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Profile: Daniel Stoljar (Australian National University)
  1.  59
    Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2010 - Routledge.
    The standard picture -- Form and alternatives -- The starting point view -- The theory view -- Hempel's dilemma -- The necessity view -- Is necessitation necessary? -- Is necessitation sufficient? -- Skeptics and true believers -- Arguments against physicalism -- Arguments for physicalism.
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  2. Introspection and Consciousness.Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship between consciousness and (...)
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  3. Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.
    A phenomenal concept is the concept of a particular type of sensory or perceptual experience, where the notion of experience is understood phenomenologically. A recent and increasingly influential idea in philosophy of mind suggests that reflection on these concepts will play a major role in the debate about conscious experience, and in particular in the defense of physicalism, the thesis that psychological truths supervene on physical truths. According to this idea.
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  4.  83
    Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2006 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Ignorance and Imagination advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, Stoljar argues, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view (...)
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  5.  50
    The Semantics of ‘What It’s Like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.
    This paper defends a novel view of ‘what it is like’-sentences, according to which they attribute certain sorts of relations—I call them ‘affective relations’—that hold between events and individuals. The paper argues in detail for the superiority of this proposal over other views that are prevalent in the literature. The paper further argues that the proposal makes better sense than the alternatives of the widespread use of Nagel’s definition of conscious states and that it also shows the mistakes in two (...)
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  6. Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253 - 281.
    The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; a priori physicalism is false; if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception, it is plausible that is true and is false; on the object-based conception, it is plausible that is true (...)
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  7. Physicalism and the Necessary A Posteriori.Daniel Stoljar - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):33-55.
  8. Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. The thesis is usually intended as a metaphysical thesis, parallel to the thesis attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Thales, that everything is water, or the idealism of the 18th Century philosopher Berkeley, that everything is mental. The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the universe and everything in it) conforms (...)
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  9. Introspection and Consciousness: An Overview.Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies - 2012 - In Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Introspection stands at the interface between two major currents in philosophy and related areas of science: on the one hand, there are metaphysical and scientific questions about the nature of consciousness; and on the other hand, there are normative and epistemological questions about the nature of self-knowledge. Introspection seems tied up with consciousness, to the point that some writers define consciousness in terms of introspection; and it is also tied up with self-knowledge, since introspection is the distinctive way in which (...)
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  10. The Argument From Diaphanousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - In M. Escurdia, Robert J. Stainton & Christopher D. Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Alberta Press. pp. 341--90.
    1. Introduction In ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, G.E.Moore observed that, "when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous" (1922; p.25). Many philosophers, but Gilbert Harman (1990, 1996) in particular, have suggested that this observation forms the basis of an argument against qualia, usually called the argument from diaphanousness or transparency.1 But even its friends concede that it is none too clear what the argument (...)
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  11. A Neuron Doctrine in the Philosophy of Neuroscience.Ian Gold & Daniel Stoljar - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):809-830.
    It is widely held that a successful theory of the mind will be neuroscientific. In this paper we ask, first, what this claim means, and, secondly, whether it is true. In answer to the first question, we argue that the claim is ambiguous between two views--one plausible but unsubstantive, and one substantive but highly controversial. In answer to the second question, we argue that neither the evidence from neuroscience itself nor from other scientific and philosophical considerations supports the controversial view.
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  12. The Argument From Revelation.Daniel Stoljar - 2009 - In Robert Nola & David Braddon Mitchell (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press.
    1. Introduction The story of Canberra, the capital of Australia, is roughly as follows. In 1901, when what is called.
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  13. Two Conceivability Arguments Compared.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):27-44.
    The conclusion of this argument entails the falsity of physicalism because, technical details aside, physicalism is or entails the thesis that every psychological truth is entailed by some physical truth. If it is possible that I have a zombie duplicate however, then it is possible that the physical truths are as they are and some psychological truth is different. Hence 3 entails that physicalism is false. The second conceivability argument is one that is almost as famous, though perhaps it is (...)
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  14.  99
    Emotivism and Truth Conditions.Daniel Stoljar - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):81 - 101.
    By distinguishing between pragmatic and semantic aspects of emotivism, and by distinguishing between inflationary and deflationary conceptions of truth conditions, this paper defends emotivism against a series of objections. First, it is not the case (as Blackburn has argued) that emotivism must explain the appearance that moral sentences have truth conditions. Second, it is not the case (as Boghossian has argued) that emotivism presupposes that non-moral sentences have inflationary truth conditions. Finally, it is not the case (as Geach and Blackburn (...)
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  15. Does the Exclusion Argument Put Any Pressure on Dualism?Daniel Stoljar & Christian List - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):96-108.
    The exclusion argument is widely thought to put considerable pressure on dualism if not to refute it outright. We argue to the contrary that, whether or not their position is ultimately true, dualists have a plausible response. The response focuses on the notion of ‘distinctness’ as it occurs in the argument: if 'distinctness' is understood one way, the exclusion principle on which the argument is founded can be denied by the dualist; if it is understood another way, the argument is (...)
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  16.  60
    Distinctions in Distinction.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - In Jesper Kallestrup & Jakob Hohwy (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Causation and Explanation in the Special Sciences. Oxford University Press.
    1.Puzzle According to a standard view in contemporary metaphysics, there are no necessary connections between distinct properties. But according to a standard view in philosophy of mind there are necessary connections between distinct properties. In short, we have a puzzle: standard metaphysics inconsistent with standard philosophy of mind. By ‘a standard view in contemporary metaphysics’ I mean, of course, Hume’s dictum that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. I don’t mean the historical Hume; whether the historical Hume held (...)
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  17. The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):393-413.
    The conceivability argument against physicalism1 starts from the prem- ises that: It is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, i.e., that there is someone who is physically identical to me and yet who lacks phenomenal con- sciousness; and If it is conceivable that I have a zombie-twin, then it is possible that I have a zombie-twin. These premises entail that physicalism is false, for physicalism is the claim—or can be assumed for our purposes to be the claim2—that.
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  18. Does Nagel's Footnote Eleven Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Tyler Doggett & Daniel Stoljar - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):125-143.
  19. There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument.Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) - 2004 - MIT Press.
    The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.
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  20. Crimmins, Gonzales and Moore.Stoljar Daniel & Hájek Alan - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):208 - 213.
    Gonzales tells Mark Crimmins (1992) that Crimmins knows him under two guises, and that under his other guise Crimmins thinks him an idiot. Knowing his cleverness, but not knowing which guise he has in mind, Crimmins trusts Gonzales but does not know which of his beliefs to revise. He therefore asserts to Gonzales. (FBI) I falsely believe that you are an idiot.
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  21.  60
    Response to Alter and Bennett. [REVIEW]Daniel Stoljar - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):775-784.
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  22.  26
    Introspection and Necessity.Daniel Stoljar - forthcoming - Noûs.
    What is the connection between being in a conscious mental state and believing that you yourself are currently in that state? On the one hand, it is natural to think that this connection is, or involves, a necessary connection of some sort. On the other hand, it is hard to know what the nature of this necessary connection is. For there are plausible arguments according to which this connection is not metaphysically necessary, not rationally necessary, and not merely naturally necessary. (...)
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  23.  33
    Uriah Kriegel: The Varieties of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):678-682.
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  24.  48
    Introduction.Davies Martin & Stoljar Daniel - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):1-10.
    The two-dimensional semantic framework, with its two-dimensional matrices of truth values, was developed for tense logic by Frank Vlach (1973), building on work by Hans Kamp (1971), and for modal logic by Lennart Åqvist (1973), Krister Segerberg (1973), and Bas van Fraassen (1977). Other antecedents of the contemporary use of the framework are found in formal work on contextdependence by Richard Montague (1968) and David Lewis (1970) and especially in David Kaplan’s distinction between character and content in ‘Demonstratives’ (published in (...)
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  25.  13
    Introspection and Necessity.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Noûs.
    What is the connection between being in a conscious mental state and believing that you yourself are currently in that state? On the one hand, it is natural to think that this connection is, or involves, a necessary connection of some sort. On the other hand, it is hard to know what the nature of this necessary connection is. For there are plausible arguments according to which this connection is not metaphysically necessary, not rationally necessary, and not merely naturally necessary. (...)
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  26. Consequences of Intentionalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Erkenntnis (Special Issue) 66 (1-2):247--70.
    Most of the recent discussion in philosophy of mind concerning intentionalism.
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  27.  66
    Four Kinds of Russellian Monism.Daniel Stoljar - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 17.
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  28.  70
    The Deflationary Theory of Truth.Daniel Stoljar - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    According to the deflationary theory of truth, to assert that a statement is true is just to assert the statement itself. For example, to say that ‘snow is white’ is true, or that it is true that snow is white, is equivalent to saying simply that snow is white, and this, according to the deflationary theory, is all that can be said significantly about the truth of ‘snow is white’.
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  29.  2
    The Consequences Of Intentionalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):247-270.
    This article explores two consequences of intentionalism. My first line of argument focuses on the impact of intentionalism on the 'hard problem' of phenomenal character. If intentionalism is true, the phenomenal supervenes on the intentional. Furthermore, if physicalism about the intentional is also true, the intentional supervenes on the physical. Therefore, if intentionalism and physicalism are both true, then, by transitivity of supervenience, physicalism about the phenomenal is true. I argue that this transitivity argument is not persuasive, because on any (...)
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  30. Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - unknown
    Consciousness is extremely familiar yet it is at the limits—beyond the limits, some would say—of what one can sensibly talk about or explain. Perhaps this is the reason its study has drawn contributions from many fields including psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, anthropology, cultural and literary theory, artificial intelligence, physics, and others. The focus of this entry is on: the varieties of consciousness, different problems that have been raised about these varieties, and prospects for progress on these problems.
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  31. Strawson's Realistic Monism.Daniel Stoljar - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    There is at least one element in Strawson.
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  32. On the Self-Locating Response to the Knowledge Argument. [REVIEW]Daniel Stoljar - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):437-443.
    On the self-locating response to the knowledge argument Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9612-2 Authors Daniel Stoljar, Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT, 0200 Australia Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  33.  25
    Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism, by Robert J. Howell.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):608-611.
  34.  61
    Global Response-Dependence and Noumenal Realism.Daniel Stoljar - 1998 - The Monist 81 (1):85-111.
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  35. Comments on Galen Strawson - 'Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.Daniel Stoljar - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):170-176.
  36.  25
    Should Moore Have Followed His Own Method?Daniel Stoljar - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):609-618.
    I discuss Soames’s proposal that Moore could have avoided a central problem in his moral philosophy if he had utilized a method he himself pioneered in epistemology. The problem in Moore’s moral philosophy concerns what it is for a moral claim to be self-evident. The method in Moore’s epistemology concerns not denying the obvious. In review of the distance between something’s being self-evident and its being obvious, it is suggested that Soames’s proposal is mistaken.
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  37.  5
    The Ontology of Mind: Events, States and Processes.Daniel Stoljar & Helen Steward - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (3):418.
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  38.  41
    Nominalism and Intentionality.Daniel Stoljar - 1996 - Noûs 30 (2):221-241.
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  39.  3
    The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):393-413.
  40.  96
    What What It's Like Isn't Like.Daniel Stoljar - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):281-83.
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  41.  83
    Précis of Ignorance and Imagination. [REVIEW]Daniel Stoljar - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):748-755.
  42.  47
    Qualitative Inaccuracy and Unconceived Alternatives.Daniel Stoljar - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):745-752.
  43.  47
    Introspective Knowledge of Negative Facts.Daniel Stoljar - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):389-410.
  44. Introduction to There's Something About Mary.Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa - 2003 - In Peter Ludlow, Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), There's Something About Mary.
    Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of (...)
     
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  45.  51
    Interpreting Neuroscience and Explaining the Mind.Ian Gold & Daniel Stoljar - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):856-866.
    Although a wide variety of questions were raised about different aspects of the target article, most of them fall into one of five categories each of which deals with a general question. These questions are Is the radical neuron doctrine really radical? Is the trivial neuron doctrine really trivial? Were we sufficiently critical of the radical neuron doctrine? Is there a distinction to be drawn at all between the two doctrines? and How does our argument bear on related issues in (...)
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  46.  48
    Actors and Zombies.Daniel Stoljar - 2006 - In Alex Byrne & J. Thomson (eds.), Content and Modalities: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.
    1. Much of contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by the intersection of three topics: physicalism, the conceivability argument, and the necessary a posteriori. I will be concerned here to describe the consensus view of these topics; to explain why I think this account is mistaken; and to briefly sketch an alternative.
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  47.  20
    Review: Should Moore Have Followed His Own Method? [REVIEW]Daniel Stoljar - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):609 - 618.
    I discuss Soames's proposal that Moore could have avoided a central problem in his moral philosophy if he had utilized a method he himself pioneered in epistemology. The problem in Moore's moral philossophy concerns what it is for a moral claim to be self-evident. The method in Moore's epistemology concerns not denying the obvious. In view of the distance between something's being self-evident and its being obvious, it is suggested that Soames's proposal is mistaken.
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  48.  44
    On Biological and Cognitive Neuroscience.Daniel Stoljar & Ian Gold - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (1):110-31.
  49.  37
    Physicalism Plus Intentionalism Equals Error Theory.Daniel Stoljar - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):790-791.
    Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) combine physicalism about color with intentionalism about color experience. I argue that this combination leads to an “error theory” about color experience, that is, the doctrine that color experience is systematically illusory. But this conflicts with another aspect of B&H's position, namely, the denial of error theory.
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  50.  23
    The Ontology of Mind.Daniel Stoljar - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (3):418-421.
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