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  1.  87
    Knowing How to Establish Intellectualism.Daniele Sgaravatti & Elia Zardini - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):217-261.
    In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in particular for the version of the view developed by Stanley & Williamson 2001. Their argument draws on the alleged uniformity of 'know how'-and 'know wh'-ascriptions. We offer a series of considerations to the effect that this assimilation is problematic. Firstly, in contrast to 'know wh'-ascriptions, 'know how'-ascriptions with known negative answers are false. Secondly, knowledge-how obeys closure principles whose counterparts fail for knowledge-wh and knowledge-that. Thirdly, (...)
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  2.  64
    Petitio Principii: A Bad Form of Reasoning.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):fzt086.
    In this paper I develop an account of petitio principii (the fallacy sometimes also called ‘vicious circularity’, or ‘begging the question’) which has two crucial features: it employs the notion of doxastic justification, and it takes circularity to be relative to an evidential state. According to my account, an argument will be circular relative to an evidential state if and only if having doxastic justification for the conclusion is necessary, for a subject in that evidential state, to have doxastic justification (...)
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  3.  16
    Is Knowledge of Essence Required for Thinking About Something?Daniele Sgaravatti - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):217-228.
    Lowe claims that having knowledge of the essence of an object is a precondition for thinking about it. Lowe supports this claim with roughly the following argument: you cannot think about something unless you know what you are thinking about; and to know what it is that you are thinking about just is to know its essence. I will argue that this line of reasoning fails because of an equivocation in the expression ‘what a thing is’, which can be used (...)
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  4.  8
    The ‘If’ in the ‘What If’.Daniele Sgaravatti - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    In this paper, I defend the view that any good account of the logical form of thought experiments should contain a conditional. Moreover, there are some reasons to think it should be a counterfactual conditional. First, I defend Williamson’s account of the logical form of thought experiments against a competing account offered by Ichikawa and Jarvis. The two accounts have a similar structure, but Williamson’s posits a counterfactual conditional where Ichikawa and Jarvis’ posits a strict conditional. Williamson’s motivation is related (...)
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  5.  64
    Scepticism, Defeasible Evidence and Entitlement.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):439-455.
    The paper starts by describing and clarifying what Williamson calls the consequence fallacy. I show two ways in which one might commit the fallacy. The first, which is rather trivial, involves overlooking background information; the second way, which is the more philosophically interesting, involves overlooking prior probabilities. In the following section, I describe a powerful form of sceptical argument, which is the main topic of the paper, elaborating on previous work by Huemer. The argument attempts to show the impossibility of (...)
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  6.  13
    In Conversation with the Skeptic: Contextualism and the Raising of Standards.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):97-118.
    I begin by describing the solution to the problem of skepticism propounded by contextualists, which constitutes the background of the rest of the paper. I then address the question of what happens when a skeptic and a non-skeptic are confronted in dialogue to the standards in play for correct knowledge ascription, on the assumption that contextualism about knowledge is right. I argue against Keith DeRose that there are reasons, both intuitive and theoretical, to conclude that the standards will be raised (...)
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  7.  15
    Down to Earth Philosophy: An Anti-Exceptionalist Essay on Thought Experiments and Philosophical Methodology.Daniele Sgaravatti - unknown
    In the first part of the dissertation, chapters 1 to 3, I criticize several views which tend to set philosophy apart from other cognitive achievements. I argue against the popular views that 1) Intuitions, as a sui generis mental state, are involved crucially in philosophical methodology 2) Philosophy requires engagement in conceptual analysis, understood as the activity of considering thought experiments with the aim to throw light on the nature of our concepts, and 3) Much philosophical knowledge is a priori. (...)
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  8.  1
    La debolezza del volere. Filosofia analitica e spiegazioni dell'irrazionalità.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2003 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 16 (1):125-136.
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