The ethical behavior of a national sample of marketing professionals was examined by analyzing their responses to four different types of ethical dilemmas presented in vignette form. The ethical situations operationalize the concepts of coercion and control, deceit and falsehood, conflict of interest, and self integrity, within the context of the marketing mix elements – place, promotion, price, and product. Responses were examined to determine whether behavior varied by type of ethical situation, and whether demographic factors affected their responses. The (...) results indicate that marketing professionals vary their ethical decisions depending on which marketing mix decision they face. Among demographic variables, age, gender, and education level had significant but mixed influence on respondents' ethical decisions across the different situations. (shrink)
This empirical investigation reexamines the impact of gender on ethics judgment of marketing professionals in a cross-section of firms in the United States. In the study, gender differences in ethics judgment focus on decisions in the context of marketing-mix elements (product, promotion, pricing, and distribution). The results of statistical analyses indicate that men and women marketing professionals differ significantly in their ethics judgment. Overall, female marketing professionals evinced significantly higher ethics judgment than their male counterparts. Given the changing demographics of (...) corporate America, it is conceivable that ethical decision-making in organizations stands to improve as the ratio of women in executive positions increases. The finding also bodes well with the recent emphasis of moving away from transaction-based in favor of relationship-focused conceptualization of marketing. (shrink)
The authors examine empirically the influence of personal and organizational values on marketing professionals'' ethical behavior. The results indicate that personal and organizational values underlie differences in marketing professionals'' ethical behavior, albeit small terms of the proportion of explained variance. The results also suggest the relationship between organizational values and ethical behavior to be significant. However, the same is not the case for the relationship between personal values and ethical behavior.
This paper seeks to reinterpret the life and work of J. B. S. Haldane by focusing on an illuminating but largely ignored essay he published in 1927, "The Last Judgment" -- the sequel to his better known work, "Daedalus" (1924). This astonishing essay expresses a vision of the human future over the next 40,000,000 years, one that revises and updates Wellsian futurism with the long range implications of the "new biology" for human destiny. That vision served as a kind of (...) lifelong credo, one that infused and informed his diverse scientific work, political activities, and popular writing, and that gave unity and coherence to his remarkable career. (shrink)
This paper assesses branching spacetime theories in light of metaphysical considerations concerning time. I present the A, B, and C series in terms of the temporal structure they impose on sets of events, and raise problems for two elements of extant branching spacetime theories—McCall’s ‘branch attrition’, and the ‘no backward branching’ feature of Belnap’s ‘branching space-time’—in terms of their respective A- and B-theoretic nature. I argue that McCall’s presentation of branch attrition can only be coherently formulated on a model with (...) at least two temporal dimensions, and that this results in severing the link between branch attrition and the ﬂow of time. I argue that ‘no backward branching’ prohibits Belnap’s theory from capturing the modal content of indeterministic physical theories, and results in it ascribing to the world a time-asymmetric modal structure that lacks physical justiﬁcation. (shrink)
The goal of this paper is to defend the general tenet that time travelers cannot change the past within B-theoretical models of time, independently of how many temporal dimensions there are. Baron Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98, 129–147 offered a strong argument intended to reach this general conclusion. However, his argument does not cover a peculiar case, i.e. a B-theoretical one-dimensional model of time that allows for the presence of internal times. Loss Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96, 1–11 used the latter model (...) to argue that time travelers can change the past within such model. We show a way to debunk Loss’s argument, so that the general tenet about the impossibility of changing the past within B-theoretical models is maintained. (shrink)
Jesus Christ may be regarded as the chief spirit of agitation and innovation. He himself declared, “I come not to bring peace, but a sword.” One cannot delve seriously into the centuries of activism and scholarship against racism, Jim Crowism, and the terrorism of lynching without encountering the legacies of Timothy Thomas Fortune and Ida B. Wells-Barnett. Black scholars from the 19th century to the present have been inspired by the sociological and economic works of Fortune and Wells. Scholars of (...) American philosophy, however, continue to ignore their writings, their theoretical contributions and their ethical aspirations, preferring instead the insipid declarations of white turn of the century .. (shrink)
In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks :399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” has in both editions of the first Critique a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception”. To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. And if we take this meaning as a premise of the B-Deduction, then there is a gap in (...) the argument since the categories are certainly not conditions for non-conceptual cognition. Still, I believe it is not this wide meaning but rather the narrow one that figures in any premise of the B-Deduction. Thus, in the reading that I am proposing, categories are not conditions for representing something, or even conditions for representing something objectively. Instead, they are conditions for the recognition that what we represent through the senses exists mind-independently. In the first step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the propositional thinking that the nonconceptually represented object of the sensible intuition exists objectively. In contrast, in the second step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the apprehension of what our human senses represent nonconceptually as existing objectively. (shrink)
The aim of this study is to describe organizational commitment between type A personality’s and type B is personality’s workers on three companies. Organizational commitment is define as the degree of psychological identification with or attachment to the organization for which we work. Participant of this study was 108 workers from three different companies. Data was obtained by questionnaire and processed with SPSS for Windows ver. 12. Using Mann-Whitney independent t-test for non parametric, the result of organizational commitment U = (...) 1183, p > 0.05, showed that there is no difference of organizational commitment between type A personality and type B personality on company X, Y, and Z. (shrink)
It is customary in current philosophy of time to distinguish between an A- (or tensed) and a B- (or tenseless) theory of time. It is also customary to distinguish between an old B-theory of time, and a new B-theory of time. We may say that the former holds both semantic atensionalism and ontological atensionalism, whereas the latter gives up semantic atensionalism and retains ontological atensionalism. It is typically assumed that the B-theorists have been induced by advances in the philosophy of (...) language and related A-theorists’ criticisms to acknowledge that semantic atensionalism can hardly stand, but have also maintained that what is essential for the B-theory is ontological atensionalism, which can be independently defended. Here it is argued that the B-theorists have been too quick in abandoning semantic atensionalism: they can still cling to it. (shrink)
In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...) for the truth of tensed tokens and conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I demonstrate that there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of tensed tokens, and there is a true formulation of the date theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I argue that once the views are properly formulated, the A-theorist’s objections fail to make their mark. However, I conclude by claiming that even though there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory and a true formulation of the date theory, the New B-theory nonetheless fails to provide a complete account of the truth and falsity of tensed sentences. (shrink)
This article opens a new discussion in the field of post-classical Islamic intellectual history by showing how literature and intellectual history are two inseparable and interdependent fields through an analysis of Ibn Ṭufayl’s novel, Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān. To this end, the article first examines the tension between the two concepts of jadal and burhān, which have affected much of the currents in classical Islamic intellectual history, and does so by assessing the three main figures in Ibn Ṭufayl’s novel: Ḥayy, Absāl (...) and Salāmān. Our references to that tension are affirmed by two highly regarded scholars in post-classical Islamic intellectual history, Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī and Sājaqlīzāda, particularly in their clear distinction between jadal, baḥth and munāẓara. This article will show how the evidence in post-classical text analyses shows that the battle between the two concepts of jadal and burhān was won in favor of burhān in post-classical period. (shrink)
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar is one of the names who advocated to change social order of the age-old tradition of suppression and humiliation. He was an intellectual, scholar, statesman and contributed greatly in the nation building. He led a number of movements to emancipate the downtrodden masses and to secure human rights to millions of depressed classes. He has left an indelible imprint through his immense contribution in framing the modern Constitution of free India. He stands as a symbol of struggle (...) for achieving the Social Justice. We can assign several roles to this great personality due to his life full dedication towards his mission of eradicating evils from Indian society. The social evils of Indian society, also neglected this great personality even in intellectual sphere too. The so-called intellectuals of India not honestly discussed his contribution to Indian intellectual heritage, rather what they discussed, also smells their biases towards a Dalit literate and underestimated his great personality. This paper will attempt to discuss important facts about life and a short description of the literature written by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. This is followed by discussion his philosophy in the five major sections i.e. Feminism and women empowerment, philosophy of education, ideas on social justice and equality, philosophy of politics and economics and philosophy of religion. (shrink)
In this paper I revisit a dispute between Mikel Burley and Robin Le Poidevin about whether or not the B-theory of time can give its adherents any reason to be less afraid of death. In ‘Should a B-theoretic atheist fear death?’, Burley argues that even on Le Poidevin’s understanding of the B-theory, atheists shouldn’t be comforted. His reason is that the prevalent B-theoretic account of our attitudes towards the past and future precludes treating our fear of death as unwarranted. I (...) examine his argument and provide a tentative defense of Le Poidevin. I claim that while Burley rightly spots a tension with a non-revisionary approach to our ordinary emotional life, he doesn’t isolate the source of that tension. The real question is how to understand Le Poidevin’s idea that on the B-theory, we and our lives are ‘eternally real’. I then suggest that there is a view of time that does justice to Le Poidevin’s remarks, albeit a strange one. The view takes temporal relations to be quasi-spatial and temporal entities to exist in a totum simul. (shrink)
This thesis is about the conceptualization of persistence of physical, middle-sized objects within the theoretical framework of the revisionary ‘B-theory’ of time. According to the B-theory, time does not flow, but is an extended and inherently directed fourth dimension along which the history of the universe is ‘laid out’ once and for all. It is a widespread view among philosophers that if we accept the B-theory, the commonsensical ‘endurance theory’ of persistence will have to be rejected. The endurance theory says (...) that objects persist through time by being wholly present at distinct times as numerically the same entity. Instead of endurantism, it has been argued, we have to adopt either ‘perdurantism’ or the ‘stage theory’. Perdurantism is the theory that objects are four-dimensional ‘space-time worms’ persisting through time by having distinct temporal parts at distinct times. The stage theory says that objects are instantaneous temporal parts (stages) of space-time worms, persisting by having distinct temporal counterparts at distinct times. In the thesis, it is argued that no good arguments have been provided for the conclusion that we are obliged to drop the endurance theory by acceptance of the B-theory. This conclusion stands even if the endurance theory incorporates the claim that objects endure through intrinsic change. It is also shown that perdurantism and the stage theory come with unwelcome consequences. -/- Paper I demonstrates that the main arguments for the view that objects cannot endure in B-time intrinsically unchanged fail. Papers II and III do the same with respect to the traditional arguments against endurance through intrinsic change in B-time. Paper III also contains a detailed account of the semantics of the tenseless copula, which occurs frequently in the debate. The contention of Paper IV is that four-dimensional space-time worms, as traditionally understood, are not suited to take dispositional predicates. In Paper V, it is shown that the stage theory needs to introduce an overabundance of persistence-concepts, many of which will have to be simultaneously applicable to a single object (qua falling under a single sortal), in order for the theory to be consistent. The final article, Paper VI, investigates the sense in which persistence can, as is sometimes suggested, be a ‘conventional matter’. It also asks whether alleged cases of ‘conventional persistence’ create trouble for the endurance theory. It is argued that conventions can only enter at a trivial semantic level, and that the endurance theory is no more threatened by such conventions than are its rivals. (shrink)
In this paper it is exactly proved that the standard transformations of the three-dimensional (3D) vectors of the electric and magnetic fields E and B are not relativistically correct transformations. Thence the 3D vectors E and B are not well-defined quantities in the 4D space-time and, contrary to the general belief, the usual Maxwell equations with the 3D E and B are not in agreement with the special relativity. The 4-vectors E a and B a , as well-defined 4D quantities, (...) are introduced instead of ill-defined 3D E and B. The proof is given in the tensor and the Clifford algebra formalisms. (shrink)
This article is a response to Clifford Williams’s claim that the debate between A- and B theories of time is misconceived because these theories do not differ. I provide some missing support for Williams’s claim that the B-theory includes transition, by arguing that representative B-theoretic explanations for why we experience time as passing (even though it does not) are inherently unstable. I then argue that, contra Williams, it does not follow that there is nothing at stake in the A- versus (...) B debate. (shrink)
When interpreters orient Kant in relation to contemporary philosophy of time, they claim that the B series is dependent on the A series. However, I claim that the opposite direction of dependence is also supported, due to Kant’s position that change is both intelligible and involves incompatibility. This paper extends the contemporary description of Kant’s philosophy of time to show that Kant endorses the interdependence of A series and B series views on time.
Three arguments for the conclusion that objects cannot endure in B-time even if they remain intrinsically unchanged are examined: Carter and Hestevolds enduring-objects-as-universals argument (American Philosophical Quarterly 31(4):269-283, 1994) and Barker and Dowe's paradox 1 and paradox 2 (Analysis 63(2):106-114, 2003, Analysis 65(1):69-74, 2005). All three are shown to fail.
Values are an important part of human existence, his society and human relations. All social, economic, political, and religious problems are in one sense is reflection of this special abstraction of human knowledge. We are living in a globalized village and thinking much about values rather than practice of it. If we define religion and spirituality we can say that religion is a set of beliefs and rituals that claim to get a person in a right relationship with God, and (...) spirituality is a focus on spiritual things and the spiritual world instead of physical/earthly things. If we think rationally we can find the major evils related to religion exiting in present society are due to lack of proper understanding of religion and spirituality. If we really know our own religions and values associated with it, we can create a beautiful world, full or love and respect for each and every human being. The proper knowledge and practice of any religion’s values can make an integrated man. In the book, The Buddha and His Dhamma, Dr. Ambedkar elucidated the significance and importance of Dhamma in human life. The Dhamma maintained purity of life, which meant abstains from lustful, evil practices. The Dhamma is a perfection of life and giving up craving. Dhamma’s righteousness means right relation of man to man in all sphere of life. The basic idea underlying religion is to create an atmosphere for the spiritual development of the individual. He said that Knowing the proper ways and means is more important than knowing the ideal. The major objective of this paper is to the study the religious philosophy of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and to study how he established that religious and spiritual values enables religious people in particular and humanity at large to solve contemporary problems. (shrink)
Mezheplerin teşekkül etmeye başladığı ilk dönemlerden itibaren istihsanın bir istidlal yöntemi olup olmadığı tartışılagelmiştir. Bu tartışmaların temelinde kavramsallaşma sürecini henüz tamamlamamış olan istihsan teriminin çağrıştırdığı keyfiliğin/sübjektivitenin etkisi çok fazladır. Bu yüzden istihsanı bir yöntem olarak benimseyenler, ağır ithamlara maruz kalmışlardır. İstihsanı benimseyenlerin başında Hanefî hukukçular gelmektedir. Öyle ki istihsan yöntemi Hanefî mezhebiyle anılır hale gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte mezhebin önde gelen temsilcilerinden biri olan ve kıyas metodunu kullanmasıyla ön plana çıkan Züfer b. Hüzeyl’in istihsana yaklaşımıyla ilgili iki farklı yaklaşım tespitedilmiştir. Yaptığımız (...) araştırma ve inceleme neticesinde her iki tespitinde isabetli olmadığını; Züfer b. Hüzeyl’inkıyas yapmadaki becerisinin yanı sıra istihsana müracaatta sonuna kadar kıyas taraftarı olduğunu; ancak kıyasın meselelere çözüm üretmede yetersiz kaldığı ya da doğru sonuç vermediği durumlarda ise ızdırârın da bir gereği olarak meseleyi hükümsüz bırakmama adına istihsana müracaat ettiği görülmektedir. Sonuç olarak Züfer b. Hüzeyl’in genel hatlarıyla Hanefî usulüne bağlı kalmakla birlikte istihsanı bir istidlâl yöntemi olarak kullanma hususunda çerçeveyi oldukça daralttığını; kıyasa başvurma konusunda ise sınırları mümkün olduğunca geniş tuttuğunu söylemek mümkündür. İctihad hürriyeti ve hukûkî zenginlik açısından oldukça önemli olan Hanefi mezhebindeki mezhep içi ihtilaflar, hukûkî istikrar ve emniyeti tehdit etme potansiyeli taşımakta ve ayrıca ihtilaflı meselelerde hüküm veya fetva verecek fakihlerin işini zorlaştırmaktadır. Bu nedenle mezhep içerisindeki ihtilaflı meselelerde râcih görüşü tespit etmek, diğer bir ifadeyle mezhep içi tercih, zorunlu bir ihtiyaçtır. Mezhep içi tercih, “muayyen bir mesele ile ilgili mezhepteki muhtelif kavil veya rivayetlerden daha ağır basanı, üstün olanı belirlemek” şeklinde tarif edilebilir. Tarihi süreçte bu ihtiyacı karşılamak için muhtasar ve fetva kitapları gibi farklı telif türleri; esahh-ı akvâl ve maʻrûzât gibi farklı uygulamalar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu ihtiyacı gidermeyi hedefleyen uygulamalardan biri de Osmanlı Devleti’nin son dönemindeki kanunlaştırmalardır. Fıkha dayalı kanunlaştırmanın ilk örneği olan Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye ile mezhep içi tercih arasındaki ilişki ve bu bağlamda Mecelle hazırlanırken, mezhep içi tercihte nasıl bir usûl izlendiği; râcih görüşe ne oranda uyulduğu; Mecelleʼde yer alan râcih görüşe aykırı kanun maddeleri ve bunların gerekçeleri; ihtilaflı bütün konularda düzenleneme yapılıp yapılmadığı ve râcih görüşleri belirleme ihtiyacının ne kadar giderildiği, incelenmesi gereken konulardır. Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliyye gibi bir kanun metnine ihtiyaç duyulmasının temel nedenlerinden birisi, Hanefî mezhebinde mezhep içi ihtilafların çokluğudur. Buna bağlı olarak Mecelleʼnin hedefi râcih görüşler içeren oluşan bir kanun hazırlamaktır. Mecelle’nin esbâb-ı mûcibeleri mezhep içi tercih açısından incelendiğinde, esbâb-ı mûcibelerin iki temel işlevi olduğu görülür. Bunlardan ilki, kanunun büyük oranda mezhepteki râcih görüşlere uygun olarak hazırlandığını vurgulamaktır. Öyle ki, Mecelle’nin ilk on kitabının esbâb-ı mûcibelerinde bu husus mutlaka ifade edilmektedir. Esbâb-ı mûcibelerin diğer işlevi ise niçin bazı maddelerde râcih görüşe riayet edilmediğini gerekçelendirmektir. Esbâb-ı mûcibelerde on iki maddenin râcih olmayan görüş doğrultusunda hazırlandığı belirtilmektedir. Mecelleʼnin 1851 maddeden oluştuğu göz önünde tutulduğunda Mecelleʼnin muhtevasında râcih görüşlerin ne kadar etkili olduğu daha iyi anlaşılacaktır. Esasen devrin özelliği de bunu zorunlu kılmaktadır. Zira Kitâbüʼl-Havâlenin 692. maddesinde Züferʼin râcih olmayan görüşünün tercih edilmesi, başta Şeyhülislam Hasan Fehmi Efendi olmak üzere bazı çevrelerin tepkisine neden olmuş ve bu sebeple Ahmet Cevdet Paşa Divân-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliyye nâzırlığından ve Mecelle Komisyonu başkanlığından azledilmiştir. Râcih görüşe aykırı maddelerin esbâb-ı mûcibeleri incelendiğinde, bu yöndeki tercihlerde maslahat ve örfün belirleyici olduğu görülmektedir. Ayrıca bazı fakihlerin tercihlerinin de bir tercih sebebi olarak zikredildiği görülmektedir. Hanefi kaynaklarda en sık karşılaşılan tercih sebebi naslara uygunluktur. Buna karşın Mecelleʼde sefîhin hacri konusu dışında, naslara uygunluğun bir tercih sebebi olarak işletilmemesi dikkat çekicidir. Mecelle Komisyonunun bazı tercihlerine diğer kurumlarca müdahale edilmiştir. Komisyonca hazırlanan kitaplar hem Meclis-i Vükelâ hem de Meşîhat tarafından incelenmiş ve bu esnada bazı tashihlere konu olmuştur. İşte râcih olmayan görüş esas alınarak hazırlanan iki maddeye Meclis-i Vükelâ tarafından müdahale edilmiştir. Bunların birincisi hakk-ı mürur ve hakk-ı şirbin müstakil olarak satımının cevazını savunan Belh Meşâyihinin görüşü doğrultusunda yazılan 216. madde, ikincisi ise ecîr-i müşterekin tazmin sorumluluğunu düzenleyen 611. maddedir. Mecelle’nin ilk ve en hacimli kitabı olan Kitâbüʼl-Büyûʻun muhtevası mezhep içi tercih açısından incelendiğinde, ihtilaflı konularda genelde mezhepteki râcih görüşün esas alındığı görülmektedir. Kitâbüʼl-Büyûʻun esbâb-ı mûcibesinde, dört meselenin râcih olmayan görüş esas alınarak hazırlandığı ifade edilmekte ve bu tercihler örf ve maslahatla gerekçelendirilmektedir. Ancak Kitâbüʼl-Büyûʻdaki râcih görüşe aykırı maddeler bunlarla sınırlı değildir. Bizim araştırmamıza göre bunlara ilaveten üç madde daha râcih olmayan görüş tercih edilerek hazırlanmıştır. Bunlar beyʻ biʼl-vefânın menkullerde cevazına dair 118. madde, gabn-i fâhişin tanımı hakkındaki 165. madde ve şart muhayyerliğinin hükmü ile ilgili 309. maddedir. Bu üç madde, Mecelleʼdeki râcih görüşe aykırı düzenlemelerin sadece esbâb-ı mûcibelerde açıklananlardan ibaret olmadığını göstermektedir ve bu durum Mecelle hazırlanırken izlenen usûle aykırıdır. Hanefi mezhebindeki bazı ihtilaflı meselelerde hangi görüşün râcih olduğu konusunda tercih ehli fakihler ihtilaf etmişlerdir. Bu meselelerde Mecelleʼde düzenleme yapılırken nasıl bir yol izlendiği açıklanmamıştır. Bu meseleler incelendiğinde çoğunluk tarafından tercih edilme, kolaylığı temin etme ve bazı fakihler tarafından tercih edilme gibi hususların etkili olduğu söylenebilir. Mecelleʼdeki tercihler sadece şerʻî hükümler arasında gerçekleşmemiştir. Buna ilaveten tanımlar ve tanımlarda yer alan kayıtlar da tercihe konu olmuştur. Bu kapsamda Kitâbüʼl-Büyûʻdaki beyʻ akdi, mevkûf akid ve gabn-i fâhişin tanımına ilişkin tercihler örnek olarak zikredilebilir. Hanefi mezhebin içerisindeki ihtilaflı bazı meseleler Mecelleʼde düzenlenmemiştir. İhtilaflı meselelerin çokluğu ve dolayısıyla bütün bunları kapsayan bir kanun hazırlamanın zorluğu dikkate alındığında bu durum doğaldır. Ayrıca bu meselelerden bazıları sık gerçekleşmediği ve lüzumlu görülmediği için Mecelleʼde düzenlenmemiş olabilir. Ancak düzenleme yapılmayan ihtilaflı meselelerin tamamını bu sebeplerle izah etmek mümkün değildir. Zira yasal düzenleme yapılmayan ihtilaflı meselelerin bazıları temel, görece önemli meselelerdir ve muhtasarlarda yer almaktadır. Bu durum Mecelle hazırlanırken, ihtilaflı bazı meselelerde tercih yapmak yerine bu meselelere ilişkin düzenleme yapmama metodunun benimsendiğini göstermektedir. İhtilaftan ârî bir kanun metni oluşturmanın bir yolu olarak da bu usûlün benimsendiği söylenebilir. Böylece bu meselelerde râcih görüşü tespit etme işi hâkimlere bırakılmıştır. Bu durum Mecelleʼnin hedefi olan râcih görüşleri tespit etme ihtiyacını gidermeye uygunluk arz etmemektedir. Ancak bu durum bütün meseleleri kuşatan bir kanun yapmanın güçlüğünün bir sonucudur. (shrink)
In the decade following hepatitis B vaccine’s 1981 approval, U.S. health officials issued evolving guidelines on who should receive the vaccine: first, gay men, injection drug users, and healthcare workers; later, hepatitis B-positive women’s children; and later still, all newborns. States laws that mandated the vaccine for all children were quietly accepted in the 1990s; in the 2000s, however, popular anti-vaccine sentiment targeted the shot as an emblem of immunization policy excesses. Shifting attitudes toward the vaccine in this period were (...) informed by hepatitis B’s changing popular image, legible in textual and visual representations of the infection from the 1980s through the 1990s. Notably, the outbreak of AIDS, the advent of genetically engineered pharmaceuticals, and a Democratic push for health reform shaped and reshaped hepatitis B’s public image. Hepatitis B thus became, in turn, an AIDS-like scourge; proof of a new era of pharmaceuticals; a threat from which all American children had a right to be protected; and a cancer-causing infection spread by teenage lifestyles. The metamorphosis of the infection’s image was reflected in evolving policy recommendations regarding who should receive the vaccine in the 1980s, and was key to securing broad uptake of the vaccine in the 1990s. (shrink)
This Article critically discusses Clifford Williams’ claim that the A-theory and B-theory of time are indistinguishable. I examine three considerations adduced by Williams to support his claim that the concept of time essentially includes transition as well as extension, and argue that, despite its prima facie plausibility, the claim has not been adequately justified. Williams therefore begs the question against the B-theorist, who denies that transition is essential. By Williams’ own lights, he ought to deny that the B-theory is a (...) (realist) theory of time; and thus his claim that A-time and B-time do not differ significantly should be rejected. (shrink)
A pathogenic connection between autoreactive T cells, fungal infection, and carcinogenesis has been demonstrated in studies of human autoimmune polyendocrinopathy-candidiasis-ectodermal dystrophy as well as in a mouse model in which kinase-dead Ikkα knock-in mice develop impaired central tolerance, autoreactive T cell–mediated autoimmunity, chronic fungal infection, and esophageal squamous cell carcinoma, which recapitulates APECED. IκB kinase α is one subunit of the IKK complex required for NF-κB activation. IKK/NF-κB is essential for central tolerance establishment by regulating the development of medullary thymic (...) epithelial cells that facilitate the deletion of autoreactive T cells in the thymus. In this review, we extensively discuss the pathogenic roles of inborn errors in the IKK/NF-κB loci in the phenotypically related diseases APECED, immune deficiency syndrome, and severe combined immunodeficiency; differentiate how IKK/NF-κB components, through mTEC, T cells/leukocytes, or epithelial cells, contribute to the pathogenesis of infectious diseases, autoimmunity, and cancer; and highlight the medical significance of IKK/NF-κB in these diseases. IKK/NF-κB regulates the expression of many genes that encode proteins involved in many crucial biological functions, such as immunity, tissue homeostasis, and fungal/bacterial/viral infections. Also, IKKα plays anti-tumor activities in many organs independently of NF-κB pathways. Thus, an inborn error in one of these gene loci can cause severe human diseases through these complicated mechanisms. (shrink)
The most important argument against the B-theory of time is the paraphrase argument. The major defense against that argument is the “new” tenseless theory of time, which is built on what I will call the “indexical reply” to the paraphrase argument. The move from the “old” tenseless theory of time to the new is most centrally a change of viewpoint about the nature and determiners of ontological commitment. Ironically, though, the new tenseless theorists have generally not paid enough sustained, direct (...) attention to that notion. I will defend a general criterion of ontological commitment and apply it to generate a version of the new tenseless theory of time. I will argue that many of the extant versions of the new tenseless theory of time (specifically, all those which seek to identify tenseless truth-conditions of tensed sentences as a way out of apparent ontological commitment to tensed features of reality) are unsatisfactory because their general criterion of ontological commitment is inadequate. Those versions of the new tenseless theory which are adequate (specifically, those which identify tenseless truthmakers for tensed sentences) actually entail the criterion of ontological commitment that I defend, despite appearances to the contrary. (shrink)
I argue that the proper way to think of the difference between A- and B-time is not as the difference between transition and the lack of transition, as is common, but as A-transition and B-transition. However, it is not evident what the difference is between these two kinds of transition. Thus, it is not evident what the difference is between A- and B-time.
The common assumption in the debate between the A- and B-theories is that there is a difference between A- and B-time. A-time has been said to be characterized by a flow, whereas B-time has been said not to consist of a flow. This way of construing the debate, however, is mistaken. Both A- and B-time possess "flow" or transition. But if this is so, we need to ask how B-time flow differs from A-time flow. I argue that none of the (...) ways in which the difference has been characterized is satisfactory. My conclusion is that the debate between A- and B-time either needs to be recast or given up. (shrink)