12 found
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  1. Humean Laws and Explanation.Daniel Graham Marshall - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3145-3165.
    A common objection to Humeanism about natural laws is that, given Humeanism, laws cannot help explain their instances, since, given the best Humean account of laws, facts about laws are explained by facts about their instances rather than vice versa. After rejecting a recent influential reply to this objection that appeals to the distinction between scientific and metaphysical explanation, I will argue that the objection fails by failing to distinguish between two types of facts, only one of which Humeans should (...)
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  2. Analyses of Intrinsicality in Terms of Naturalness.Daniel Graham Marshall - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (8):531-542.
    Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties in terms of the facts about naturalness. This article discusses the three most influential of these attempts, each of which involve David Lewis. These are Lewis's 1983 analysis, his 1986 analysis, and his joint 1998 analysis with Rae Langton.
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    Analyses of Intrinsicality Without Naturalness.Daniel Graham Marshall - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (2):186-197.
    Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. This article discusses three leading attempts to analyse this distinction that don’t appeal to the notion of nat-uralness: the duplication analysis endorsed by G. E. Moore and David Lewis, Peter Vallentyne’s analysis in terms of contractions of possible worlds, and the analysis of Gene Witmer, William Butchard and Kelly Trogdon in terms of grounding.
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  4. Can 'Intrinsic' Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions?Daniel Graham Marshall - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):646-672.
    An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of 'intrinsic' that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.
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  5. Intrinsicality and Grounding.Daniel Graham Marshall - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-19.
    A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperintensional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible with popular metaphysical theories that posit necessary entities and necessary connections between wholly distinct entities, on which it is plausible that (...)
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  6. Langton and Lewis on 'Intrinsic'.Daniel Graham Marshall & Josh Parsons - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):347-351.
  7.  44
    Yablo’s Account of Intrinsicality.Daniel Graham Marshall - 2014 - In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. pp. 199-220.
    An intrinsic property is roughly a property something has in virtue of how it is, as opposed to how it is related to other things. More carefully, the property of being F is intrinsic iff, necessarily, for any x that is F , x is F in virtue of how it is, as opposed to how it is related to wholly distinct things, or how wholly distinct things are. An extrinsic property, on the other hand, is any property that is (...)
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  8.  44
    A Puzzle for Modal Realism.Daniel Graham Marshall - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16.
    Modal realists face a puzzle. For modal realism to be justified, modal realists need to be able to give a successful reduction of modality. A simple argument, however, appears to show that the reduction they propose fails. In order to defend the claim that modal realism is justified, modal realists therefore need to either show that this argument fails, or show that modal realists can give another reduction of modality that is successful. I argue that modal realists cannot do either (...)
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    Intrinsicality and Grounding.Daniel Graham Marshall - unknown
    A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperintensional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible with popular metaphysical theories that posit necessary entities and necessary connections between wholly distinct entities, on which it is plausible that (...)
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  10.  43
    A Puzzle for Modal Realism (Talk).Daniel Graham Marshall - manuscript
    Modal realists face a puzzle. For modal realism to be justified, modal realists need to be able to give a successful reduction of modality. A simple argument, however, appears to show that the reduction they propose fails. In order to defend the claim that modal realism is justified, modal realists therefore need to either show that this argument fails, or show that modal realists can give another reduction of modality that is successful. I argue that modal realists cannot do either (...)
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    Symmetric and Nonsymmetric Macdonald Polynomials.Daniel Graham Marshall - 1999 - Annals of Combinatorics 3 (2-4):385-415.
    The symmetric Macdonald polynomials may be constructed from the nonsymmetric Macdonald polynomials. This allows us to develop the theory of the symmetric Macdonald polynomials by first developing the theory of their nonsymmetric counterparts. In taking this approach we are able to obtain new results as well as simpler and more accessible derivations of a number of the known fundamental properties of both kinds of polynomials.
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  12. Can ‘Intrinsic’ Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions?Daniel Graham Marshall - unknown
    An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of ‘intrinsic’ that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.
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