This book highlights the benefits of engaging with Critical Theory for Feminist research and provides a framework for a Feminist Critical Theory.

George Berkeley is, with John Locke and David Hume, one of the three major figures in the British empiricist school of philosophy. He has been the centre of much attention recently and his philosophical profile has gradually changed. In the 20th century he was almost exclusively known for his denial of the existence of matter, but today it is no longer reasonable to confine an account of Berkeley to the challenging philosophical inventions that he published when he was a young (...) fellow at Trinity College in Dublin. This is a welcome trend. It shows Berkeley as a contributor not only to epistemology, metaphysics and moral and social philosophy, but also to a wide range of subjects including mathematics, philosophy of science, empirical psychology, political economy and monetary policy. The present collection aims at meeting this new trend by presenting a broad and comprehensive picture of Berkeley's works in their historical context. The contributors are some of the finest international experts in the field. The editors hope that this collection will show George Berkeley as he was: a wide-ranging, widely influential and courageous philosophical innovator. This volume has been published to celebrate the 300th anniversary of George Berkeley's Principles. (shrink)

Steering a middle course between the strong neoliberalization thesis and arguments that deny that neoliberalization has occurred, this article accounts for the complex and hybridic shift in Sweden from pension reform through share ownership as a socialist strategy to an as-of-yet incomplete and contradictory neoliberal process. Noting the broader significance of Sweden for the international debate over pension reform, the article unpacks the concept of “mass investment culture” to discern the significant headway toward neoliberalization in Swedish pension savings and provision (...) while still noting profound sources of crisis tendencies. (shrink)

We have investigated attitudes towards the use of health data among the Swedish population by analyzing data from a survey answered by 1645 persons. Health data are potentially useful for a variety of purposes. Yet information about health remains sensitive. A balance therefore has to be struck between these opposing considerations in a number of contexts. The attitudes among those whose data is concerned will influence the perceived legitimacy of policies regulating health data use. We aimed to investigate what views (...) are held by the general public, and what aspects matter for the willingness to let one’s data be used not only for one’s own care but also for other purposes. We found that while there is a broad willingness to let one’s data be used, the possibility to influence that use is considered important. The study also indicated that when respondents are required to balance different interests, priority is typically given to compulsory schemes ensuring that data are available where needed, rather than voluntary participation and data protection. The policy implications to be drawn from this are not self-evident, however, since the fact that a majority has a certain attitude does not by itself determine the most adequate policy. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper begins with the assumption that it is morally problematic when people in need are offered money in exchange for research participation if the amount offered is unfair. Such offers are called ‘coercive’, and the degree of coerciveness is determined by the offer's potential to cause exploitation and its irresistibility. Depending on what view we take on the possibility to compensate for the sacrifices made by research participants, a wish to avoid ‘coercive offers’ leads to policy recommendations concerning payment (...) for participation. For sacrifices considered compensable, we ought to offer either no payment or payment at a level deemed fair, while for sacrifices deemed incompensable, we always ought to offer no payment because as compensation appears and increases, so too does coercion. This article provides a model for thinking of the way in which degrees of exploitativeness, irresistibility, and coerciveness interact with the size of the reward for compensable and incompensable cases. T... (shrink)

Luce once declared that his and Jessop’s interpretation of Berkeley is “reflected in our edition of the Works.” The appearance of a recent article by Stephen Daniel draws attention to two examples of the implications of this interpretive model of editing. One is Luce’s and Jessop’s rejection of Alciphron as a reliable source for Berkeley’s philosophy, because we have access to his true philosophy elsewhere , and “it is idle to turn to Alciphron for Berkeleianism,” for he does not rest (...) his case there “on his own philosophy” . The other is the “correction” of Alciphron by incorporating an anonymous letter to Peter Browne “as a supplement” to Berkeley’s work—something that Daniel criticizes for circularity and lack of scholarly accuracy. The question arises as to whether Alciphron is the only example of a text in the Worksthat is biased in favor of the editors’ private interpretation. (shrink)

Due to his theory of 'immaterialism' and Schopenhauer's regard of him as the 'father of idealism', George Berkeley (1685-1753) is one of the most important thinkers of the Early Modern period. "The Bloomsbury Companion to Berkeley "is a comprehensive one volume reference guide to his life, thought and work. In twenty six original essays, a team of leading international scholars of Modern Philosophy cover all of Berkeley's writings, from the major works such as his Principles of Human Knowledge through to (...) minor works, unpublished manuscripts and correspondence, providing readers with a complete and accessible source of information to the entire corpus of Berkeley's writings. The book is supported by a substantial dictionary of major terms and extended essays on key themes in Berkeley's thought. In addition, the book includes sections covering Berkeley's life and times, and also his intellectual influence and legacy. "The Bloomsbury Companion to Berkeley "is an indispensable resource for anyone working on the history of Early Modern philosophy at any level and the definitive textbook to Berkeley's life and work. (shrink)

Did George Berkeley, as I argued long ago in Belfrage (1986), defend a theory of "emotive meaning" in his Manuscript Introduction (an early version of the introduction to the Principles)? This question has raised a broad spectrum of different issues, which I think it is important to keep apart, such as rhetorical, psychological, semantic, ethical, metaphysical, and theological aspects. In the present paper, I hope to clear the ground of ambiguities, which have led to serious misunderstandings on this interesting (...) point in Berkeley's unpublished philosophy. I open with a summary account of the historical context. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there is a paradigm shift in George Berkeley's philosophy between his early, unpublished manuscripts (1707-1708) and the Theory of Vision (1709). If so, the traditional method of mixing published and unpublished material will lead to a confused picture of both his early, unpublished view and the doctrine that he published. Cet article montre qu'il y a eu un changement de paradigme dans la philosophie de Berkeley entre ses premiers manuscrits, non publiés, de 1707-1708 et (...) la Théorie de la vision de 1709. Dans ces conditions, la méthode d'analyse traditionnelle consistant à mêler textes publiés et non publiés ne peut conduire qu'à fausser la représentation tant de ses premières idées restées inédites que de la doctrine qu'il a publiée. (shrink)

George Berkeley opens the Principles (Part I) with "a Survey of the Objects of Human Knowledge" including such ideas "as are perceiv'd by attending to the Passions and Operations of the Mind." Scholars have rejected this passage as being "philosophically impossible," not seriously meant, just a reference to John Locke's ideas of reflection, or not at all about "ideas." It is true, in a few unpublished manuscripts Berkeley used the term "ideas" for image-pictures of particular things (the Old Paradigm). But, (...) I argue, in the Theory of Vision he develops a New Paradigm; and if we follow Berkeley's advice to read his book "in the order [he] published them," then his "Survey of the Objects of Human Knowledge" makes perfect sense in the light of this New Paradigm. (shrink)

George Berkeley (1685-1753) is, with John Locke and David Hume, one of the three major figures in the British empiricist school of philosophy. He has been the centre of much attention recently and his philosophical profile has gradually changed. In the 20th century he was almost exclusively known for his denial of the existence of matter (as this term was defined in those days), but today it is no longer reasonable to confine an account of Berkeley to the challenging philosophical (...) inventions that he published when he was a young fellow at Trinity College in Dublin. This is a welcome trend. It shows Berkeley as a contributor not only to epistemology, metaphysics and moral and social philosophy, but also to a wide range of subjects including mathematics, philosophy of science, empirical psychology, political economy and monetary policy. The present collection aims at meeting this new trend by presenting a broad and comprehensive picture of Berkeley's works in their historical context. The contributors are some of the finest international experts in the field. The editors hope that this collection will show George Berkeley as he was: a wide-ranging, widely influential and courageous philosophical innovator. This volume has been published to celebrate the 300th anniversary of George Berkeley's Principles. (shrink)

BackgroundThe ability of healthcare to protect sensitive personal data in medical records and registers might influence public trust, which in turn might influence willingness to allow healthcare to use such data. The aim of this study was to examine how the general public’s trust relates to their attitudes towards uses of health data.MethodsA stratified sample from the general Swedish population received a questionnaire about their willingness to share health data. Respondents were also asked about their trust in the management and (...) protection of electronic health data.ResultsA large majority (81.9%) of respondents revealed high levels of trust in the ability of healthcare to protect electronic patient data. Good health was associated with significantly higher levels of trust compared to bad health. Respondents with low levels of trust were significantly less willing to allow personal data to be used for different purposes and were more inclined to insist on being asked for permission beforehand. Those with low levels of trust also perceived risks of unauthorized access to personal data to be higher and the likely damage of such unauthorized access worse, compared to those with high levels of trust.ConclusionsTrust in the ability of healthcare to protect electronic health is generally high in Sweden. Those with higher levels of trust are more willing to let their data be used, including without informed consent. It thus seems crucial to promote trust in order to be able to reap the benefits that digitalization makes possible through increased access and use of data in healthcare. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSEL:rS ANTI-COMMUNIST RHETORIC BEFORE AND AFTER STALIN'S DEATH STEPHEN HAYHURST History / Copenhagen International School Copenhagen, Denmark 1100 A communist regimes collapse in Eastern Europe, and the rhetoric of the Cold War is at last abandoned, it seems an appropriate time to examine an aspect of Bertrand Russell's political life and thought which has not been as well documented as, for example, his activities in the First World War (...) or the 1960s. In the decade following the end of the Second World War Russell could, with some justification, be accused of contributing to Cold War mistrust, and even of playing the role of a "Cold War Warrior". Between 1945 and 1953 not only was Russell, as he himself later admitted, well entrenched as part of the "Establishment", but he was also actively involved in denouncing Communism, Stalin, the Soviet Union, and at times even the Russian people. Russell's Cold War invective intruded into his private letters, newspaper and magazine articles, public lectures and some of his books during this period. For example, What is Freedom? and What is Democracy?, whilst not the best remembered of Russell's books, are illustrative of his vehement hatred of Stalin's regime, and are of especial interest because they underwent small but significant revisions after Stalin's death. This brief survey of Russell's anti-Stalinism is, by necessity, highly selective, and has intentionally focussed on some of Russell's more extreme statements. A much more comprehensive study would be necessary to analyze the overall significance of Russell's anti-Stalinism. Russell's political thought in the years immediately after the end of the Second World War is dominated by what has been called his "preventative war phase". His proposal that the Soviet Union should be ru II: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives McM rer University Libraty Press n.s. II (summer 1991): 67-81 ISSN 0031>-01631 68 STEPHEN HAYHURST pressured into signing the Baruch Plan for the international control of nuclear weapons, was made on at least twelve separate occasions between 1945 and 1949 and was, he later confessed, "the worst thing" he ever said.I This episode, characterized by controversy, proposals, denials and counter-denials, and reasonably well discussed by both critics and commentators, has direct relevance to Russell's anti-communist rhetoric.2 His prescient awareness of the staggering implications of nuclear weapons led him to demand, within two weeks of the destruction of Hiroshima, the urgent implementation of some procedure of international control.3 Since the First World War Russell had always maintained a vigorous belief in the long-term necessity of world government. Although this internationalism had been a central component of Russell's political thought, it had remained at least until 1945, at the level of a political ideal rather than a concrete proposal. In his more pessimistic moods, Russell had maintained that it would only arise through American hegemony, and at all times he had argued that a world government would only be effective if it possessed a monopoly ofweapons.4 Suddenly with the development of the atomic bomb, conditions had changed. Until 1949 the United States had a monopoly of this new monstrous weapon. Despite his very mixed views about both American political ideology and practice, Russell now clearly looked to the United States for international leadership. From the outset he accepted that international control of the bomb may not arise voluntarily. In October 1945 he wrote, "I think a world government supremely important, and I do not expect to see it established without I The twelve occasions are set out in I. F. Stone, "Bertrand Russell as a Moral Force in World Politics", Russell, n.s. I (1981): 7-25. Interview by Cedric Belfrage in the National Guardian, New York, 8, no. 35 (18 June 1956): 6. 2 Clark: D. P. Lackey, "Russell's Contribution to the Study of Nuclear Weapons Policy", Russell, n.s. 4 (1984): 243-52; Alan Ryan, Bertrand Russell, a Political Lift (London: Allen Lane the Penguin P., 1988): Stone, "Bertrand Russell as a Moral Force in World Politics~'. l "The Bomb and Civilization", Forward. Glasgow, 39, no. 33 (18 Aug. 1945): I, 3... (shrink)

Marx und die "bürgerliche" Nationalökonomie, von G. Aspelin.--Några textkritiska problem i Berkeleyforskningen, av B. Belfrage.--Några kommentarer till C.L. Stevensons teori om etisk oenighet, av L. Befgström.--Viljeteorins premisser, av J. Evers.--Axel Hägerströms analys av värdeupplevelsen, av L. Fröström.--On archetypical performatives, by M. Furberg.--The better something is, the worse its absence, by S. Halldén.--Ett slags representationsteorem för deontisk logik, av B. Hansson.--Om Platons "Euthyphron," av I. Hedenius.--Tolkningssatsernas logik, av G. Hermerén.--Är verkligheten motsägande? Ett dialektiskt argument, av K. Marc-Wogau.--Moral, amoral og indifferens, (...) av H. Ofstad.--Begreppet "property" hos John Locke, av K. Olivecrona.--En skademodell, av U. Persson.--Objektivitet som kunskaps teoretiskt begepp och som värderingsideal, av H. Regnéll.--Satsen "Flickan F är vacker," av E. Ryding.--Lathund för lagläsare, av T. Strömberg. (shrink)

Deux innovations caractérisent la philosophie de Berkeley : il met la perception au centre de sa théorie de l'être (esse est percipi out percipere) et il lie étroitement vision et langage, en affirmant que les idées de la vue constituent un " langage universel de l'Auteur de la nature ". Ces deux innovations continuent à nourrir la philosophie contemporaine, en particulier certains aspects de la philosophie analytique. C'est pourquoi, il est essentiel d'examiner à nouveaux frais les questions concernant l'hétérogénéité des (...) champs sensoriels, la nature de la suggestion, le rôle de l'imagination et celui de l'idée médiate dans la construction de l'objet. Le présent ouvrage vise donc à éclairer le tournant philosophique et sémantique instauré par Berkeley dans l'étude de la perception et de la vision. Une comparaison avec Locke met en valeur la spécificité des thèses du philosophe irlandais. Un examen précis des textes concernés permet de réévaluer la place et le rôle des thèses sur la vision dans l'économie générale de l'œuvre. Textes de Margaret Atherton, Bertil Belfrage, Geneviève Brykman, Richard Glauser, Philippe Hamou, Jean-Michel Vienne. (shrink)

Berkeley doesn't use the Time-Gap Argument, as Leibniz does, to prove either that we immediately see only ideas or that we see physical objects mediately. It may be doubted whether he was even aware of the time-gap problem that gives rise to the argument. But certain passages in the Three Dialogues and elsewhere suggest that Berkeley would have had cogent answers to anyone who claimed that this argument, construed as being in aid of the conclusion that we only perceive ideas, (...) is unsound. Discussing points made by Bertil Belfrage, Len Carrier, John Foster, A. C. Grayling, Howard Robinson, A. D. Smith, Tom Stoneham, and Colin Turbayne, I try to show that the Time-Gap Argument can be expanded into a strong argument for Berkeleian Idealism. I also idnicate how the latter provides a solution to J. J. Valberg's "puzzle of experience" and disarms James Cornman's argument in Perception, Common Sense, and Science that Berkeley, too, faces a time-gap problem. (shrink)

The first question to ask of this diplomatic edition is why bother? Why attempt to provide an exact print reproduction of a handwritten antecedent of the Introduction to Berkeley’s A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge? And why divide the book into Editor’s Introduction, Editor’s Commentary, Text, and Critical Apparatus? The answer makes one appreciate Belfrage’s labors. T. E. Jessop, the editor of the standard edition of MI, as I shall call the material from a notebook in the (...) library of Trinity College, Dublin, made several major editing errors. Belfrage’s painstaking approach avoids them by separating editing from interpreting. Some examples. First, Jessop entitled MI “First Draft of the Introduction to the Principles,” whereas Belfrage provides physical evidence that it began as a draft prepared for a printer and therefore was probably not the first draft of the Introduction. Second, Jessop numbered the sections of MI on the basis of his interpretation of how they related to the sections of the printed text of the first edition. By making at least one glaring mistake, he demonstrated why one should employ a neutral numbering system as Belfrage does. Third, he printed only the earliest statum of a stratefied document. This approach makes it easier for the reader, but suggests linearity where none exists, makes the printed text problematic for scholars interested in dating stages of Berkeley’s thought, and prevents one from seeing how the author worked his way to the text that was finally published. To make matters worse, Jessop incorporated into the sections dates from the margin that probably were added after the original version of the draft was written, thereby suggesting an incorrect composition period for the text he presents. In his Editor’s Introduction, Belfrage presents a carefully organized argument concerning the compositional history of MI; even better, he presents the text so that the reader, too, can assess the evidence. One final error, not an editing error, but what perhaps led to them, is worth noting. Jessop wrongly encouraged reader’s to discount MI’s importance; he remarked in his Editor’s Introduction that “Compared with the printed Introduction, the draft neither adds nor omits anything of substance.” The vague expression “anything of substance” makes refuting his claim difficult, but at the very least it is extremely misleading. One need not accept Belfrage’s overall interpretation of how MI relates to the printed text to realize he has provided powerful arguments against Jessop’s view. Belfrage’s interpretation, too complex to be adequately summarized here and, indeed, too complex to be fully presented in the Editor’s Commentary, is, roughly, that Berkeley’s views on language, knowledge, and representation changed dramatically from when he first wrote MI to when he quit correcting it. In defending this historical thesis Belfrage develops a number of distinctions regarding Berkeleian doctrines which are philosophically important whether or not his defence fully succeeds. Consequently, anyone who wishes to understand the doctrines developed in the printed Introduction will have to take into account Belfrage’s interpretation of how it relates to MI. What this means is that we are doubly in his debt. Not only has he provided us with a carefully edited version of MI, one which every research library should include, he has also deepened our understanding of Berkeley’s philosophy. (shrink)