Better Never to Have Been argues for a number of related, highly provocative, views: (1) Coming into existence is always a serious harm. (2) It is always wrong to have children. (3) It is wrong not to abort fetuses at the earlier stages of gestation. (4) It would be better if, as a result of there being no new people, humanity became extinct. These views may sound unbelievable--but anyone who reads Benatar will be obliged to take them seriously.

Are our lives meaningless? Is death bad? Would immortality be better? Alternatively, should we hasten our deaths by acts of suicide? Many people are tempted to offer comforting optimistic answers to these big questions. The Human Predicament offers a less sanguine assessment, and defends a substantial, but not unmitigated, pessimism.

In Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, I argued that coming into existence is always a harm and that procreation is wrong. In this paper, I respond to those of my critics to whom I have not previously responded. More specifically, I engage the objections of Tim Bayne, Ben Bradley, Campbell Brown, David DeGrazia, Elizabeth Harman, Chris Kaposy, Joseph Packer and Saul Smilansky.

While procreation is ubiquitous, attention to the ethical issues involved in creating children is relatively rare. In Debating Procreation, David Benatar and David Wasserman take opposing views on this important question. David Benatar argues for the anti-natalist view that it is always wrong to bring new people into existence. He argues that coming into existence is always a serious harm and that even if it were not always so, the risk of serious harm is sufficiently great to make procreation wrong. (...) In addition to these "philanthropic" arguments, he advances the "misanthropic" one that because humans are so defective and cause vast amounts of harm, it is wrong to create more of them.David Wasserman defends procreation against the anti-natalist challenge. He outlines a variety of moderate pro-natalist positions, which all see procreation as often permissible but never required. After criticizing the main anti-natalist arguments, he reviews those pronatalist positions. He argues that constraints on procreation are best understood in terms of the role morality of prospective parents, considers different views of that role morality, and argues for one that imposes only limited constraints based on the well-being of the future child. He then argues that the expected good of a future child and of the parent-child relationship can provide a strong justification for procreation in the face of expected adversities without giving individuals any moral reason to procreate. (shrink)

Peter Singer has argued that the affluent have very extensive duties to the world’s poor. His argument has some important implications for procreation, most of which have not yet been acknowledged. These implications are explicated in this paper. First, the rich should desist from procreation and instead divert to the poor those resources that would have been used to rear the children that would otherwise have been produced. Second, the poor should desist from procreation because doing so can prevent the (...) very bad things that would otherwise have befallen the children they would have brought into existence. Third, the rich sometimes have a duty to prevent the poor from procreating. Fourth, the rich sometimes have a right to prevent the poor from reproducing. Although these implications may not amount to a categorical prohibition on all procreation, they do significantly restrict the permissibility of procreation. They are, in that sense, anti-natalist. (shrink)

Opinion about neonatal male circumcision is deeply divided. Some take it to be a prophylactic measure with unequivocal and significant health benefits, while others consider it a form of child abuse. We argue against both these polar views. In doing so, we discuss whether circumcision constitutes bodily mutilation, whether the absence of the child's informed consent makes it wrong, the nature and strength of the evidence regarding medical harms and benefits, and what moral weight cultural considerations have. We conclude that (...) nontherapeutic circumcision of infant boys is a suitable matter for parental discretion. (shrink)

Procreation and Parenthood offers new and original essays by leading philosophers on some of the main ethical issues raised by these activities.

_Does sexism against men exist? What it looks like and why we need to take it seriously_ This book draws attention to the "second sexism," where it exists, how it works and what it looks like, and responds to those who would deny that it exists. Challenging conventional ways of thinking, it examines controversial issues such as sex-based affirmative action, gender roles, and charges of anti-feminism. The book offers an academically rigorous argument in an accessible style, including the careful use (...) of empirical data, and includes examples and engages in a discussion of how sex discrimination against men and boys also undermines the cause for female equality. (shrink)

Rodger et al 1 argue that ‘ethically defensible xenotransplantation should entail the use of genetic disenhancement if it is demonstrated that’ the pain and suffering of donor pigs ‘cannot be eliminated by other means’. The phrase ‘genetic disenhancement’ refers to genetic manipulation that would produce an animal that is either less able or entirely unable to experience pain and suffering. (The phrase is euphemistic because, on one possible reading, it suggests the removal of an existing enhancement, rather than what it (...) actually is, namely a diminishment relative to the species norm.) The authors acknowledge that genetic ‘disenhancement’ is not a ‘morally ideal ‘solution’, but argue that ‘it is morally better to prevent unavoidable pain until a viable non-animal alternative becomes available’ (p. 1). In advancing this argument, they explicitly state that they make no assumption that xenotransplantation is, in principle, morally permissible. They take no stand on that issue, which is beyond the scope of their paper. They assume only that ‘ (1) xenotransplantation research will inevitably continue and (2) causing pain and suffering requires sufficient justification’ (p. 1). However, in the absence of an assumption that xenotransplantation is, in principle, morally permissible, the authors have not established their …. (shrink)

Many people are resistant to the conclusions for which I argued in Better Never to Have Been . I have previously responded to most of the published criticisms of my arguments. Here I respond to a new batch of critics (and to some fellow anti-natalists) who gathered for a conference at the University of Johannesburg and whose papers are published in this special issue of the South African Journal of Philosophy . I am also taking the opportunity to respond to (...) two other critics whose articles have previously been published in South African philosophy journals. Clearly I cannot respond to all the arguments in each of these papers and thus I shall focus on what I take to be some of the central issues in each. None of the arguments to which I shall respond have caused me to revise my views. However, I am pleased to have the opportunity to show why this is the case. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that the overwhelming majority of gamete donors are amongst those who treat decisions about bringing children into existence too lightly. The argument proceeds through the following stages. 1) People have a presumptive responsibility for rearing children who result from their gametes. 2) The responsibility people have to rear their offspring is a responsibility not merely to provide a minimum of care, but also to attend to the details of nurturing children and fostering their flourishing. (...) 3) Gamete donors transfer their responsibilities for raising their genetic offspring to those who will raise it. 4) Responsibilities for rearing children are weighty ones. 5) Treating weighty responsibilities too lightly is morally wrong. 6) Gamete donors' decisions to transfer their responsibilities for rearing their offspring to others, almost always involves treating parental responsibilities too lightly. 7) Therefore, gamete donation is almost always morally wrong. (shrink)

Humour is worthy of serious ethical consideration. However, it is often taken far too seriously. In this paper, it is argued that while humour is sometimes unethical, it is wrong much less often than many people think. Non-contextual criticisms, which claim that certain kinds of humour are always wrong, are rejected. Contextual criticisms, which take issue with particular instances of humour rather than types of humour, are more promising. However, it is common to overstate the number of contexts in which (...) humour is wrong. Various mistakes of this kind are highlighted and cautioned against. (shrink)

Many people think that promiscuity is morally acceptable, but rape and pedophilia are heinous. I argue, however, that the view of sexual ethics that underlies an acceptance of promiscuity is inconsistent with regarding (1) rape as worse than other forms of coercion or assault, or (2) (many) sex acts with willing children as wrong at all. And the view of sexual ethics that would fully explain the wrong of rape and pedophilia would also rule out promiscuity. I intend this argument (...) neither as a case against promiscuity nor as either a mitigation of rape or a partial defense of pedophilia. My purpose is to highlight an inconsistency in many people's judgements. Whether one avoids the inconsistency by extending or limiting the range of practices one condemns, will depend on which underlying view of the ethics of sex one accepts. (shrink)

Interviews with David Benatar and Thaddeus Metz about some core aspects of their views about meaning in life, including debate between them. Accessible to a generally educated audience. Edited by Mark Oppenheimer and Jason Werbeloff.

Nick Zangwill has argued that we have a moral duty to eat meat. His argument applies to the flesh of those domesticated animals who (a) would not have existed had it not been for the practice of killing and eating them; and (b) have lives that contain more good than bad—and thus, on his view, have “lives worth living.” In my reply, I point to various features of his argument that are unclear. I seek to render explicit the various premises (...) and inferences of his argument. I argue that there are problems with at least some of the premises. I also argue that his argument as a whole is liable to a reductio ad absurdum, which he considers, but to which he responds inadequately. I conclude that we ought to reject his argument. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA number of problems plague universal declarations. To the extent that those drafting and adopting the declaration represent a range of different views, consensus can only be obtained if the declaration makes minimalist claims that all can support, or makes claims that are vague enough that they can be interpreted to everybody's satisfaction. To the extent that a universal declaration avoids these problems, and takes an unequivocal and controversial stand, it does so by privileging the view that is hegemonic . (...) After discussing these problems I ask whether such declarations could nonetheless do any good. (shrink)

Are fetuses, at any stage of their development, capable of feeling pain? In his paper, ‘Locating the Beginnings of Pain’, Stuart Derbyshire argues that they are not. We argue that he reaches this conclusion by way of conceptual confusion, a misreading of the available scientific data and the inclusion of irrelevant data. Despite his assertion to the contrary, the work of most scientists in the area supports the conclusion that fetuses can feel pain. At the outset we examine the concept (...) of pain and distinguish it from the allied concept of nociception, with which it is sometimes confused. With the relevant conceptual framework in place, we elucidate the problem of determining when, in its development, a human becomes capable of feeling pain. We then examine the available data showing how, on balance, it tends more to support than undermine the claim that fetuses of around 28 to 30 weeks' gestation are capable of feeling pain. (shrink)

Life, Death, and Meaning is designed to introduce students to the key existential questions of philosophy.

In her Why Have Children?, Christine Overall takes issue with my anti-natalist arguments that it is better never to come into existence. She provides three criticisms of my arguments and then, in a fourth criticism, suggests that my conclusions are bad for women. I respond to her criticisms, arguing that they fail.

This article describes a paradoxical phenomenon arising from the fact that those who act rightly often pay a price for doing so. The paradox is that the very thing – acting rightly – that incurs the cost also makes the cost (especially) undeserved. In explicating the paradox, I distinguish between two kinds of cost (internal and external), two kinds of unfairness (intrinsic and comparative), and two manifestations of the paradox (prospective and retrospective). I suggest that the problem generated by the (...) paradox of desert arises and becomes steadily more pronounced as we regress through three kinds of cases. I then consider and reject an attempt to dissolve the paradox, and I discuss the relevance of the paradox for questions about the extent of duty. Finally, I consider a concern about drawing attention to the paradox of desert. (shrink)

Opinion about neonatal male circumcision is deeply divided. Some take it to be a prophylactic measure with unequivocal and significant health benefits, while others consider it a form of child abuse. We argue against both these polar views. In doing so, we discuss whether circumcision constitutes bodily mutilation, whether the absence of the child's informed consent makes it wrong, the nature and strength of the evidence regarding medical harms and benefits, and what moral weight cultural considerations have. We conclude that (...) nontherapeutic circumcision of infant boys is a suitable matter for parental discretion. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that theism entails full religious observance and that atheism entails either the abandonment of religious practice or, at least, its reform. Focusing on Judaism, I argue against both of these entailment claims. Both theistic departure from religious observance and atheistic adherence to religious practice are coherent. I outline the features of those religions that make them more conducive to atheistic observance. Finally, I consider various objections to full observance by atheists.

One common mistake in discussions about the ethics of infant male circumcisioni is to attempt to answer the question of the practice's permissibility by appealing to general principles and bypassing the empirical evidence about purported benefits and harms of the practice.Joseph Mazor1 avoids the mistake of appealing only to general principles. He correctly argues that it is not sufficient to invoke a child's right to bodily integrity or to self-determinationii. Moreover, he does not appeal to parents’ rights to religious or (...) cultural freedom in order to make his case for the permissibility of parents having their sons circumcised for religious or cultural reasons.However, in invoking empirical considerations, he is insufficiently careful. For example, he includes, on the negative side of the circumcision ledger, a reduction in sexual pleasure, yet it is not clear that even his own reasoning warrants this. The problem is that he seems to want both, to acknowledge the absence of clear evidence for this claim, and to accept it as one of the costs of circumcision.He says that Michael Benatar and I2 ‘carefully reviewed the medical evidence’1 about circumcision. In the paper that he cites, we noted that competing claims were made about the effect of circumcision on sexual pleasureiii and we established that no conclusion could be drawn from the limited and conflicting evidence available on this question. Dr Mazor notes that critics could point to those studies that lend support to the conclusion that circumcision reduces sexual pleasure, but he concedes that this would be controversial,1 …. (shrink)

The worst pains seem to be worse than the best pleasures are good. Anybody who doubts this should consider what choice they would make if they wereoffered the option of securing an hour of the most sublime pleasures possible in exchange for suffering an hour of the worst pain possible.

Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better to be immortal? Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Since Life, Death, and Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions first appeared, David Benatar’s distinctive anthology designed to introduce students to the key existential questions of philosophy has won a devoted following among users in a variety of upper-level and even introductory courses. While many philosophers in the "continental (...) tradition"—those known as "existentialists"—have engaged these issues at length and often with great popular appeal, English-speaking philosophers have had relatively little to say on these important questions. Yet, the methodology they bring to philosophical questions can, and occasionally has, been applied usefully to "existential" questions. This volume draws together a representative sample of primarily English-speaking philosophers' reflections on life's big questions, divided into six sections, covering (1) the meaning of life, (2) creating people, (3) death, (4) suicide, (5) immortality, and (6) optimism and pessimism. These key readings are supplemented with helpful introductions, study questions, and suggestions for further reading, making the material accessible and interesting for students. In short, the book provides a singular introduction to the way that philosophy has dealt with the big questions of life that we are all tempted to ask. (shrink)

When presented with the claim of the moral vegetarian that it is wrong for us to eat meat, many people respond that because it is not wrong for lions, tigers and other carnivores to kill and eat animals, it cannot be wrong for humans to do so. This response is what Peter Alward has called the naive argument. Peter Alward has defended the naive argument against objections. I argue that his defence fails.

This chapter contains sections titled: Rectifying Injustice Consequentialist Arguments Conclusion.

In the first of our three pieces responding to Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion, David Benatar suggests that Dawkins is preaching.

The Gendered Conference Campaign seeks to reduce the prevalence of conferences at which the keynote speakers are all male. Such conferences, according to proponents of the campaign, stereotype philosophy as male, contribute to implicit bias against women and perpetuate stereotype threat. I argue, first, that if a more diverse list of keynote speakers were the correct way to counter harms such as implicit bias and stereotype threat, then a Gendered Conference Campaign would not be the solution. The campaign would need (...) to include other groups that are the victims of implicit bias and stereotype within philosophy. Other challenges to proponents of the Gendered Conference Campaign are then presented. (shrink)

Most people think that their coming into existence benefited them. This paper reports on and analyses a study that shows that most people, when making such a judgement, do not really consider the counterfactual case -- the scenario in which they never come into existence. Because proper consideration is not given to both options, the ranking of one over the other is not an appropriately informed judgement. The preference for having come into existence is thus a profoundly unreliable indicator of (...) whether it really is better to be than not to have been. The practical value of knowing this will be outlined. (shrink)

Sara Kolmes has argued that the human ‘handlers’ of emotional support animals (ESAs) should have the sorts of body-like rights to those animals that people with prosthetics have to their prosthetics. In support of this conclusion, she argues that ESAs both function and feel like prosthetics, and that the disanalogies between ESAs and prosthetics are irrelevant to whether humans can have body-like rights to their ESAs. In response, we argue that Ms Kolmes has failed to show that ESAs are body-like (...) in the ways that paradigmatic prostheses are and that, even if they were, these similarities would be outweighed by a crucial dissimilarity that she underestimates. (shrink)

This book's thirty essays explore philosophically the nature and morality of sexual perversion, cybersex, masturbation, homosexuality, contraception, same-sex marriage, promiscuity, pedophilia, date rape, sexual objectification, teacher-student relationships, pornography, and prostitution. Authors include Martha Nussbaum, Thomas Nagel, Alan Goldman, John Finnis, Sallie Tisdale, Robin West, Alan Wertheimer, John Corvino, Cheshire Calhoun, Jerome Neu, and Alan Soble, among others. A valuable resource for sex researchers as well as undergraduate courses in the philosophy of sex.

Many societies are now characterized by much more informality than they were before. One manifestation of this is that whereas children would previously address adults more deferentially , they are now much more likely to call adults by their first names. The same is true of younger adults addressing considerably older adults. Is this greater familiarity acceptable or should it be avoided?

Did those who published the cartoons of Muhammad do something wrong?