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  1.  68
    Why People See Things That Are Not There: A Novel Perception and Attention Deficit Model for Recurrent Complex Visual Hallucinations.Daniel Collerton, Elaine Perry & Ian McKeith - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):737-757.
    As many as two million people in the United Kingdom repeatedly see people, animals, and objects that have no objective reality. Hallucinations on the border of sleep, dementing illnesses, delirium, eye disease, and schizophrenia account for 90% of these. The remainder have rarer disorders. We review existing models of recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) in the awake person, including cortical irritation, cortical hyperexcitability and cortical release, top-down activation, misperception, dream intrusion, and interactive models. We provide evidence that these can neither (...)
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  2.  22
    Dreaming and Hallucinations – Continuity or Discontinuity? Perspectives From Dementia with Lewy Bodies.Daniel Collerton & Elaine Perry - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1016-1020.
    Comparing the phenomenology, neurochemical pathology, and psychopharmacology of hallucinations and dreaming is limited by the available data. Evidence to date reveals no simple correspondence between the two states. Differences in the phenomenology of visual hallucinations and the visual component of dreams may reflect variations in visual context acting on the same underlying mechanism – the minimal visual input during dreaming contrasts with the more substantial perceived context in hallucinations. Variations in cholinergic, dopaminergic and serotonergic neurotransmitter function during sleep and during (...)
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  3.  1
    Seeing for Ourselves: Insights Into the Development of Moral Behaviour From Models of Visual Perception and Misperception.Daniel Collerton & Elaine Perry - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
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  4.  33
    Thalamocortical Dysfunction and Complex Visual Hallucinations in Brain Disease – Are the Primary Disturbances in the Cerebral Cortex?Daniel Collerton & Elaine Perry - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):789-790.
    Applying Behrendt & Young's (B&Y's) model of thalamocortical synchrony to complex visual hallucinations in neurodegenerative disorders, such as dementia with Lewy bodies and progressive supranuclear palsy, leads us to propose that the primary pathology may be cortical rather than thalamic. Additionally, the extinction of active hallucinations by eye closure challenges their conception of the role of reduced sensory input.
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  5.  32
    Still PADing Along: Perception and Attention Remain Key Factors in Understanding Complex Visual Hallucinations.Daniel Collerton, Elaine Perry & Ian McKeith - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):776-794.
    Commentators agree that the Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model is a promising model for accounting for recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH) across several disorders, though with varying detailed criticisms. Its central tenets are not modified, but further consideration of generative models of visual processing and the relationship of proto-objects and memory systems allows the PAD model to deal with variations in phenomenology. The commentaries suggest new ways to generate evidence that will test the model.
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  6.  30
    Do Multiple Cortical-Subcortical Interactions Support Different Aspects of Consciousness?Daniel Collerton & Elaine Perry - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):88-89.
    Merker's core idea, that the experience of being conscious reflects the interactions of actions, targets, and motivations in the upper brainstem, with cortex providing the content of the conscious experience, merits serious consideration. However, we have two areas of concern: first, that his definition of consciousness is so broad that it is difficult to find any organisms with a brain that could be non-conscious; second, that the focus on one cortical–subcortical system neglects other systems (e.g., basal forebrain and brainstem cholinergic (...)
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