105 found
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  1.  5
    What is a Law of Nature?David M. Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
    First published in 1985, D. M. Armstrong's original work on what laws of nature are has continued to be influential in the areas of metaphysics and philosophy of science. Presenting a definitive attack on the sceptical Humean view, that laws are no more than a regularity of coincidence between stances of properties, Armstrong establishes his own theory and defends it concisely and systematically against objections. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Marc (...)
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  2. Perception And The Physical World.David M. Armstrong - 1961 - Humanities Press.
  3. A Theory of Universals. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume Ii.David Malet Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
  4. The Nature of Mind and Other Essays.David M. Armstrong - 1980 - University of Queensland Press.
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  5. Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind.David M. Armstrong & Norman Malcolm - 1984 - Blackwell.
    Two distinguished philosophers present opposing views on the questions of howthe objects of consciousness are perceived. (Philosophy).
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  6. Bodily Sensations.David M. Armstrong - 1962 - Routledge.
  7. What is Consciousness?David M. Armstrong - 1981 - In John Heil (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press.
  8. Four Disputes About Properties.David M. Armstrong - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):309-320.
    In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.
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  9. The Nature of Mind.David M. Armstrong - 1970 - In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
  10. Nominalism and Realism. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume I.David Malet Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
  11. Identity Through Time.David Armstrong - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel. pp. 67-78.
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  12. Against Ostrich Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt.David Armstrong - 1980 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):440-449.
    In my reply to michael devitt, It is argued, First, That quine fails to appreciate the force of plato's "one over many" argument for universals. It is argued, Second, That quine's failure springs in part at least from his doctrine of ontological commitment: from the view that predicates need not be treated with ontological seriousness. Finally, An attempt is made to blunt the force of devitt's contention that realists cannot give a coherent explanation of the way that universals stand to (...)
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  13. The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction.David M. Armstrong - 1999 - Westview Press.
    The emphasis is always on the arguments used, and the way one position develops from another. By the end of the book the reader is afforded both a grasp of the state of the controversy, and how we got there.
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  14. How Do Particulars Stand to Universals?David M. Armstrong - 2004 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
  15. Smart and the Secondary Qualities.David M. Armstrong - 1987 - In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics And Morality. Blackwell.
     
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  16. The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties According to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others.David Malet Armstrong - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):25-37.
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  17. Universals and Scientific Realism: A Theory of Universals Vol. II.David M. Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
  18. The Open Door: Counterfactual Versus Singularist Theories of Causation.David M. Armstrong - 1999 - In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 175--185.
  19. The Causal Theory of the Mind.David M. Armstrong - 1981 - In The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Cornell University Press.
     
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  20.  91
    The Causal Theory of Properties.David M. Armstrong - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):25-37.
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  21. The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of Materialism.David Malet Armstrong - 1968 - Analysis 29 (2):48--9.
    The paper tries to rebut an objection to materialism. Anti-Materialists have argued that mental processes do not appear to be mere physical processes in the brain, And that secondary qualities such as sounds do not appear to be mere vibrations in the air. So materialists must admit that introspection and perception involve at least the illusion of the falsity of materialism. Using the headless woman illusion as a model, It is shown how the illusion is generated, And that it is (...)
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  22.  95
    Dispositions Are Causes.David Malet Armstrong - 1969 - Analysis 30 (1):23-26.
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  23. The Identification Problem and the Inference Problem.David M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):421 - 422.
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  24. What Makes Induction Rational?David Malet Armstrong - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (4):503-11.
    In this paper I put forward what I think is a new approach to the problem of induction. I sketched the approach in brief sections of a book published in 1983. The same idea had occurred to the English philosopher John Foster and he presented it in a paper at about the same time.
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  25.  90
    Reply to Simons and Mumford.David Armstrong - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):271 – 276.
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  26. Universals and Scientific Realism: Nominalism and Realism Vol. I.David M. Armstrong - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
  27. Truthmakers for Modal Truths.David Armstrong - 2003 - In Hallvard Lillehammer Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (ed.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. Routledge. pp. 12-24.
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  28. C. B. Martin, Counterfactuals, Causality and Conditionals.David Malet Armstrong - 1989 - In J. Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind and Reality; Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 7-15.
     
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  29. Intentionality, Perception, and Causality.David M. Armstrong - 1991 - In John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  30. Combinatorialism Revisited.David Armstrong - 2004 - In .
    The object of this paper is to argue once again for the combinatorial account of possibility defended in earlier work. But there I failed fully to realise the dialectical advantages that accrue once one begins by assuming the hypothesis of logical atomism, the hypothesis that postulates simple particulars and simple universals at the bottom of the world. Logical atomism is, I incline to think, no better than ‘speculative cosmology’ as opposed to ‘analytic ontology’, to use Donald Williams’ terminology. It is, (...)
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  31. Dispositions as Categorical States.David M. Armstrong - 1996 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge. pp. 15--18.
  32. Colour Realism and the Argument From Microscopes.David M. Armstrong - 1969 - In R. Brown & C. D. Rollins (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy in Australia. Humanities Press. pp. 301-323.
  33.  85
    Properties.David M. Armstrong - 1992 - In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 14--27.
  34. Epistemological Foundations for a Materialist Theory of Mind.David M. Armstrong - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (June):178-93.
    A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) "higher" sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind.
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  35.  12
    Discussion: Reply to Van Fraassen.David M. Armstrong - 1988 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):224-229.
  36. Be Angry and Sin Not" : Philodemus Versus the Stoics on Natural Bites and Natural Emotions.David Armstrong - 2008 - In John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought. Routledge. pp. 79--121.
  37.  36
    The Editor and the Associate Editors Thank the Consulting Editors, the Members of the Editorial Board and the Following Philosophers for Their Help with Refereeing Papers During the Period July 1994 to June 1995. Adeney, Douglas Kennett, Jeanette Agar, Nicholas Lamarque, Peter. [REVIEW]David Armstrong, Rae Langton, Robert Audi, Jerrold Levinson, John Bacon, David Lewis, Rick Benitez, Gary Malinas, John Biro & Jeff Malpas - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4).
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  38.  95
    In Defence of the Cognitivist Theory of Perception.David M. Armstrong - 2004 - Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):19-26.
  39.  23
    Immediate Perception.David M. Armstrong - 1976 - In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel. pp. 23--35.
  40. Illusions of Sense.David M. Armstrong - 1955 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):88-106.
  41. Questions About States of Affairs.David M. Armstrong - 2009 - In M. Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs. Ontos Verlag. pp. 30--39.
     
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  42.  94
    Beliefs and Desires as Causes of Actions: A Reply to Donald Davidson.David M. Armstrong - 1975 - Philosophical Papers 4 (May):1-7.
  43.  59
    Vérifacteurs pour des vérités modales.David M. Armstrong - 2002 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2 (4):491-507.
    Revenant sur la question des vérifacteurs, D. Armstrong demande ici d'abord comment concilier le maximalisme et la relation de nécessitation. L'A. examine quel sens métaphysique donner à la notion d'implication, et s'il y a un sens à admettre une contingence de re. Il traite à ce niveau des possibilités pures, examine le cas des aliens chez David Lewis, puis pose la question de savoir s'il est contingent de dire qu'il y a de l'être plutôt que rien. L'exposé le conduit à (...)
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  44.  73
    Vesey on Bodily Sensations.David M. Armstrong - 1964 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):247-248.
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  45. Perception, Sense-Data, and Causality.David Malet Armstrong - 1979 - In Graham Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A.~J. Ayer with His Replies. Macmillan.
     
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  46. Derrida Degree: A Question of Honour.Barry Smith, Hans Albert, David M. Armstrong, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Keith Campbell, Richard Glauser, Rudolf Haller, Massimo Mugnai, Kevin Mulligan, Lorenzo Peña, Willard Van Orman Quine, Wolfgang Röd, Karl Schuhmann, Daniel Schulthess, Peter M. Simons, René Thom, Dallas Willard & Jan Wolenski - 1992 - The Times 9 (May 9).
    A letter to The Times of London, May 9, 1992 protesting the Cambridge University proposal to award an honorary degree to M. Jacques Derrida.
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  47.  8
    Berkeley's New Theory of Vision.David M. Armstrong - 1956 - Journal of the History of Ideas 17 (1/4):127.
  48. Searle's Neo-Cartesian Theory of Consciousness.David M. Armstrong - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:67-71.
  49.  40
    Discussion: Berkeley's New Theory of Vision.David M. Armstrong - 1956 - Journal of the History of Ideas 17 (1):127-129.
    Most of the New Theory of Vision is an argument for a negative answer to Molyneux's question.// re primacy of vision in spatial perception: "most rational philosopher on this topic is Berkeley, whose New Theory of Vision presents in cogent detail the argument" (from Bennett 1966, p. 30, in note cites 41ff.).// Berkeley's criticisms of Locke: "If we really abstract from colour and hardness and all that 'belongs to sensation', so far from being left with 'pure' notions of extension and (...)
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  50.  66
    Incorrigibility, Materialism, and Causation.David M. Armstrong - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (August):125-28.
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