18 found
Order:
Disambiguations
David Beisecker [18]David Wayne Beisecker [1]
  1. Phenomenal Consciousness, Sense Impressions, and the Logic of 'What It's Like.David Beisecker - 2005 - In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  2. Dennett and the Quest for Real Meaning: In Defense of a Myth.David Beisecker - 2002 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 9 (1):11-18.
    In several recent pieces, Daniel Dennett has advanced a line of reasoning purporting to show that we should reject the idea that there is a tenable distinction to be drawn between the manner in which we represent the way things are and the manner in which "blessedly simple" intentional systems like thermostats and frogs represent the way things are. Through a series of thought experiments, Dennett aims to show that philosophers of mind should abandon their preoccupation with "real meaning as (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  3. The Importance of Being Erroneous: Prospects for Animal Intentionality.David Beisecker - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (1):281-308.
    The question of animal belief (or animal intentionality) often degenerates into a frustrating and unproductive exchange. Foes of animal intentionality point out that non-linguistic animals couldn’t possibly possess the kinds of mental states we linguistic beings enjoy. They claim that linguistic ability enables us to become sensitive to intensional contexts or to the states of mind of others in a way that is unavailable to the non-linguistic, and that would be necessary for proper attributions of intentionality. To attribute mental states (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4.  77
    Moscow Nights.Ron Wilburn, Todd Jones & David Beisecker - 2001 - The Philosophers' Magazine 15 (15):30-31.
  5.  74
    Some More Thoughts About Thought and Talk: Davidson and Fellows on Animal Belief.David Beisecker - 2002 - Philosophy 77 (1):115-124.
    Donald Davidson's argument that non-linguistic creatures lack beliefs rests on two premises: (1) to be a believer, one must have the concept of belief, and (2) to have the concept of belief, one must interpret the utterances of others. However, Davidson's defense of these premises is overly compressed and unconvincing. In a recent issue of Philosophy, Roger Fellows provides new arguments for these premises. In this paper, I explain why I'm not persuaded by Fellows' attempt to bolster Davidson's line of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  6.  19
    Interpretation and First-Person Authority.David Beisecker - 2003 - Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):89-96.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  7
    The Importance of Being Erroneous.David Beisecker - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (1):281-308.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8.  22
    “From the Grunts and Groans of the Cave….” Presidential Address.David Beisecker - 2013 - Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):1-11.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  5
    Interpretation and First-Person Authority: Davidson on Self-Knowledge.David Beisecker - 2003 - Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):89-96.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  50
    Dennett's Overlooked Originality.David Beisecker - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (1):43-55.
    No philosopher has worked harder than Dan Dennett to set the possibility of machine mentality on firm philosophical footing. Dennett’s defense of this possibility has both a positive and a negative thrust. On the positive side, he has developed an account of mental activity that is tailor-made for the attribution of intentional states to purely mechanical contrivances, while on the negative side, he pillories as mystery mongering and skyhook grasping any attempts to erect barriers to the conception of machine mentality (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  21
    There's Something About Mary: Phenomenal Consciousness and its Attributions.David Beisecker - 2000 - Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (2):143-152.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  16
    (Re)Motivating Inferentialism Commentary on Mark McCullagh's.David Beisecker - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (2):151-154.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  15
    (Re)Motivating Inferentialism Commentary on Mark McCullagh's "Motivating Inferentialism".David Beisecker - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (2):151-154.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  1
    There’s Something About Mary: Phenomenal Consciousness and its Attributes.David Beisecker - 2000 - Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (2):143-152.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  3
    Impressions, and the Logic of 'What It's Like'.David Beisecker - 2005 - Consciousness and Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception 1:137.
  16. Dennett and the Quest for Real Meaning: In Defense of a “Myth”.David Beisecker - 2002 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 9 (1):11-18.
    In several recent pieces, Daniel Dennett has advanced a line of reasoning purporting to show that we should reject the idea that there is a tenable distinction to be drawn between the manner in which we represent the way things are and the manner in which "blessedly simple" intentional systems like thermostats and frogs represent the way things are. Through a series of thought experiments, Dennett aims to show that philosophers of mind should abandon their preoccupation with "real meaning as (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. The Importance of Being Erroneous: Prospects for Animal Intentionality.David Beisecker - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 27 (1):281-308.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Moscow Nights.Ron Wilburn, Todd Jones & David Beisecker - 2001 - The Philosophers' Magazine 15:30-31.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography