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Daniel Breyer [5]Daniel S. Breyer [4]
  1. Cognitive Integration and the Ownership of Belief: Response to Bernecker.Daniel Breyer & John Greco - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):173–184.
    This paper responds to Sven Bernecker’s argument that agent reliabilism cannot accommodate internalist intuitions about clarvoyance cases. In section 1 we clarify a version of agent reliabilism and Bernecker’s objections against it. In section 2 we say more about how the notion of cognitive integration helps to adjudicate clairvoyance cases and other proposed counterexamples to reliabilism. The central idea is that cognitive integration underwrites a kind of belief ownership, which in turn underwrites the sort of responsibility for belief required for (...)
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  2.  84
    Reflective Luck and Belief Ownership.Daniel Breyer - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):133-154.
    A belief is reflectively lucky if it is a matter of luck that the belief is true, given what a subject is aware of on reflection alone. Various epistemologists have argued that any adequate theory of knowledge should eliminate reflective luck, but doing so has proven difficult. This article distinguishes between two kinds of reflective luck arguments in the literature: local arguments and global arguments. It argues that local arguments are best interpreted as demanding, not that one be reflectively aware (...)
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  3.  80
    Freedom with a Buddhist Face.Daniel Breyer - 2013 - Sophia 52 (2):359-379.
    This article clarifies the Buddhist position on freedom and responsibility, while arguing for three central claims. The first is that it is an open question whether Buddhists endorse causal determinism or causal indeterminism. The second claim is that the most promising contemporary interpretations of the Buddhist view fail in important respects. The final claim is that the best interpretation of the Buddhist position on freedom and responsibility is Buddhist Perspectivalism, the view that we should view ourselves as genuinely free and (...)
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  4.  57
    Knowledge, Credit, and Cognitive Agency.Daniel S. Breyer - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):503-528.
    According to credit theories of knowledge, S knows that p only if S deserves credit for truly believing that p. This article argues that any adequate credit theory has to explain the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to subjects. It then presents a general account of these conditions and defends two models of cognitive agency. Finally, the article explains how an agent-based approach rescues the credit theory from an apparent counterexample. The article's defense of the credit theory is qualified, (...)
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  5.  45
    Ownership, Agency, and Defeat.Daniel S. Breyer - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):253-256.
    In this article, I respond to Jennifer Duke-Yonge’s (2012) discussion of my article ‘Reflective Luck and Belief Ownership’ (Breyer, Acta Analytica, 25:133–154, 2010) and defend my Taking Responsibility account of belief ownership against her insightful criticisms.
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  6.  40
    The Structure of Cognitive Agency.Daniel Breyer - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):285-296.
    Credit theories of knowledge have to explain the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to cognitive agents. The most promising way to explain these conditions is to offer an account of cognitive agency that is a plausible development of the uncontroversial notion that we are believing subjects. This article develops and defends a Structuralist model of cognitive agency.
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  7.  39
    World Without Design.Daniel S. Breyer - 2005 - International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1):131-133.
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    Molinism, Freedom, and Luck.Daniel Breyer - 2013 - Philosophia Christi 15 (2):415-432.
    This article argues that Molinism faces an intractable objection. This is the Luck Argument, which begins with a dilemma: either counterfactuals of freedom have truth-makers or they do not. Molinism faces insurmountable problems no matter which horn of the dilemma it accepts. As a result, Molinism cannot account both for divine foreknowledge and for human freedom. If it accounts for one, it sacrifices the other.
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    World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism. [REVIEW]Daniel S. Breyer - 2005 - International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1):131-133.
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