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Daniel Shargel
CUNY Graduate Center
  1.  98
    Emotions without objects.Daniel Shargel - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (6):831-844.
    It is widely assumed that emotions have particular intentional objects. This assumption is consistent with the way that we talk: when we attribute states of anger, we often attribute anger at someone, or at something. It is also consistent with leading theories of emotion among philosophers and psychologists, according to which emotions are like judgments or appraisals. However, there is evidence from the social psychology literature suggesting that this assumption is actually false. I will begin by presenting a criterion for (...)
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  2.  30
    Appraisals, Emotions, and Inherited Intentional Objects.Daniel Shargel - 2017 - Emotion Review 9 (1):46-54.
    Modern appraisal theories inherited a problem from the Schachter theory: are emotions directed at intentional objects, and if so, why? On both theories the emotion is initiated by some sort of cognitive state, which according to Schachter produces a state of arousal, and according to appraisal theorists a cluster of emotion-specific states. If cognitions are components of the emotional state it may seem like we can explain why emotions inherit objects from those cognitions. In this article I focus on appraisal (...)
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  3.  29
    Emotion, Imagination, and the Limits of Reason, by Talia Morag: Abingdon: Routledge, 2016, pp. x + 287, £90.Daniel Shargel - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):837-838.
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