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Daniel Kalpokas [20]Daniel E. Kalpokas [9]Daniel Enrique Kalpokas [2]
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Daniel Kalpokas
National University of Córdoba
  1.  30
    Sellars on Perceptual Knowledge.Daniel Kalpokas - 2017 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 53 (3):425.
    In Part VIII of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, after criticizing one of the forms that the Myth of the Given adopts, Sellars presents his own conception of epistemic justification. This conception, along with his criticism of the framework of the Given, has had a great impact on the analytic philosophy of the second half of twentieth century, an impact that still persists today.1 In this article, I aim to examine Sellars's theory of epistemic justification in order to highlight (...)
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  2.  73
    Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism.Daniel Enrique Kalpokas - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):715-738.
    In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection, that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of acceptance of their contents.
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  3.  26
    Naïve realism and seeing aspects.Daniel E. Kalpokas - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-16.
    Naïve realism is the view according to which perception is a non-representational relation of conscious awareness to mind-independent objects and properties. According to this approach, the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by just the objects, properties, or facts presented to the senses. In this article, I argue that such a conception of the phenomenology of experience faces a clear counter-example, i.e., the experience of seeing aspects. The discussion suggests that, to accommodating such a kind of experience, it must be (...)
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  4.  27
    Brandom on Perceptual Knowledge.Daniel Kalpokas - 2022 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 3 (1):49-70.
    According to Brandom, perceptual knowledge is the product of two distinguishable capacities: the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli, and the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlements and commitments of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a (...)
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  5.  48
    Perceptual Experience and Seeing-as.Daniel Enrique Kalpokas - 2015 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (1):123-144.
    According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as (...)
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  6.  44
    Perception as a propositional attitude.Daniel Kalpokas - forthcoming - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science.
    It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?”, Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of “the propositional-attitude thesis”, it does not really follow that experience has propositional content. In this paper I shall discuss Crane’s (...)
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  7.  39
    Two Dogmas of Coherentism.Daniel Kalpokas - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):213-236.
    This paper discusses two dogmas attributed to Davidson’s coherentism. The first dogma says that perceptual experience is only a causal link between the world and beliefs. The second one says that only beliefs can justify other beliefs. Against these two statements it is argued that the conception of perceptual experience as a mere causal link between the world and our beliefs makes the world unknowable. Moreover, the article presents some additional reasons against that conception: it misses the phenomenological and perspectival (...)
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  8.  26
    The Experience Not Well Lost.Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2014 - Contemporary Pragmatism 11 (1):43-56.
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  9. Richard Rorty y la superación pragmatista de la epistemologia.Daniel Kalpokas - 2006 - Critica 38 (113):80-86.
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  10.  36
    Perceiving mental states: Co-presence and constitution.Laura Danón & Daniel Kalpokas - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (2).
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  11.  30
    Perception as a propositional attitude.Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2020 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 35 (2):155-174.
    It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?” (2009), Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of “the propositional-attitude thesis”, it does not really follow that experience has propositional content. In this paper I shall discuss (...)
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  12.  14
    Perceiving Mental States: Co-presence and Constitution.Laura Danón & Daniel Kalpokas - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57:29-34.
    Recently, some philosophers of mind have called the attention to the idea according to which we can perceive, in many cases, some mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals: the co-presence thesis and the hybrid model. We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections against both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts that allows us to avoid these objections. In a nutshell, our idea is that by perceiving (...)
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  13.  14
    Doxastic Revision in Non-Human Animals: The First-Order Model.Laura Danón & Daniel E. Kalpokas - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    If we focus on current debates on how creatures revise or correct their beliefs, we can identify two opposing approaches that we propose to call “intellectualism” and “minimalism.” In this paper, we outline a new account of doxastic revision — “the first-order model”— that is neither as cognitively demanding as intellectualism nor as deflationary as minimalism. First-order doxastic revision, we argue, is a personal-level process in which a creature rejects some beliefs and accepts others based on reasons. However, it does (...)
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  14.  36
    A new case of the Myth of the Given?Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2022 - Theoria 88 (5):927-942.
    For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in perception are the physical objects of our surroundings. This is the view called, among others names, “the Relational View”. Basically, this view consists in the claim that experience is not representational, it is not a matter of the subject's taking things in the world to be this or that way; rather, it is just a matter of being presented with things, of being in (...)
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  15.  22
    Francisco Pereira, Ver no es creer.Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2022 - Critica 54 (161):95-108.
    Francisco Pereira, Ver no es creer, Gedisa, México, 2021, 272 pp.
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  16. Dewey and the myth of the given.Daniel Kalpokas - 2010 - Endoxa 26:157-186.
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  17. Dewey y el mito de lo dado.Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2010 - Endoxa 26:157-186.
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  18. El debate Putnam-Rorty sobre la naturaleza de la justificación.Daniel Kalpokas - 2003 - Dianoia 48 (51):119-126.
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  19. Entre el objetivismo y el relativismo: el etnocentrismo liberal de R. Rorty.Daniel Kalpokas - 1999 - Agora 18 (2):41-63.
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  20. Justificación, verdad y práctica social. El debate Putnam-Rorty sobre los alcances de la verdad y la justificación.Daniel Kalpokas - 2003 - Analogía Filosófica 17 (1):133-158.
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  21. Normatividad y facticidad: el doble aspecto del concepto de justificación. Respuesta a Penelas y Satne [Normativity and Factuality: The Double Aspect of the Concept of Justification. Reply to Penelas and Satne].Daniel Kalpokas - 2007 - Dianoia 52 (58):125-142.
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  22.  47
    Objetividad como ausencia de toda perspectiva.Daniel Kalpokas - 2009 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 34 (2):29-47.
    order to defend Putnam’s conceptual pluralism. Finally, the paper defends the compatibility between conceptual pluralism and the idea of convergence in a final opinion. Consequently, I conclude that objectivity depends on the particular vocabularies employed. This paper examines the concept of objectivity as a point of view without perspective. This sense of objectivity is present (among others) in Williams’ works (particularly in its notion of absolute conception of reality). The structure of the paper is the following: first, Williams’ physicalist program (...)
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  23. ¿Puede el mundo desempeñar un papel epistémico en la justificación de la creencia?: Rorty, Davidson y Mc Dowell en debate.Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2004 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 30 (1):37-64.
     
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  24.  49
    Pragmatismo, empirismo y representaciones: Una propuesta acerca del papel epistémico de la experiencia.Daniel Kalpokas - 2008 - Análisis Filosófico 28 (2):281-302.
    El empirismo puede ser caracterizado, por un lado, como una teoría acerca de los orígenes del conocimiento empírico; por otro, como una concepción epistémica acerca de la justificación de las creencias empíricas. Actualmente, esta última dimensión del empirismo ha sido criticada por diversos filósofos. Paradigmáticamente, Rorty ha sostenido que la experiencia es únicamente la causa de las creencias, pero no su justificación. La tesis de Rorty es que las creencias se relacionan con el mundo sólo causalmente. Este artículo posee dos (...)
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  25.  39
    Peirce, Wittgenstein y Davidson: coincidencias anti-escépticas.Daniel Kalpokas - 2008 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 20 (2):217-232.
    “Peirce, Wittgenstein and Davidson: Anti-skeptic Coincidences”. This paper shows some similarities among Peirce’s, Wittgenstein’s and Davidson’s answers to skepticism. In each case, the response to Cartesian skepticism consist in pointing out the contradictory character of the skeptical doubt in itself. More specifically, those philosophers agree on the following points: (i) in order to face the challenge of skepticism we have to examine its bases without conceding the terms of the challenge; (ii) the skeptic cannot doubt without assuming some propositional contents (...)
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  26.  2
    Peirce y lo incognoscible. Respuesta a Damiani.Daniel Kalpokas - 2011 - Tópicos 22:265-276.
    El presente artículo responde algunas objeciones que Damiani, en su trabajo “Comunidad, realidad y pragmatismo”, efectúa a un artículo anterior mío sobre lo incognoscible en Peirce: “Lo incognoscible y los límites del sentido”. Señalo que nuestros desacuerdos conciernen principalmente a dos puntos: si tiene sentido sostener que no podemos saber si hay incognoscibles, y si cabe defender la tesis de Peirce sin comprometerse con el idealismo. Al argumentar por una respuesta afirmativa al primer punto y por una negativa al segundo, (...)
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  27. Pensamiento y lenguaje.Daniel Kalpokas - 2015 - In Mariela Aguilera, Laura Danón, Carolina Scotto & Elisabeth Camp (eds.), Conceptos, lenguaje y cognición. [Córdoba, Argentina]: Editorial Universidad Nacional de Córdoba.
     
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  28. Pragmatismo y virtudes liberales en la filosofía de Rorty.Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2002 - Diálogo Filosófico 53:291-304.
     
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  29.  14
    ¿Realismo o Pragmatismo? El debate Rorty vs Taylor sobre las implicaciones de la superación de la Epistemología.Daniel Kalpokas - 2001 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 20 (1):59-106.
    Este artículo analiza la discusión entre Taylor y Rorty sobre los resultados de la superación de la epistemología. Primeramente, este artículo resume la crítica de Taylor a Rorty. En segundo lugar, considera la respuesta rortyana a Taylor y sus propios argumentos contra el realismo de Taylor. Los desacuerdos principales entre Rorty y Taylor son los siguientes: 1) Rorty dice que el pragmatismo supera la epistemología, mientras que Taylor dice que el realismo no-comprometido es el que supera la tradición epistemológica popular; (...)
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  30.  29
    ¿Superación de la epistemología o final de la filosofía?: La crisis de la filosofía en Richard Rorty.Daniel Kalpokas - 1999 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 22 (2):255-286.
    order to defend Putnam’s conceptual pluralism. Finally, the paper defends the compatibility between conceptual pluralism and the idea of convergence in a final opinion. Consequently, I conclude that objectivity depends on the particular vocabularies employed. This paper examines the concept of objectivity as a point of view without perspective. This sense of objectivity is present (among others) in Williams’ works (particularly in its notion of absolute conception of reality). The structure of the paper is the following: first, Williams’ physicalist program (...)
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  31. Verdad, pragmatismo y progreso.Daniel Kalpokas - 2002 - Análisis Filosófico 22 (1):37-68.
    This paper examines Rorty´s theory of truth in reference to concepts such as “falibilism” and “progress”. First, it claims that Rorty mixes inconsistently the pragmatist conception of truth, the Davidsonian thesis that “true” is a primitive and the deflacionist conception of truth. Secondly, it analyses the Rortyan attempt to “reduce” “true”” to “warranted assertibility” in order to show that this move is imcompatible with falibilism. It is argued that the distinction between truth and justification is essential to conceiving falibilism. Finally, (...)
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