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David J. Alexander
Iowa State University
David Alexander
Huntington University
  1. The Problem of Respecting Higher-Order Doubt.David J. Alexander - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.
    This paper argues that higher-order doubt generates an epistemic dilemma. One has a higher-order doubt with regards to P insofar as one justifiably withholds belief as to what attitude towards P is justified. That is, one justifiably withholds belief as to whether one is justified in believing, disbelieving, or withholding belief in P. Using the resources provided by Richard Feldman’s recent discussion of how to respect one’s evidence, I argue that if one has a higher-order doubt with regards to P, (...)
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  2.  6
    If We Accept That Poor Replication Rates Are Mainstream.David M. Alexander & Pieter Moors - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
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  3. Gestalt has No Notion of Attention. But Does It Need One.Cees van Leeuwen, David Alexander, Chie Nakatani, Andrey R. Nikolaev, Gijs Plomp & Antonino Raffone - 2011 - Humana Mente 17:35-68.
     
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  4. In Defense of Epistemic Circularity.David J. Alexander - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):223-241.
    In this paper I defend epistemic circularity by arguing that the “No Self-Support” principle (NSS) is false. This principle, ultimately due to Fumerton ( 1995 ), states that one cannot acquire a justified belief in the reliability of a source of belief by trusting that very source. I argue that NSS has the skeptical consequence that the trustworthiness of all of our sources ultimately depends upon the trustworthiness of certain fundamental sources – sources that we cannot justifiably believe to be (...)
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  5.  91
    Inferential Internalism and Reflective Defeat.David J. Alexander - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):497-521.
    Inferential Internalists accept the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ), according to which one has justification for believing P on the basis of E only if one has justification for believing that E makes probable P. Richard Fumerton has defended PIJ by appeal to examples, and recently Adam Leite has argued that this principle is supported by considerations regarding the nature of responsible belief. In this paper, I defend a form of externalism against both arguments. This form of externalism recognizes what (...)
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  6.  27
    Social Media in Disaster Risk Reduction and Crisis Management.David E. Alexander - 2014 - Science and Engineering Ethics 20 (3):717-733.
    This paper reviews the actual and potential use of social media in emergency, disaster and crisis situations. This is a field that has generated intense interest. It is characterised by a burgeoning but small and very recent literature. In the emergencies field, social media (blogs, messaging, sites such as Facebook, wikis and so on) are used in seven different ways: listening to public debate, monitoring situations, extending emergency response and management, crowd-sourcing and collaborative development, creating social cohesion, furthering causes (including (...)
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  7. The Recent Revival of Cosmological Arguments.David Alexander - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):541–550.
  8.  60
    Problems for Moral/Natural Supervenience.David E. Alexander - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (1):73 - 84.
    'Everyone agrees that the moral features of things supervene on their natural features' (Smith (1994), 22). Everyone is wrong, or so I will argue. In the first section, I explain the version of moral supervenience that Smith and others argue everyone should accept. In the second section, I argue that the mere conceptual possibility of a divine command theory of morality (DCT) is sufficient to refute the version of moral supervenience under consideration. Lastly, I consider and respond to two objections, (...)
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  9.  32
    Problems for Moral/Natural Supervenience: DAVID E. ALEXANDER.David E. Alexander - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (1):73-84.
    ???Everyone agrees that the moral features of things supervene on their natural features??? , 22). Everyone is wrong, or so I will argue. In the first section, I explain the version of moral supervenience that Smith and others argue everyone should accept. In the second section, I argue that the mere conceptual possibility of a divine command theory of morality is sufficient to refute the version of moral supervenience under consideration. Lastly, I consider and respond to two objections, showing, among (...)
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  10.  39
    Unjustified Defeaters.David Alexander - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):891-912.
    A number of philosophers have recently claimed that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters. However these claims have been made in passing, occurring in the context of defenses of other theses. As a result, the claim that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters has been neither vigorously defended nor thoroughly explained. This paper fills that gap. It begins by identifying problems with the two most in-depth accounts of the possibility of unjustified defeaters due to Bergmann and Pryor. It then offers a revised (...)
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  11.  9
    The Relationship Between the Type A Behavior Pattern, Fear of Death, and Manifest Anxiety.James L. Tramill, P. Jeannie Kleinhammer-Tramill, Stephen F. Davis, Cherri S. Parks & David Alexander - 1984 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 22 (1):42-44.
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  12.  16
    Unreasonable Cartesian Doubt.David Alexander - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):503-522.
    In this paper I argue that Cartesian skepticism about the external world is self-defeating. The Cartesian skeptic holds that we are not justified in believing claims about the external world on the grounds that we cannot rule out the possibility of our being in a radical skeptical scenario. My argument against this position builds upon a critique of Wilson in Analysis, 72, 668–673. Wilson argues that the Cartesian’s skeptical reasoning commits him to mental state skepticism and that this undermines his (...)
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  13.  85
    Weak Inferential Internalism.David J. Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.
    Inferential internalism holds that for one to be inferentially justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be justified in believing that E makes probable P. Inferential internalism has long been accused of generating a vicious regress on inferential justification that has drastic skeptical consequences. However, recently Hookway and Rhoda have defended a more modest form of internalism that avoids this problem. They propose a form of weak inferential internalism according to which internalist conditions are restricted to (...)
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  14.  10
    Fallible Reasons on Behalf of Fallibilism.David Alexander - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    In this paper I introduce a problem regarding whether there are good reasons to accept fallibilism about justified belief. According to this species of fallibilism, one can be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of reasons that do not justify certainty. Call such reasons “fallible reasons.” The problem is this: can one justifiably believe fallibilism on the basis of fallible reasons? To do so would seem to beg the question. If you are undecided as to whether you should (...)
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  15.  59
    Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable From Externalism – A Reply to Rhoda.David J. Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:387-394.
    In “Weak Inferential Internalism” I defended the frequently voiced criticism that any internalist account of inferential justification generates a vicious regress. My defense involved criticizing a recent form of internalism, “Weak Inferential Internalism” (WII) defended by Hookway and Rhoda. I argued that while WII does not generate a vicious regress, the position is only distinguishable from externalism insofar as it makes an arbitrary distinction between individuals who believe for the very same reason. Either way, WII is not a defensible internalist (...)
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  16.  34
    Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable From Externalism.David Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:387-394.
    In “Weak Inferential Internalism” I defended the frequently voiced criticism that any internalist account of inferential justification generates a vicious regress. My defense involved criticizing a recent form of internalism, “Weak Inferential Internalism” , defended by Hookway and Rhoda. I argued that while WII does not generate a vicious regress, the position is only distinguishable from externalism insofar as it makes an arbitrary distinction between individuals who believe for the very same reason. Either way, WII is not a defensible internalist (...)
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  17.  27
    The View From the Armchair: Responding to Kornblith's Alternative to Armchair Philosophy.Anthony Bryson & David Alexander - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):10.
    In the last two decades, the greatest threat to armchair philosophy has been the natural kinds approach. On this view, philosophic theorizing should not be obsessed with the ideas of justice, goodness, and truth but should look outward to the world of objects to find these things. And if these things happen to be natural kinds, like kinds of rock or fish for instance, then clearly we should reject the armchair for the lab. The philosopher should leave the office and (...)
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  18.  34
    Epistemology Modalized.David J. Alexander - 2011 - Teaching Philosophy 34 (1):69-72.
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  19.  13
    " Stressors" and Difficulties in Dealing with the Terminal Patient.David A. Alexander & Ewan Ritchie - forthcoming - Journal of Palliative Care.
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  20.  2
    Weak Inferential Internalism.David Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.
    Inferential internalism holds that for one to be inferentially justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be justified in believing that E makes probable P. Inferential internalism has long been accused of generating a vicious regress on inferential justification that has drastic skeptical consequences. However, recently Hookway and Rhoda have defended a more modest form of internalism that avoids this problem. They propose a form of weak inferential internalism according to which internalist conditions are restricted to (...)
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  21.  1
    Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable From Externalism: A Reply to Rhoda.David Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:387-394.
    In “Weak Inferential Internalism” I defended the frequently voiced criticism that any internalist account of inferential justification generates a vicious regress. My defense involved criticizing a recent form of internalism, “Weak Inferential Internalism”, defended by Hookway and Rhoda. I argued that while WII does not generate a vicious regress, the position is only distinguishable from externalism insofar as it makes an arbitrary distinction between individuals who believe for the very same reason. Either way, WII is not a defensible internalist account (...)
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  22. Calvinism and the Problem of Evil.David E. Alexander & Daniel M. Johnson (eds.) - 2016 - Wipf & Stock.
    Contrary to what many philosophers believe, Calvinism neither makes the problem of evil worse nor is it obviously refuted by the presence of evil and suffering in our world. Or so most of the authors in this book claim. While Calvinism has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years amongst theologians and laypersons, many philosophers have yet to follow suit. The reason seems fairly clear: Calvinism, many think, cannot handle the problem of evil with the same kind of plausibility as other (...)
     
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