in Psychopathy and Autism.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2017 - In S. Matthew Liao & Collin O'Neil (eds.), Current Controversies in Bioethics. New York: pp. 47-66.
    With a new understanding of the deficits of psychopaths, many have argued that psychopaths are not morally accountable for their actions because they seem to lack any capacity for fundamental moral understanding. And yet, a lack of capacity for empathy, which has been seen as the root of this incapacity, has also been attributed to subjects with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). But there is much evidence that at least many with ASD have moral understanding and are rightly treated as morally (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  26
    Intuitive Probabilities and the Limitation of Moral Imagination.Arseny A. Ryazanov, Jonathan Knutzen, Samuel C. Rickless, Nicholas J. S. Christenfeld & Dana Kay Nelkin - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (S1):38-68.
    There is a vast literature that seeks to uncover features underlying moral judgment by eliciting reactions to hypothetical scenarios such as trolley problems. These thought experiments assume that participants accept the outcomes stipulated in the scenarios. Across seven studies, we demonstrate that intuition overrides stipulated outcomes even when participants are explicitly told that an action will result in a particular outcome. Participants instead substitute their own estimates of the probability of outcomes for stipulated outcomes, and these probability estimates in turn (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Free Will Skepticism and Obligation Skepticism: Comments on Derk Pereboom’s Free Will Skepticism, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2014 - Life, Science, Religion, Culture 1 (1).
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  35
    Sher , George . Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness .New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 168. $99.00 (Cloth); $24.95 (Paper). [REVIEW]Dana Kay Nelkin - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):675-680.
  28. Oxford Handbook of Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Rational Deliberation and the Sense of Freedom.Dana Kay Nelkin - 1995 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    In this dissertation, I offer an interpretation and defense of the following argument for the claim that we--together with all rational deliberators--are free: rational deliberators necessarily possess a sense of freedom in virtue of their nature as rational deliberators, and if rational deliberators, in virtue of their nature as rational deliberators, necessarily possess a sense of freedom, then they are free. Therefore, rational deliberators are free. ;I offer two related arguments for , each of which is inspired by the Kantian (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark