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David Atkinson [69]David John Atkinson [5]
  1.  46
    The Emergence of Justification.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):546-564.
    A major objection to epistemic infinitism is that it seems to make justification impossible. For if there is an infinite chain of reasons, each receiving its justification from its neighbour, then there is no justification to inherit in the first place. Some have argued that the objection arises from misunderstanding the character of justification. Justification is not something that one reason inherits from another; rather it gradually emerges from the chain as a whole. Nowhere however is it made clear what (...)
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  2.  91
    Confirmation and Justification. A Commentary on Shogenji's Measure.David Atkinson - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):49-61.
    So far no known measure of confirmation of a hypothesis by evidence has satisfied a minimal requirement concerning thresholds of acceptance. In contrast, Shogenji’s new measure of justification (Shogenji, Synthese, this number 2009) does the trick. As we show, it is ordinally equivalent to the most general measure which satisfies this requirement. We further demonstrate that this general measure resolves the problem of the irrelevant conjunction. Finally, we spell out some implications of the general measure for the Conjunction Effect; in (...)
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  3. Nonconservation of Energy and Loss of Determinism. I. Infinitely Many Colliding Balls.David Atkinson & Porter Johnson - unknown
    An infinite number of elastically colliding balls is considered in a classical, and then in a relativistic setting. Energy and momentum are not necessarily conserved globally, even though each collision does separately conserve them. This result holds in particular when the total mass of all the balls is finite, and even when the spatial extent and temporal duration of the process are also finite. Further, the process is shown to be indeterministic: there is an arbitrary parameter in the general solution (...)
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  4. When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones?Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2003 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (2):305-322.
    A characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy is its ample use of thought experiments. We formulate two features that can lead one to suspect that a given thought experiment is a poor one. Although these features are especially in evidence within the philosophy of mind, they can, surprisingly enough, also be discerned in some celebrated scientific thought experiments. Yet in the latter case the consequences appear to be less disastrous. We conclude that the use of thought experiments is more successful in (...)
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  5. Achilles, the Tortoise, and Colliding Balls.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2008 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):187 - 201.
    It is widely held that the paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, introduced by Zeno of Elea around 460 B.C., was solved by mathematical advances in the nineteenth century. The techniques of Weierstrass, Dedekind and Cantor made it clear, according to this view, that Achilles’ difficulty in traversing an infinite number of intervals while trying to catch up with the tortoise does not involve a contradiction, let alone a logical absurdity. Yet ever since the nineteenth century there have been dissidents (...)
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  6. Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2009 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2):183-193.
    Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs into difficulties.
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  7.  75
    Transitivity and Partial Screening Off.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2013 - Theoria 79 (4):294-308.
    The notion of probabilistic support is beset by well-known problems. In this paper we add a new one to the list: the problem of transitivity. Tomoji Shogenji has shown that positive probabilistic support, or confirmation, is transitive under the condition of screening off. However, under that same condition negative probabilistic support, or disconfirmation, is intransitive. Since there are many situations in which disconfirmation is transitive, this illustrates, but now in a different way, that the screening-off condition is too restrictive. We (...)
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  8.  72
    Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (3):333-341.
    We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.
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  9.  47
    Galileo and Prior Philosophy.David Atkinson - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):115-136.
    Galileo claimed inconsistency in the Aristotelian dogma concerning falling bodies and stated that all bodies must fall at the same rate. However, there is an empirical situation where the speeds of falling bodies are proportional to their weights; and even in vacuo all bodies do not fall at the same rate under terrestrial conditions. The reason for the deficiency of Galileo’s reasoning is analyzed, and various physical scenarios are described in which Aristotle’s claim is closer to the truth than is (...)
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  10. Losing Energy in Classical, Relativistic and Quantum Mechanics.David Atkinson - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (1):170-180.
    A Zenonian supertask involving an infinite number of colliding balls is considered, under the restriction that the total mass of all the balls is finite. Classical mechanics leads to the conclusion that momentum, but not necessarily energy, must be conserved. Relativistic mechanics, on the other hand, implies that energy and momentum conservation are always violated. Quantum mechanics, however, seems to rule out the Zeno configuration as an inconsistent system.
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  11. Learning Juror Competence: A Generalized Condorcet Jury Theorem.Jan-Willem Romeijn & David Atkinson - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (3):237-262.
    This article presents a generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. All results to date assume a fixed value for the competence of jurors, or alternatively, a fixed probability distribution over the possible competences of jurors. In this article, we develop the idea that we can learn the competence of the jurors by the jury vote. We assume a uniform prior probability assignment over the competence parameter, and we adapt this assignment in the light of the jury vote. We then compute (...)
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  12.  15
    Till at Last There Remain Nothing.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume presents an argument according to which all knowledge reduces to probability, and all probability reduces to nothing. Many have criticized this argument, while others find nothing wrong with it. In this paper we explain that the argument is invalid as it stands, but for different reasons than have been hitherto acknowledged. Once the argument is repaired, it becomes clear that there is indeed something that reduces to nothing, but it is something other (...)
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  13.  75
    Grounds and Limits: Reichenbach and Foundationalist Epistemology.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2011 - Synthese 181 (1):113 - 124.
    From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form 'x is probable' only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis's idea, calling it "a remnant of rationalism". The last move in this debate was a challenge by (...)
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  14. Probability Without Certainty: Foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach Debate.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):442-453.
    Like many discussions on the pros and cons of epistemic foundationalism, the debate between C.I. Lewis and H. Reichenbach dealt with three concerns: the existence of basic beliefs, their nature, and the way in which beliefs are related. In this paper we concentrate on the third matter, especially on Lewis’s assertion that a probability relation must depend on something that is certain, and Reichenbach’s claim that certainty is never needed. We note that Lewis’s assertion is prima facie ambiguous, but argue (...)
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  15. Probability All the Way Up.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2006 - Synthese 153 (2):187-197.
    Richard Jeffrey’s radical probabilism (‘probability all the way down’) is augmented by the claim that probability cannot be turned into certainty, except by data that logically exclude all alternatives. Once we start being uncertain, no amount of updating will free us from the treadmill of uncertainty. This claim is cast first in objectivist and then in subjectivist terms.
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  16.  82
    Time in Quantum Mechanics.Jan Hilgevoord & David Atkinson - 2001 - In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press.
    Time is often said to play in quantum mechanics an essentially different role from position: whereas position is represented by a Hermitian operator, time is represented by a c-number. This discrepancy has been found puzzling and has given rise to a vast literature and many efforts at a solution. In this paper it is argued that the discrepancy is only apparent and that there is nothing in the formalism of quantum mechanics that forces us to treat position and time differently. (...)
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  17. Justification by Infinite Loops.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2010 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (4):407-416.
    In an earlier paper we have shown that a proposition can have a well-defined probability value, even if its justification consists of an infinite linear chain. In the present paper we demonstrate that the same holds if the justification takes the form of a closed loop. Moreover, in the limit that the size of the loop tends to infinity, the probability value of the justified proposition is always well-defined, whereas this is not always so for the infinite linear chain. This (...)
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  18.  46
    The Solvability of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Frederik Herzberg.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2010 - Studia Logica 94 (3):347-353.
    We have earlier shown by construction that a proposition can have a welldefined nonzero probability, even if it is justified by an infinite probabilistic regress. We thought this to be an adequate rebuttal of foundationalist claims that probabilistic regresses must lead either to an indeterminate, or to a determinate but zero probability. In a comment, Frederik Herzberg has argued that our counterexamples are of a special kind, being what he calls ‘solvable’. In the present reaction we investigate what Herzberg means (...)
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  19.  63
    How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
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  20.  7
    A Relativistic Zeno Effect.David Atkinson - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):5-12.
    A Zenonian supertask involving an infinite number of identical colliding balls is generalized to include balls with different masses. Under the restriction that the total mass of all the balls is finite, classical mechanics leads to velocities that have no upper limit. Relativistic mechanics results in velocities bounded by that of light, but energy and momentum are not conserved, implying indeterminism. The notion that both determinism and the conservation laws might be salvaged via photon creation is shown to be flawed.
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  21.  6
    “Till at Last There Remain Nothing” Hume’s Treatise 1.4.1 in Contemporary Perspective.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume presents an argument according to which all knowledge reduces to probability, and all probability reduces to nothing. Many have criticized this argument, while others find nothing wrong with it. In this paper we explain that the argument is invalid as it stands, but for different reasons than have been hitherto acknowledged. Once the argument is repaired, it becomes clear that there is indeed something that reduces to nothing, but it is something other (...)
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  22.  6
    Losing Energy in Classical, Relativistic and Quantum Mechanics.David Atkinson - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (1):170-180.
    A Zenonian supertask involving an infinite number of colliding balls is considered, under the restriction that the total mass of all the balls is finite. Classical mechanics leads to the conclusion that momentum, but not necessarily energy, must be conserved. Relativistic mechanics, on the other hand, implies that energy and momentum conservation are always violated. Quantum mechanics, however, seems to rule out the Zeno configuration as an inconsistent system.
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  23. A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Unknown Juror Competence.Jan-Willem Romeijn & David Atkinson - 2011 - Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 10 (3):237-262.
     
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  24.  25
    The Need for Justification.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):201-210.
    Some series can go on indefinitely, others cannot, and epistemologists want to know in which class to place epistemic chains. Is it sensible or nonsensical to speak of a proposition or belief that is justified by another proposition or belief, ad infinitum? In large part the answer depends on what we mean by “justification.” Epistemologists have failed to find a definition on which everybody agrees, and some have even advised us to stop looking altogether. In spite of this, the present (...)
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  25.  34
    Nonconservation of Energy and Loss of Determinism I. Infinitely Many Colliding Balls.David Atkinson - 2009 - Foundations of Physics 39 (8):937-957.
    An infinite number of elastically colliding balls is considered in a classical, and then in a relativistic setting. Energy and momentum are not necessarily conserved globally, even though each collision does separately conserve them. This result holds in particular when the total mass of all the balls is finite, and even when the spatial extent and temporal duration of the process are also finite. Further, the process is shown to be indeterministic: there is an arbitrary parameter in the general solution (...)
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  26. Quantum Mechanics and Retrocausality.David Atkinson - manuscript
    The classical electrodynamics of point charges can be made finite by the introduction of effects that temporally precede their causes. The idea of retrocausality is also inherent in the Feynman propagators of quantum electrodynamics. The notion allows a new understanding of the violation of the Bell inequalities, and of the world view revealed by quantum mechanics. Published in The Universe, Visions and Perspectives, edited by N. Dadhich and A. Kembhavi, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, pages 35-50.
     
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  27.  67
    Does Quantum Electrodynamics Have an Arrow of Time?☆.David Atkinson - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 37 (3):528-541.
    Quantum electrodynamics is a time-symmetric theory that is part of the electroweak interaction, which is invariant under a generalized form of this symmetry, the PCT transformation. The thesis is defended that the arrow of time in electrodynamics is a consequence of the assumption of an initial state of high order, together with the quantum version of the equiprobability postulate.
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  28.  14
    A Consistent Set of Infinite-Order Probabilities.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - unknown
    Some philosophers have claimed that it is meaningless or paradoxical to consider the probability of a probability. Others have however argued that second-order probabilities do not pose any particular problem. We side with the latter group. On condition that the relevant distinctions are taken into account, second-order probabilities can be shown to be perfectly consistent. May the same be said of an infinite hierarchy of higher-order probabilities? Is it consistent to speak of a probability of a probability, and of a (...)
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  29.  55
    Probability as a Theory Dependent Concept.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 1999 - Synthese 118 (3):307-328.
    It is argued that probability should be defined implicitly by the distributions of possible measurement values characteristic of a theory. These distributions are tested by, but not defined in terms of, relative frequencies of occurrences of events of a specified kind. The adoption of an a priori probability in an empirical investigation constitutes part of the formulation of a theory. In particular, an assumption of equiprobability in a given situation is merely one hypothesis inter alia, which can be tested, like (...)
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  30.  51
    Nonconservation of Energy and Loss of Determinism II. Colliding with an Open Set.David Atkinson & Porter Johnson - 2010 - Foundations of Physics 40 (2):179-189.
    An actual infinity of colliding balls can be in a configuration in which the laws of mechanics lead to logical inconsistency. It is argued that one should therefore limit the domain of these laws to a finite, or only a potentially infinite number of elements. With this restriction indeterminism, energy nonconservation and creatio ex nihilo no longer occur. A numerical analysis of finite systems of colliding balls is given, and the asymptotic behaviour that corresponds to the potentially infinite system is (...)
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  31. 1. How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.
     
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  32. On Poor and Not so Poor Thought Experiments. A Reply to Daniel Cohnitz.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2007 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (1):159 - 161.
    We have never entirely agreed with Daniel Cohnitz on the status and rôle of thought experiments. Several years ago, enjoying a splendid lunch together in the city of Ghent, we cheerfully agreed to disagree on the matter; and now that Cohnitz has published his considered opinion of our views, we are glad that we have the opportunity to write a rejoinder and to explicate some of our disagreements. We choose not to deal here with all the issues that Cohnitz raises, (...)
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  33.  29
    Fractal Patterns in Reasoning.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2012 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 53 (1):15-26.
    This paper is the third and final one in a sequence of three. All three papers emphasize that a proposition can be justified by an infinite regress, on condition that epistemic justification is interpreted probabilistically. The first two papers showed this for one-dimensional chains and for one-dimensional loops of propositions, each proposition being justified probabilistically by its precursor. In the present paper we consider the more complicated case of two-dimensional nets, where each "child" proposition is probabilistically justified by two "parent" (...)
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  34. Experiments and Thought Experiments in Natural Science.David Atkinson - 2001 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 232:209-226.
    My theme is thought experiment in natural science, and its relation to real experiment. I shall defend the thesis that thought experiments that do not lead to theorizing and to a real experiment are generally of much less value that those that do so. To illustrate this thesis I refer to three examples, from three very different periods, and with three very different kinds of status. The first is the classic thought experiment in which Galileo imagined that he had, by (...)
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  35.  1
    Probability Without Certainty: Foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach Debate.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):442-453.
    Like many discussions on the pros and cons of epistemic foundationalism, the debate between C. I. Lewis and H. Reichenbach dealt with three concerns: the existence of basic beliefs, their nature, and the way in which beliefs are related. In this paper we concentrate on the third matter, especially on Lewis’s assertion that a probability relation must depend on something that is certain, and Reichenbach’s claim that certainty is never needed. We note that Lewis’s assertion is prima facie ambiguous, but (...)
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  36.  1
    Galileo and Prior Philosophy.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):115-136.
    Galileo claimed inconsistency in the Aristotelian dogma concerning falling bodies and stated that all bodies must fall at the same rate. However, there is an empirical situation where the speeds of falling bodies are proportional to their weights; and even in vacuo all bodies do not fall at the same rate under terrestrial conditions. The reason for the deficiency of Galileo’s reasoning is analyzed, and various physical scenarios are described in which Aristotle’s claim is closer to the truth than is (...)
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  37.  55
    How to Confirm the Disconfirmed. On Conjunction Fallacies and Robust Confirmation.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - unknown
    Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for nine different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.
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  38.  2
    Correction To: “Till at Last There Remain Nothing”.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - forthcoming - Synthese:1-1.
    The original article has been corrected. Erroneously, a comma and a space were added in line 164 to 500, 500, and the authors would like readers to know that this should instead read 500,500.
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  39. Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2007 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):93 - 108.
    Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey conditionalization. We conclude that, under (...)
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  40.  13
    Agriculture–Reconciling Ancient Tensions.David Atkinson - 2002 - Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics 2 (2002):52-58.
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  41.  3
    Losing Energy in Classical, Relativistic and Quantum Mechanics.David Atkinson - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (1):170-180.
    A Zenonian supertask involving an infinite number of colliding balls is considered, under the restriction that the total mass of all the balls is finite. Classical mechanics leads to the conclusion that momentum, but not necessarily energy, must be conserved. Relativistic mechanics, on the other hand, implies that energy and momentum conservation are always violated. Quantum mechanics, however, seems to rule out the Zeno configuration as an inconsistent system.
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  42. A New Metaphysics: Finding a Niche for String Theory.David Atkinson - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1):95-102.
    Theo Kuipers describes four kinds of research programs and the question is raised here as to whether string theory could be accommodated by one of them, or whether it should be classified in a new, fifth kind of research program.
     
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  43.  3
    When Are Two Witnesses Better Than One?David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - unknown
    Even if two testimonies in a criminal trial are independent, they are not necessarily more trustworthy than one. But if they are independent in the sense that they are screened off from one another by the crime, then two testimonies raise the probability of guilt above the level that one testimony alone could achieve. In fact this screening-off condition can be weakened without changing the conclusion. It is however only a sufficient, not a necessary condition for concluding that two witnesses (...)
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  44.  74
    A Relativistic Zeno Effect.David Atkinson - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):5 - 12.
    A Zenonian supertask involving an infinite number of identical colliding balls is generalized to include balls with different masses. Under the restriction that the total mass of all the balls is finite, classical mechanics leads to velocities that have no upper limit. Relativistic mechanics results in velocities bounded by that of light, but energy and momentum are not conserved, implying indeterminism. The notion that both determinism and the conservation laws might be salvaged via photon creation is shown to be flawed.
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  45.  64
    Lamps, Cubes, Balls and Walls: Zeno Problems and Solutions.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):49 - 59.
    Various arguments have been put forward to show that Zeno-like paradoxes are still with us. A particularly interesting one involves a cube composed of colored slabs that geometrically decrease in thickness. We first point out that this argument has already been nullified by Paul Benacerraf. Then we show that nevertheless a further problem remains, one that withstands Benacerraf s critique. We explain that the new problem is isomorphic to two other Zeno-like predicaments: a problem described by Alper and Bridger in (...)
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  46.  15
    Pluralism in Probabilistic Justification.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - unknown
  47.  17
    Biased Coins: A Model for Higher-Order Probabilities.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2014 - In Maria Clara Galavotti, Elisabeth Nemeth & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), European Philosophy of Science: Philosophy of Science in Europe and the Vienna Heritage. Springer. pp. 241-248.
    Is it coherent to speak of the probability of a probability, and the probability of a probability of a probability, and so on? We show that it is, in the sense that a regress of higher-order probabilities can lead to convergent sequences that determine all these probabilities. By constructing an implementable model which is based on coin-making machines, we demonstrate the consistency of our regress.
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  48.  21
    An Endless Hierarchy of Probabilities.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):267-276.
    Suppose q is some proposition, and let -/- P(q) = v0 (1) -/- be the proposition that the probability of q is v0.1 How can one know that (1) is true? One cannot know it for sure, for all that may be asserted is a further probabilistic statement like -/- P(P(q) = v0) = v1, (2) -/- which states that the probability that (1) is true is v1. But the claim (2) is also subject to some further statement of an (...)
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  49. Probabilistic Justification.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - unknown
    We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.
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  50.  10
    Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):93-108.
    Reichenbach's use of 'posits' to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach's second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach's alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey conditionalization. We conclude that, under (...)
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