Bertrand Russell says of Leibniz that "the best parts of his philosophy are the most abstract and the worst those which most nearly concern human life". Many have agreed with Russell's comments and the treatment of Leibniz by most Anglo-American philosophers in particular during this century is a testimony to his sentiments. Even sympathetic commentators have been dismissive or apologetic of those aspects of Leibniz's thought that "concern human life". My purpose here is not to dear Leibniz of any and (...) all animadversions - personal or philosophical - but to attempt to understand the dissimulation and equivocality that even his admirers ascribe to his non-logical writings. It is my position that such qualities were intrinsic to his thought, and not simply personal quirks or flaws that have to be tolerated or dismissed in any sustained examination of his philosophy. (shrink)

Während viel über Leibniz und China geschrieben wurde, fand seine Beschäftigung mit dem anderen "Orient" — dem Nahen Osten — wenig Beachtung. Mein Beitrag widmet sich daher Leibniz' Haltung gegenüber dem Islam und dessen Anhängern. Abgesehen von der osmanischen Bedrohung für Zentral-Europa, die zur Zeit seiner mittleren Schaffensperiode im Abnehmen begriffen war, wird der Islam von Leibniz in erster Linie als theologisches System behandelt. Leibniz äußerte sich zu den ihm zur Verfügung stehenden islamischen und arabischen Quellen und zeigte ein wachsendes (...) Interesse an ihnen. In dem Leibniz' Haltung gegenüber dem islamischen/arabischen Orient untersucht wird, vertieft sich auch unser Verständnis gegenüber seiner lebenslangen Suche nach einem Dialog zwischen Christentum und anderen Glaubensrichtungen, wie auch die Rolle der islamischen Theologie innerhalb des europäischen religiösen Denkens beleuchtet wird. Schließlich zeigt sich Leibniz' Haltung gegenüber dem Islam als repräsentativ für viele Denker im Europa der frühen Aufklärung. (shrink)

This book is one of a growing number on the Anglo-American scene devoted to attacking the empiricist or foundational model of knowledge. Those sympathetic to the Hegelian tradition should welcome such a change in the prevailing Zeitgeist. In this spirit, several writers have compared or connected Hegel and Marx to the language philosophy of the “later” Wittgenstein. Inspired in part by an article of Charles Taylor, David Lamb undertakes to elaborate upon “the considerable convergence of the later Wittgenstein, as commonly (...) understood, and the Hegelian understanding of language.” “It is striking,” he continues, “that the two philosophers argued very similarly against what might be called the empirical account of the relation between language and reality.” The core of this five-chapter book is devoted to highlighting this convergence, primarily between the sections on Sense-Certainty and Perception in the Phenomenology of Spirit and Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. The final two chapters deal with similarities between Hegel and Wittgenstein on a much broader scale. (shrink)

During Leibniz's lifetime, interest in the interpretation of the Bible and biblical prophecy became central to the theological and political concerns of Protestant Europe. Leibniz's treatment of this phenomenon will be examined in the light of his views on the nature of revelation and its role in his defence of Christianity. It will be argued that Leibniz's defence of the miracle of revelation (and its vehicle, biblical prophecy) – unlike his arguments on behalf of the core Christian mysteries of the (...) Trinity and Incarnation – is demonstrable by purely natural and scientific means, especially the verification of history. (shrink)

During Leibniz's lifetime, interest in the interpretation of the Bible and biblical prophecy became central to the theological and political concerns of Protestant Europe. Leibniz's treatment of this phenomenon will be examined in the light of his views on the nature of revelation and its role in his defence of Christianity. It will be argued that Leibniz's defence of the miracle of revelation – unlike his arguments on behalf of the core Christian mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation – is (...) demonstrable by purely natural and scientific means, especially the verification of history. (shrink)

It is McRae’s “position that the link between absolute knowing, and the system proper [in Hegel], cannot be understood aside from the act of presentation itself”. In a word, “absolute knowing is nothing but the presentation of the system itself”. This ongoing activity of presentation occurs in the theater of language, there being different speculative levels as well as particular “regional” languages, each in its own way capturing, in its “thick immediacy,” some stage of this process. Expressed another way, “the (...) absolute speaks… and consequently can be known and known most perfectly in language”. (shrink)

Recently, several commentators have highlighted certain affinities between Wittgenstein and the Hegelian tradition. In this brief essay, I wish to argue that whatever compatibilities or similarities one claims to find between the Hegelian tradition and Wittgenstein’s own thought, it is virtually certain that he was not positively influenced by Hegel as some have claimed.

It is McRae’s “position that the link between absolute knowing, and the system proper [in Hegel], cannot be understood aside from the act of presentation itself”. In a word, “absolute knowing is nothing but the presentation of the system itself”. This ongoing activity of presentation occurs in the theater of language, there being different speculative levels as well as particular “regional” languages, each in its own way capturing, in its “thick immediacy,” some stage of this process. Expressed another way, “the (...) absolute speaks… and consequently can be known and known most perfectly in language”. (shrink)