13 found
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  1. Robust, unconscious self-deception: Strategic and flexible.Eric Funkhouser & David Barrett - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):1-15.
    In recent years deflationary accounts of self-deception, under the banner of motivationalism, have proven popular. On these views the deception at work is simply a motivated bias. In contrast, we argue for an account of self-deception that involves more robustly deceptive unconscious processes. These processes are strategic, flexible, and demand some retention of the truth. We offer substantial empirical support for unconscious deceptive processes that run counter to certain philosophical and psychological claims that the unconscious is rigid, ballistic, and of (...)
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  2. Functional analysis and mechanistic explanation.David Barrett - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2695-2714.
    Piccinini and Craver (Synthese 183:283–311, 2011) argue for the surprising view that psychological explanation, properly understood, is a species of mechanistic explanation. This contrasts with the ‘received view’ (due, primarily, to Cummins and Fodor) which maintains a sharp distinction between psychological explanation and mechanistic explanation. The former is typically construed as functional analysis, the analysis of some psychological capacity into an organized series of subcapacities without specifying any of the structural features that underlie the explanandum capacity. The latter idea, of (...)
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  3.  47
    Building machines that learn and think for themselves.Matthew Botvinick, David G. T. Barrett, Peter Battaglia, Nando de Freitas, Darshan Kumaran, Joel Z. Leibo, Timothy Lillicrap, Joseph Modayil, Shakir Mohamed, Neil C. Rabinowitz, Danilo J. Rezende, Adam Santoro, Tom Schaul, Christopher Summerfield, Greg Wayne, Theophane Weber, Daan Wierstra, Shane Legg & Demis Hassabis - 2017 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40.
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  4. Multiple Realizability, Identity Theory, and the Gradual Reorganization Principle.David A. Barrett - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):325-346.
    In the literature on multiple realizability and the identity theory, cases of neural plasticity have enjoyed a very limited role. The present article attempts to remedy this small influence by arguing that clinical and experimental evidence of quite extensive neural reorganization offers compelling support for the claim that psychological kinds are multiply realized in neurological kinds, thus undermining the identity theory. In particular, cases are presented where subjects with no measurable psychological deficits also have vast, though gradually received, neurological damage. (...)
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  5.  36
    Reply to Doody.Eric Funkhouser & David Barrett - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (5):677-681.
    In an earlier paper, we appealed to various empirical studies to make the case that the unconscious mind is capable of robust self-deception. Paul Doody has challenged our interpretations of that empirical evidence. In this reply we defend our interpretations, arguing that the unconscious is engaged in strategic and flexible goal pursuit.
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  6. Schism and Renewal in Africa.David B. Barrett, J. D. Y. Peel & John S. Mbiti - 1971 - Religious Studies 7 (1):90-91.
     
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  7.  19
    Is coding a relevant metaphor for building AI?Adam Santoro, Felix Hill, David Barrett, David Raposo, Matt Botvinick & Timothy Lillicrap - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    Brette contends that the neural coding metaphor is an invalid basis for theories of what the brain does. Here, we argue that it is an insufficient guide for building an artificial intelligence that learns to accomplish short- and long-term goals in a complex, changing environment.
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  8.  73
    How (Not) to Theorize About Multiple Realization.David Barrett - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (5):674-690.
    Though multiple realization has been an important concept in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology for more than fifty years, it has not been until quite recently that anyone proposed an actual theory of what multiple realization is. This paper argues that the most dominant current theories of multiple realization are unacceptable. It does so by mainly arguing for a particular methodology for theorizing about multiple realization. Rather than being mostly constrained by intuitions, as theorizing about folk notions (...)
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  9.  14
    Political Polarization and Social Media.David Barrett - 2022 - Philosophical Topics 50 (2):85-104.
    A popular claim is that social media is a cause of contemporary high levels of political polarization. In this paper, I consider three of the most common kinds of arguments for the thesis. One type lays out a narrative of causes, tracing the causal steps between logging on to social media and later becoming more polarized. Another type uses computer modeling to show how polarized effects can arise from systems that are analogous to use of social media. The final type (...)
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  10. Consciousness, Attention, and Working Memory: an Empirical Evaluation of Prinz's Theory of Consciousness.David Barrett - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):7-29.
    A popular issue in mind is to explain why conscious mental states are conscious. Prinz (2012) defends three claims in an effort to make such an explanation: (i)mental states become conscious when and only when we attend to them; (ii)attention is a process by which mental states become available to working memory; so (iii) mental states are conscious when and only when they become available to working memory. Here I attack Prinz's theory, made explicit in (iii), by showing that there (...)
     
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  11. World Christian Encyclopaedia: A Comparative Survey of Churches and Religions in the Modern World A.D. 1900-2000.David B. Barrett - 1984 - Religious Studies 20 (3):510-511.
     
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  12.  33
    Developers Target Catholic Mansion.David V. Barrett - 2004 - The Chesterton Review 30 (3/4):415-417.
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  13.  7
    Marxism, the Communist Party, and the Soviet Union: Three Critiques by Hu Hanmin.David P. Barrett - 1980 - Chinese Studies in History 14 (2):47-49.