Order:
  1. Open Future and Modal Anti-Realism.Daniel Kodaj - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):1-22.
    Open future is incompatible with realism about possible worlds. Since realistically conceived (concrete or abstract) possible worlds are maximal in the sense that they contain/represent the full history of a possible spacetime, past and future included, if such a world is actual now, the future is fully settled now, which rules out openness. The kind of metaphysical indeterminacy required for open future is incompatible with the kind of maximality which is built into the concept of possible worlds. The paper discusses (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2.  17
    Introduction to Special Issue.Daniel Kodaj, Anna Marmodoro & Martin Pickup - 2018 - Religious Studies 54 (3):295-296.
    A brief introduction to the Special Issue on the Metaphysics of the Trinity by the editors.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  51
    The Problem of Religious Evil.Daniel Kodaj - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (4):425-443.
  4.  42
    Religious Evil: The Basic Issues.Daniel Kodaj - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (5):277-286.
    Religious evil is evil apparently caused or justified by religious beliefs or institutions. Religious evil is a significant issue both in applied ethics and in the philosophy of religion; in the latter area, it grounds a distinctive atheistic argument from evil. The two aspects of religious evil are interrelated in the sense that one's solution to the atheistic argument from religious evil predisposes one to specific approaches to the ethical problem of religious evil. The paper surveys the relevant literature and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  35
    Evil and the god of indifference.László Bernáth & Daniel Kodaj - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (3):259-272.
    The evidential problem of evil involves a rarely discussed challenge, namely the challenge of defending theism against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator. Our argument uses a Bayesian framework and it starts by showing that if the only alternative to classical theism is naturalistic atheism, then fine-tuning can render theism virtually certain, even in the face of evil. But if the alternatives include the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator, theism is defeated even if the fine-tuning premise is accepted. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  50
    Counterfactuals and Accessibility.Daniel Kodaj - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):147-156.
    The accessibility relation between possible worlds can be defined in the metalanguage of counterfactual semantics. As a result, counterfactuals can ground the whole of standard modal logic.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  24
    Humean Idealism.Daniel Kodaj - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  55
    Intrinsic Causation in Humean Supervenience.Daniel Kodaj - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):135-152.
    The paper investigates whether causation is extrinsic in Humean Supervenience in the sense that being caused by is an intrinsic relation between token causes and effects. The underlying goal is to test whether causality is extrinsic for Humeans and intrinsic for anti-Humeans in this sense. I argue that causation is typically extrinsic in HS, but it is intrinsic to event pairs that collectively exhaust almost the whole of history.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  5
    Revisiting the Epistemic Regress of Dispositions.Daniel Kodaj - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):625-632.
    Pandispositionalists have not refuted the charge that their ideology precludes knowledge of the external world. Their replies boil down to the claim that some dispositions can be detected without the mediation of their effects. But this reply is ineffective if the regress is restated in terms of mind-independent domains of science.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark