6 found
Daniel Elstein [3]Daniel Y. Elstein [2]Daniel J. Elstein [1]
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Profile: Daniel Y. Elstein (University of Leeds)
  1. From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans.Daniel Y. Elstein & Thomas Hurka - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 515-535.
    Many philosophers of the last century thought all moral judgments can be expressed using a few basic concepts — what are today called ‘thin’ moral concepts such as ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘right,’ and ‘wrong.’ This was the view, fi rst, of the non-naturalists whose work dominated the early part of the century, including Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and C.D. Broad. Some of them recognized only one basic concept, usually either ‘ought’ or ‘good’; others thought there were two. But they (...)
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  2. Manifesting Belief in Absolute Necessity.John Divers & Daniel Elstein - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):109-130.
    McFetridge (in Logical necessity and other essays . London: Blackwell, 1990 ) suggests that to treat a proposition as logically necessary—to believe a proposition logically necessary, and to manifest that belief—is a matter of preparedness to deploy that proposition as a premise in reasoning from any supposition. We consider whether a suggestion in that spirit can be generalized to cover all cases of absolute necessity, both logical and non-logical, and we conclude that it can. In Sect. 2, we explain the (...)
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    A New Revisability Paradox.Daniel Y. Elstein - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):308–318.
    In a recent article, Mark Colyvan has criticized Jerrold Katz's attempt to show that Quinean holism is self-refuting. Katz argued that a Quinean epistemology incorporating a principle of the universal revisability of beliefs would have to hold that that and other principles of the system were both revisable and unrevisable. Colyvan rejects Katz's argument for failing to take into account the logic of belief revision. But granting the terms of debate laid down by Colyvan, the universal revisability principle still commits (...)
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    Against Sonderholm: Still Committed to Expressivism.Daniel Elstein - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):111 - 116.
    Jorn Sonderholm (2005) has argued that Simon Blackburn's commitment semantics for evaluative discourse is unable to explain the validity of simple inferences involving disjunction. This is true insofar as the basic rules which Blackburn suggests are not strong enough, but it is relatively simple to augment those rules so as to meet Sonderholm's challenge, whilst respecting the spirit of commitment semantics. One way of doing this is to add a reduction rule such that if accepting p commits one to inconsistent (...)
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    The Asymmetry of Creating and Not Creating Life.Daniel J. Elstein - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1):49-59.
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    Value, Reality, and Desire.Daniel Elstein - 2008 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (1):159-161.
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