17 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Daniel Lim [16]Daniel F. Lim [1]
See also
Profile: Daniel Lim (Renmin University of China)
  1.  39
    Doing, Allowing, and the Problem of Evil.Daniel Lim - forthcoming - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-17.
    Many assume that the best, and perhaps only, way to address the so-called Problem of Evil is to claim that God does not do evil, but that God merely allows evil. This assumption depends on two claims: the doing-allowing distinction exists and the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. In this paper I try to undermine both of these claims. Against I argue that some of the most influential analyses of the doing-allowing distinction face grave difficulties and that these difficulties are (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  7
    Cognitive Science of Religion and Folk Theistic Belief.Daniel Lim - 2016 - Zygon 51 (4):949-965.
    Cognitive scientists of religion promise to lay bare the cognitive mechanisms that generate religious beliefs in human beings. Defenders of the debunking argument believe that the cognitive mechanisms studied in this field pose a threat to folk theism. A number of influential responses to the debunking argument rely on making two sets of distinctions: proximate/ultimate explanations and specific/general religious beliefs. I argue, however, that such responses have drawbacks and do not make room for folk theism. I suggest that a detour (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  21
    Can Mary's Qualia Be Epiphenomenal?Lim Daniel & Wang Hao - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):503-512.
    Frank Jackson (1982) famously argued, with his so-called Knowledge Argument (KA), that qualia are non-physical. Moreover, he argued that qualia are epiphenomenal. Some have objected that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness of KA. One way of developing this objection, following Neil Campbell (2003; 2012), is to argue that epiphenomenalism is at odds with the kind of behavioral evidence that makes the soundness of KA plausible. We argue that Campbell’s claim that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness of KA is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language. By Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, and John Searle. [REVIEW]Daniel Lim - 2009 - Zygon 44 (4):1003-1005.
  5.  59
    Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will. By Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown. [REVIEW]Daniel Lim - 2008 - Zygon 43 (3):748-753.
  6.  47
    Occasionalism and Non-Reductive Physicalism: Another Look at the Continuous Creation Argument.Daniel Lim - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (1):39-57.
    Malebranche’s so-called conservation is continuous creation (CCC) argument has been celebrated as a powerful and persuasive argument for Occasionalism—the claim that only God has and exercises causal powers. In this paper I want to examine the CCC argument for Occasionalism by comparing it to Jaegwon Kim’s so-called Supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. Because the arguments have deep similarities it is interesting and fruitful to consider them in tandem. First I argue that both the CCC argument and the Supervenience argument turn (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  24
    Brain Simulation and Personhood: A Concern with the Human Brain Project.Daniel Lim - 2014 - Ethics and Information Technology 16 (2):77-89.
    The Human Brain Project (HBP) is a massive interdisciplinary project involving hundreds of researchers across more than eighty institutions that seeks to leverage cutting edge information and communication technologies to create a multi-level brain simulation platform (BSP). My worry is that some brain models running on the BSP will be persons. If this is right then not only will the in silico experiments the HBP envisions being carried on the BSP be unethical the mere termination of certain brain models running (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  27
    Exclusion, Overdetermination, and Vacuity.Daniel Lim - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):57-64.
    Jaegwon Kim argues that if mental properties are irreducible with respect to physical properties then mental properties are epiphenomenal. I believe this conditional is false and argue that mental properties, along with their physical counterparts, may overdetermine their effects. Kim contends, however, that embracing overdetermination in the mental case, due to supervenience, renders the attribution of overdetermination vacuous. This way of blocking the overdetermination option, however, makes the attribution of mental epiphenomenalism equally vacuous. Furthermore, according to Kim’s own logic, physical (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  14
    Can a Dualist Adopt Bennett's Strategy?Daniel Lim - 2014 - Philosophical Forum 45 (3):251-271.
    Karen Bennett (2003, 2008) has argued for and developed a way of defending a non-reductive physicalist solution to Jaegwon Kim's Causal Exclusion Argument. She argues that mental and physical causes can both be sufficient causes of the same event without being classified as overdetermining causes. This strategy, however, is only available to physicalists. I argue that dualists can adopt or adapt her strategy.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  5
    Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland's Argument From Consciousness.Daniel Lim - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):439 - 450.
    In his so-called argument from consciousness (AC), J. P. Moreland argues that the phenomenon of consciousness furnishes us with evidence for the existence of God. In defending AC, however, Moreland makes claims that generate an undesirable tension. This tension can be posed as a dilemma based on the contingency of the correlation between mental and physical states. The correlation of mental and physical states is either contingent or necessary. If the correlation is contingent then epiphenomenalism is true. If the correlation (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  9
    Causal Exclusion and Overdetermination.Daniel F. Lim - 2013 - International Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):353-369.
    Jaegwon Kim argues that if mental properties are irreducible with respect to physical properties, then mental properties are epiphenomenal. I believe that this conditional is false and argue that mental properties, along with their physical counterparts, may causally overdetermine their effects. Kim contends, however, that embracing causal overdetermination in the mental case should be resisted for at least three reasons: it is implausible, it makes mental properties causally dispensable, and it violates the Causal Closure Principle. I believe, however, that each (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  14
    Why Not Overdetermination?Daniel Lim - 2013 - Heythrop Journal 54 (2):668-677.
    One way of responding to Jaegwon Kim's Causal Exclusion Argument is to argue that the relevant mental and physical properties overdetermine their effects. Insofar as this is a reasonable way of securing mental causation this presents a viable framework for understanding how divine and non-divine causes can conspire to bring about events in the world.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Exclusion.Daniel Lim - 2015 - In God and Mental Causation. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.
    Jaegwon Kim’s (2005) most recent formulation of the so-called Supervenience Argument against Non-Reductive Physicalism is discussed. The two stages of Kim’s argument can be seen as instances of, what I will call, the Generalized Exclusion Argument.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. God.Daniel Lim - 2015 - In God and Mental Causation. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.
    J.P. Moreland’s (2009) so-called Argument from Consciousness (AC) for the existence of God is examined. One of its key premises, the contingency of the mind-body relation, is at odds with the possibility of mental causation. The AC may be rescued from this problem by adapting some of the lessons learned in chapter three concerning one of the Non-Reductive Physicalist solutions to the Supervenience Argument.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  6
    God and Mental Causation.Daniel Lim - 2015 - Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.
    This book lies at the intersection of philosophy of religion and philosophy of mind. It combines issues regarding divine action and mental causation. In particular, by using Jaegwon Kim's Causal Exclusion Argument as a foil, it explores possible ways of making sense of divine action in relation to some recent non-reductive physicalist strategies for vindicating mental causation. These insights are then applied to an argument for the existence of God based on the nature of phenomenal consciousness.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Occasionalism.Daniel Lim - 2015 - In God and Mental Causation. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.
    Malebranche’s so-called Conservation is Continuous Creation Argument (CCCA) for Occasionalism can be construed as an instance of the Generalized Exclusion Argument. This shows that the CCCA and the two stages of the Supervenience Argument are isomorphic with respect to each other. This allows interlocutors in these disparate areas of philosophy to engage in fruitful dialogue.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Overdetermination.Daniel Lim - 2015 - In God and Mental Causation. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.
    Non-Reductive Physicalism is similar in many ways with, what I will call, Orthodox Theism. This strongly suggests that Non-Reductive Physicalist solutions to the Supervenience Argument can be adapted to offer Orthodox Theistic solutions to the Conservation is Continuous Creation Argument. One particular Non-Reductive Physicalist solution will be examined in detail and then applied in the debate over Occasionalism.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography