1.  36
    Trouble for Legal Positivism?Danny Priel - 2006 - Legal Theory 12 (3):225-263.
    Many contemporary legal positivists have argued that legal theory is evaluative because it requires the theorist to make judgments of importance. At the same time they argue that it is possible to know without resort to evaluative considerations. I distinguish between two senses of : in one sense it refers to legal validity, in another to the content of legal norms, and I argue that legal positivism is best understood (as indeed some legal positivists have explicitly said) as a claim (...)
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  2.  23
    Farewell to the Exclusive–Inclusive Debate.Danny Priel - 2005 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 25 (4):675-696.
  3.  83
    Sanction and Obligation in Hart's Theory of Law.Danny Priel - 2008 - Ratio Juris 21 (3):404-411.
    Abstract. The paper begins by challenging Hart's argument aimed to show that sanctions are not part of the concept of law. It shows that in the "minimal" legal system as understood by Hart, sanctions may be required for keeping the legal system efficacious. I then draw a methodological conclusion from this argument, which challenges the view of Hart (and his followers) that legal philosophy should aim at discovering some general, politically neutral, conceptual truths about law. Instead, the aim should be (...)
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  4.  55
    The Boundaries of Law and the Purpose of Legal Philosophy.Danny Priel - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (6):643 - 695.
    Many of the current debates in jurisprudence focus on articulating the boundaries of law. In this essay I challenge this approach on two separate grounds. I first argue that if such debates are to be about law, their purported subject, they ought to pay closer attention to the practice. When such attention is taken it turns out that most of the debates on the boundaries of law are probably indeterminate. I show this in particular with regard to the debate between (...)
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  5.  52
    Were the Legal Realists Legal Positivists?Danny Priel - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (4):309 - 350.
    Responds to Leiter's naturalist/realist approach to jurisprudence - particularly his claim that such an approach implies exclusive positivism. Considers analogy with naturalized epistemology. "With regard to the first step the realists were anti-foundationalists in the sense that they 'denied that legal reasons justify a unique decision: the legal reasons underdetermine the decision '. The second step, the replacement suggests that instead of a justificatory account of adjudication, i.e. some prescription as to how judges should decide cases, the reaslists provided an (...)
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  6.  25
    Notes . Discussion . Book Reviews Rights and Conclusive Reasons.Danny Priel - 2005 - Ratio Juris 18 (3):410-414.