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Daniel Coren
University of Colorado, Boulder
Daniel Coren
McMaster University
  1.  16
    Epistemic Conservatism and Bare Beliefs.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Synthese:1-14.
    My subject is the kind of Epistemic Conservatism (EC) that says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. Quine’s alternative to positivist foundationalism, Chisholmian particularism, Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, and Bayesianism all seem to rely on EC. I argue that, in order to evaluate EC, we must consider an agent holding a bare belief, that is, a belief stripped of all personal memory and epistemic (...)
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  2.  37
    On Young’s Version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.Daniel Coren - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):585-594.
    Harry Frankfurt (1969) famously gave cases in which an agent lacks alternate possibilities and yet seems morally responsible. Such cases purportedly falsify the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, which states that the ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. There is an enormous body of literature debating whether or not Frankfurt cases and their variants do in fact falsify PAP. In order to sidestep Frankfurt cases altogether, Garry Young (2016) argues for a different version of PAP, namely, PAP, on (...)
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  3.  48
    Alternate Possibilities and Moral Asymmetry.Daniel Coren - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (2):145-159.
    Harry Frankfurt Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829–39 famously attacked what he called the principle of alternate possibilities. PAP states that being able to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. He gave counterexamples to PAP known since then as “Frankfurt cases.” This paper sidesteps the enormous literature on Frankfurt cases while preserving some of our salient pretheoretical intuitions about the relation between alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. In particular, I introduce, explain, and defend a principle that has so far been (...)
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  4.  7
    Always Choose to Live or Choose to Always Live?Daniel Coren - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (2):89-104.
    Bernard Williams (1973) famously argued that if given the choice to relinquish our mortality we should refuse. We should not choose to always live. His piece provoked an entire literature on the desirability of immortality. Intending to contradict Williams, Thomas Nagel claimed that if given the choice between living for a week and dying in five minutes he would always choose to live. I argue that (1) Nagel’s iterating scenario is closer to the original Makropulos case (Čapek’s) that inspired Williams’s (...)
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  5.  32
    Why Does Aristotle Defend the Principle of Non‐Contradiction Against its Contrary?Daniel Coren - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (1):39-59.
    In his Metaphysics Γ.4, Aristotle defends the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The PNC says that all contradictions are false. So if some contradictions are true, then PNC is false. Even if PNC’s contrary is false, PNC’s contradictory might still be true. But it’s been noted in the literature for over a century that Aristotle seems to be exclusively interested in attacking PNC’s contrary (‘All contradictions are true’) rather than PNC’s contradictory (‘Some contradictions are true’). So his defense of PNC seems (...)
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  6.  18
    Aristotle on Political Community.Daniel Coren - 2018 - Ancient Philosophy 38 (1):222-225.
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  7.  11
    Making Sense of the Sentence.Daniel Coren - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:205-222.
    Early on in his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that there must be a single end or good desired for its own sake, for the sake of which all of our other ends are desired. The argument includes the following conditional: “If we chose everything for the sake of something else so that the process went on forever, then our desire would be empty and futile.” This paper addresses that conditional. First, I explain why the conditional appears to be false. Second, (...)
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  8. Aristotle Against (Unqualified) Self-Motion: Physics VII 1 Α241b35-242a49 / Β241b25-242a15.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Ancient Philosophy.
    It is well known that Aristotle tries to make room for self-motion – an idea he inherits to some extent from Plato – within his other commitments to causal determinism while at the same time modifying the idea. However, one argument in Physics VII 1 seems to pose a problem for the bare possibility of self-motion; in it he seems to argue that everything that moves must be moved by something else. The text in which this argument appears is itself (...)
     
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  9. Evaluating Epistemic Virtues.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Epistemic conservatism (EC) says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. In his new book On Evidence in Philosophy (2019), William Lycan argues that there is no special objection to EC that does not also impugn the other epistemic virtues. In a forthcoming Synthese piece, Daniel Coren argues that, for us as we are (as ordinary human beings), EC cannot be evaluated. Coren (2019) (...)
     
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  10. Freedom, Gratitude, and Resentment: Olivi and Strawson.Daniel Coren - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (3):1-21.
    I argue that by attending to a distinction among perspectives on the root causes of our reactive attitudes, we can better understand the bases and limitations of long-standing debates about free will and moral responsibility. I characterize this distinction as “objectivism vs. subjectivism.” I bring out this distinction by, first, scrutinizing an especially sharp divergence between Peter Strawson and Peter John Olivi: for Olivi, our ordinary human attitudes make it obvious that we have free will, and our attitudes would be (...)
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