Terry Horgan defends a new general metaphilosophical position called postanalytic metaphilosophy. I raise some critical points connected with the application of PAM to the problem of freedom. I question the distinction between opulent and austere construals of philosophical concepts. According to Horgan compatibilism comports better overall with the relevant data than does incompatibilism. I raise some objections. At the end I argue that contextualism is an inadequate explanation of incompatibilistic intuitions.
Ilhan Inan’s (2012) approach to curiosity is based on the following central theses: (i) for every question asked out of curiosity there is a corresponding term (definite description) that is inostensible for the asker (its reference is unknown) and that has the function of uniquely identifying an object; (ii) the satisfaction of curiosity is always in the form of com- ing to know an object as falling under a concept. This model primarily covers curiosity as our search for empirical objectual (...) knowledge. In my critical reflections, I explore some phenomena of non-objectual curiosity which are left out or at least not sufficiently explored by Inan: curiosity as the search for explanation and understanding, and meta-curiosity— curiosity about the very representations, i.e. how to conceptualize a certain problem, and what defi nite descriptions to use in the first place. (shrink)
This book presents a historical and scientific analysis as historical epistemology of the science of weights and mechanics in the sixteenth century, particularly as developed by Tartaglia in his Quesiti et inventioni diverse, Book VII and Book VIII (1546; 1554). -/- In the early 16th century mechanics was concerned mainly with what is now called statics and was referred to as the Scientia de ponderibus, generally pursued by two very different approaches. The first was usually referred to as Aristotelian, where (...) the equilibrium of bodies was set as a balance of opposite tendencies to motion. The second, usually referred to as Archimedean, identified statics with centrobarica, the theory of centres of gravity based on symmetry considerations. In between the two traditions the Italian scholar Niccolò Fontana, better known as Tartaglia (1500?–1557), wrote the treatise Quesiti et inventioni diverse (1546). -/- This volume consists of three main parts. In the first, a historical excursus regarding Tartaglia’s lifetime, his scientific production and the Scientia de ponderibus in the Arabic-Islamic culture, and from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, is presented. Secondly, all the propositions of Books VII and VIII, by relating them with the Problemata mechanica by the Aristotelian school and Iordani opvsculvm de ponderositate by Jordanus de Nemore are examined within the history and historical epistemology of science. The last part is relative to the original texts and critical transcriptions into Italian and Latin and an English translation. -/- This work gathers and re-evaluates the current thinking on this subject. It brings together contributions from two distinguished experts in the history and historical epistemology of science, within the fields of physics, mathematics and engineering. It also gives much-needed insight into the subject from historical and scientific points of view. The volume composition makes for absorbing reading for historians, epistemologists, philosophers and scientists. (shrink)
No other field of literature can quite equal the drama in its faithful representation of life. A solid jolt of reality can connect the audience to the primeval human instincts not readily understood in everyday life. Confronted by conscience, it is natural for a person to seek closure and meaning to achieve catharsis that sometimes drama can provide when real life cannot. The study aims to examine Danilo’s character in relation to his seeming indifference to the indignation of his (...) parents and the town folks at the heartless father of Sepang Loca’s child; to identify the various instances that allude or point to him as the criminal; and, to analyze his behavior, feelings and thoughts about the phenomenon. The descriptive method is used to (a) trace his social background and moral values; (b) reveal Danilo’s crime based on his actions, what he says or thinks, and his silences, and to infer if there has been any remorse on his part; and, (c) the role of the large black mole shaped like a teardrop that runs among sons of Danilo’s clan. The study tries to unravel the extent of Danilo’s crime, guilt and remorse. It is hoped that through his character, the play succeeds in stirring social conscience and kindling transformative energy to effect change in the way society deals with idiots. Keywords – Literature, Filipino Play, guilt, remorse, descriptive method, Philippines. (shrink)
The article is an instructive exposition of the central problem of scholastic metaphysics, namely: the problem of analogia entis. The author sees the origin of this idea in a historical development, which began with late neoplatonism, continued with Arabic philosophy and ended with medieval authors, especially S. Thomas Aquinas.
. This book is informative, provocative, and encourages one to consider carefully how s/he chooses to live."—Erin McKenna, Utopian Studies "These four lives, researched and skillfully presented by historian Michael Bess, make fascinating ...
Lo sviluppo del diritto internazionale penale è stato accolto con entusiasmo da attivisti per i diritti umani, giuristi e studiosi di questioni internazionali. La punizione dei crimini internazionali più gravi, come i crimini di guerra, quelli contro l’umanità e il genocidio è considerata un importante passo avanti verso l’effettiva protezione dei diritti umani e l’affermazione della pace. Questo entusiasmo sembra però aver lasciato sullo sfondo alcune domande fondamentali: come si giustifica l’esercizio del potere punitivo internazionale? Chi ne è il titolare (...) e in virtù di cosa? Il tribunale del mondo prova a rispondere a queste domande, indagando da una prospettiva filosofico-politico-giuridica la giustificazione del diritto internazionale penale e assumendo come punto di partenza le specificità del contesto internazionale. L’autrice auspica il superamento del diritto internazionale penale a favore di un sistema plurale di risposta alle gravi violazioni dei diritti elementari: un sistema che comprenda anche soluzioni non penali e che in alternativa all’universalismo del diritto penale internazionale offra meccanismi orientati alle esigenze delle comunità coinvolte. (shrink)
Backtracking counterfactuals are problem cases for the standard, similarity based, theories of counterfactuals e.g., Lewis. These theories usually need to employ extra-assumptions to deal with those cases. Hiddleston, 632–657, 2005) proposes a causal theory of counterfactuals that, supposedly, deals well with backtracking. The main advantage of the causal theory is that it provides a unified account for backtracking and non-backtracking counterfactuals. In this paper, I present a backtracking counterfactual that is a problem case for Hiddleston’s account. Then I propose an (...) informational theory of counterfactuals, which deals well with this problem case while maintaining the main advantage of Hiddleston’s account. In addition, the informational theory offers a general theory of backtracking that provides clues for the semantics and epistemology of counterfactuals. I propose that backtracking is reasonable when the state of affairs expressed in the antecedent of a counterfactual transmits less information about an event in the past than the actual state of affairs. (shrink)
I addresses the problem of accommodating the possibility of lucky true beliefs in necessary (or armchair) truths within contemporary modal epistemology. According to modal epistemology luck consists in the modal proximity of a false belief, but a belief in a true mathematical proposition could not easily be false because a proposition believed could never be false. According to Miščević modal stability of a true belief under small changes in the world is not enough, stability under small changes in the cognizer (...) should also (and primarily) be considered. I argue for a more traditional modal reliabilism based on the critical question: how easy is it for a belief to be false, given the way it was formed? A belief (a priori or a posteriori) is then agent-lucky when based on a specific method which might easily lead to a false belief in the target proposition. Miščević suggests a unifying approach in terms of virtue epistemology, but it seems that this approach, if successful, will undermine the project that he started with: formulate an anti-luck condition in the frame of a modal theory of luck. (shrink)
Semifactuals and Epiphenomenalism -/- Mental properties are said to be epiphenomenal because they do not pass the counterfactual test of causal relevance. Jacob (1996) adopts the defence of causal efficacy of mental properties developed by LePore and Loewer (1987). They claim that those who argue for the epiphenomenalism of the mental place too strong a requirement on causal relevance, which excludes causally efficacious properties. Given a proper analysis of causal relevance, the causal efficacy of mental properties is saved. I defend (...) the counterfactual test and epiphenomenalism of the mental against this critique. In causal counterfactuals we hold everything the same, take out the causal property and see if the effect property occurs. We do not replace the causal property with a barely different property as presupposed by LePore and Loewer. But I recognize some general problems in making counterfactual claims about mental events, which raise doubts about the usefulness of the counterfactual test in general. (shrink)
Putnam’s semantic argument against the BIV hypothesis and Sosa’s argument against dream skepticism based on the imagination model of dreaming share some important structural features. In both cases the skeptical option is supposed to be excluded because preconditions of its intelligibility are not fulfilled (affirmation and belief in the dream scenario, thought and reference in the BIV scenario). Putnam’s reasoning is usually interpreted differently, as a classic case of deception, but this feature is not essential. I propose to interpret BIV’s (...) utterances as cases of reference failure best captured by truth-value gaps. Both anti-skeptical strategies are then vulnerable to the same type of objections (how do we know what state we are in or how do we know what kind of language do we speak). (shrink)
According to the thesis of modal supervenience it is impossible that two objects be alike in their actual properties but differ in their modal properties. Some have argued that the concept of supervenience is inapplicable to the modal-actual case. Some have argued that the thesis of modal supervenience is trivially true. These arguments are refuted; a thesis of the supervenience of the modal on the actual is meaningful and nontrivial. The significance of the thesis is nevertheless limited by the problem (...) of finding a nonmodal specification for the purported subvenient properties. (shrink)
Davies argues that the ontology of artworks as performances offers a principled way of explaining work-relativity of modality. Object oriented contextualist ontologies of art (Levinson) cannot adequately address the problem of work-relativity of modal properties because they understand looseness in what counts as the same context as a view that slight differences in the work-constitutive features of provenance are work-relative. I argue that it is more in the spirit of contextualism to understand looseness as context-dependent. This points to the general (...) problem—the context of appreciation is not robust enough to ground modal intuitions about objective entities. In general, when epistemology dictates ontology there is always a threat of anti-realism, scepticism and relativism. Davies also appeals to the modality principle—an entity’s essential properties are all and only its constitutive properties. Davies understands essentiality in a traditional way: a property P is an essential property of an object o iff o could not exist and lack P. Kit Fine has recently made a convincing case for the view that the notion of essence is not to be understood in modal terms. I explore some of the implications of this view for Davies’ modal argument for the performance theory. (shrink)
According to the received view, the regularity “All F’s are G” is a real law of nature only if it supports a counterfactual conditional “If x were an F (but actually it is not), it would be a G”. Popper suggested a different approach -- universal generalisations differ from accidental generalisations in the structure of their terms. Terms in accidental generalisations are closed, extensional and terms in laws of nature are open, strictly universal, intensional. But Popper failed to develop this (...) point and used a mistaken and unnatural interpretation of counterfactual assumptions in order to defend the view that both laws of nature and accidental generalisations support counterfactuals. The idea that terms in laws of nature stand for intensions was developed twenty-five years later in the so called DTA theory, which explains laws of nature as relations between properties. (shrink)