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David Botting
De La Salle University (PhD)
  1.  37
    The Logical Evaluation of Arguments.David Botting - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (2):167-180.
    In this paper I will defend the controversial thesis that all argumentation in natural language can be reconstructed, for the purposes of assessment, as a deductively valid argument. Evaluation of the argumentation amounts to evaluation of the logical coherence of the premises. I will be taking the pragma-linguistic theory of Bermejo-Luque as an initial starting point.
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  2.  3
    Two Types of Argument From Position to Know.David Botting - 2018 - Informal Logic 38 (4):502-530.
    In this paper I will argue that there is an inductive and a non-inductive argument from position to know, and will characterise the latter as an argument from authority because of providing content-independent reasons. I will also argue that both types of argument should be doubt-preserving: testimony cannot justify a stronger cognitive attitude in the arguer than the expert herself expresses when she testifies. Failure to appreciate this point undercuts Mizrahi’s claim that arguments from expert opinion are weak.
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  3.  28
    Can 'Big' Questions Be Begged?David Botting - 2011 - Argumentation 25 (1):23-36.
    Traditionally, logicians construed fallacies as mistakes in inference, as things that looked like good (i.e., deductively valid) arguments but were not. Two fallacies stood out like a sore thumb on this view of fallacies: the fallacy of many questions (because it does not even look like a good argument, or any kind of argument) and the fallacy of petitio principii (because it looks like and is a good argument). The latter is the concern of this paper. One possible response is (...)
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  4.  36
    The Irrelevance of Relevance.David Botting - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (1):1-21.
    The lack of a theory of relevance in the current state of the art of informal logic has often been considered regrettable, a gap that must be filled before the Relevance-Sufficiency-Acceptability model can be considered complete. I wish to challenge this view. A theory of relevance is neither desirable nor possible. Informal logic can get by perfectly well, and has been doing so far, with relevance judgments that are by nature unanalysable and intuitive. Criticism of theories of relevance, for example (...)
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  5.  22
    A Pragma-Dialectical Default on the Question of Truth.David Botting - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (4):413-434.
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  6.  56
    The Paradox of Analogy.David Botting - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (1):98-115.
    I will show that there is a type of analogical reasoning that instantiates a pattern of reasoning in confirmation theory that is considered at best paradoxical and at worst fatal to the entire syntactical approach to confirmation and explanation. However, I hope to elaborate conditions under which this is a sound (although not necessarily strong) method of reasoning.
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  7.  5
    The Value Problem of A Priori Knowledge.David Botting - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-24.
    In recent years, there has been a “value turn” in epistemology. We intuitively think of knowledge as having a value, a value that mere true belief does not have, and it has been held to be a condition of adequacy on theories of knowledge that they be able to explain why. Unfortunately, for most theories their explanations suffer from the “swamping problem” because what has to be added to turn true belief into knowledge has value only instrumentally to truth; for (...)
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  8.  29
    The Virtuous Tortoise.David Botting - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (4).
    There is no philosophically interesting distinction to be made between inference-rules and premises. That there is such a distinction is often held to follow from the possibility of infinite regress illustrated by Carroll's story of Achilles and the tortoise. I will argue that this is wrong on three separate grounds. Consequently, Carroll's fable provides no motivation to abandon the traditional logical separation of arguments into their premises and conclusions. There is no proposition that must be taken to be a rule (...)
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  9.  51
    Pragma-Dialetics Epistemologized: Reply to Lumer.David Botting - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (2):269-285.
    I would like to thank Christoph Lumer for his illuminating comments on my paper “The question of truth” published in this journal (Botting 2010) and would like to exercise my right of reply on a few of the issues that he raises.
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  10.  53
    The Weak Collective Agential Autonomy Thesis.David Botting - 2011 - Disputatio 4 (31):215 - 234.
    Can a collective be an agent in its own right? Can it be the bearer of moral and other properties that we have traditionally reserved for individual agents? The answer, as one might expect, is ‘In some ways yes, in other ways no.’ The way in which the answer is ‘Yes’ has been described recently by Copp; I intend to discuss his position and defend it against objections. This describes a fairly weak form of autonomy that I will claim does (...)
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  11.  22
    Inferences and Illocutions.David Botting - 2015 - Argument and Computation 6 (3):246-264.
    Volume 6, Issue 3, September 2015, Page 246-264.
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  12.  91
    A Priori Abduction.David Botting - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (2):167-181.
    While “All events have a cause” is a synthetic statement making a factual claim about the world, “All effects have a cause” is analytic. When we take an event as an effect, no inference is required to deduce that it has a cause since this is what it means to be an effect. Some examples often given in the literature as examples of abduction work in the same way through semantic facts that follow from the way our beliefs represent those (...)
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  13. The De Re, the Per Se, the Knowable, and the Known.David Botting - 2011 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 28 (2):191.
     
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  14.  26
    The Two One Fallacy Theory Theoryik.David Botting - 2012 - In Piotr Stalmaszcyzk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos Verlag. pp. 37.
  15.  32
    The Question of Truth.David Botting - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (4):413-434.
    The problem with the pragma-dialectical view, it has been argued, is that it takes argumentation as aiming at consensus rather than truth or justified belief. The pragma-dialecticians often imply that an argumentative process aiming at consensus in a way constrained by the “Ten Commandments” will in the long run converge on epistemically favourable standpoints. I will argue that they are right provided (i) pragma-dialectics is construed, as they say, as a theory of criticism; (ii) pragma-dialectics and the other theories of (...)
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  16.  3
    “Even Though”: On the Different Functions of Discounting Expressions in Pro and Con Arguments.David Botting - 2018 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 55 (1):167-186.
    We often say things like “Even though X, Y” or “In spite of Y, X”. What do we mean when we say things like this? What does it imply about the reasons involved? I will argue that there are at least some cases, namely when they are used in the conclusions of conductive arguments, where it should be seen as modifying our expression of X and indicating a certain kind of affect towards X, and this is characteristic of conductive arguments. (...)
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  17.  18
    The Virtuous Tortoise.David Botting - 2017 - Philosophical Investigations 40 (1):31-39.
    There is no philosophically interesting distinction to be made between inference-rules and premises. That there is such a distinction is often held to follow from the possibility of infinite regress illustrated by Carroll's story of Achilles and the tortoise. I will argue that this is wrong on three separate grounds. Consequently, Carroll's fable provides no motivation to abandon the traditional logical separation of arguments into their premises and conclusions. There is no proposition that must be taken to be a rule (...)
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  18.  22
    Johnson and the Soundness Doctrine.David Botting - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (4):501-525.
    Why informal logic? Informal logic is a group of proposals meant to contrast with, replace, and reject formal logic, at least for the analysis and evaluation of everyday arguments. Why reject formal logic? Formal logic is criticized and claimed to be inadequate because of its commitment to the soundness doctrine. In this paper I will examine and try to respond to some of these criticisms. It is not my aim to examine every argument ever given against formal logic; I am (...)
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  19.  45
    What is a Sophistical Refutation?David Botting - 2012 - Argumentation 26 (2):213-232.
    From Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations the following classifications are put forward and defended through extensive excerpts from the text. (AR-PFC) All sophistical refutations are exclusively either ‘apparent refutations’ or ‘proofs of false conclusions’. (AR-F) ‘Apparent refutations’ and ‘fallacies’ name the same thing. (ID-ED) All fallacies are exclusively either fallacies in dictione or fallacies extra dictionem . (ID-nAMB) Not all fallacies in dictione are due to ambiguity. (AMB-nID) Not all fallacies due to ambiguity are fallacies in dictione . (AMB&ID-ME) The set of (...)
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  20.  24
    Do Syllogisms Commit the Petitio Principii? The Role of Inference-Rules in Mill's Logic of Truth.David Botting - 2014 - History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (3):237-247.
    It is a common complaint that the syllogism commits a petitio principii. This is discussed extensively by John Stuart Mill in ‘A System of Logic’ [1882. Eighth Edition, New York: Harper and Brothers] but is much older, being reported in Sextus Empiricus in chapter 17 of the ‘Outlines of Pyrrhonism’ [1933. in R. G. Bury, Works, London and New York: Loeb Classical Library]. Current wisdom has it that Mill gives an account of the syllogism that avoids being a petitio by (...)
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  21.  21
    Resentment and the Impossibility of Universal Abnormality.David Botting - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (2):157-169.
    P.F. Strawson in “Freedom and Resentment” argues that it is self-contradictory for abnormality to be the universal condition. This argument is claimed by Paul Russell to be faulty because conflating abnormality and incapacity, there being no contradiction involved in incapacity being a universal condition. Russell’s critique has become the mainstream view, but it will be shown that from the first-person point of view, universal incapacity could not be any basis on which we could in practice modify our attitudes.
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  22.  31
    Fallacies of Accident.David Botting - 2012 - Argumentation 26 (2):267-289.
    In this paper I will attempt a unified analysis of the various examples of the fallacy of accident given by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations. In many cases the examples underdetermine the fallacy and it is not trivial to identify the fallacy committed. To make this identification we have to find some error common to all the examples and to show that this error would still be committed even if those other fallacies that the examples exemplify were not. Aristotle says (...)
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  23.  19
    Without Qualification: An Inquiry Into the Secundum Quid.David Botting - 2014 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 36 (1):161-170.
  24.  34
    Three Theses on Acts.David Botting - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):65 – 79.
    In 'A Theory of Human Action' (1970) Alvin Goldman launched an attack on what has become known as the Anscombe-Davidson Identity Thesis. In brief, this is the thesis that our acts are our body movements, and that all the different effects of that movement do not entail that different acts have been performed, but only that an identical act has different descriptions. In her response to Goldman, Anscombe (1981) claims that Goldman is arguing at cross-purposes. I will argue that this (...)
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  25.  10
    Toulmin’s Logical Types.David Botting - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (2):433-449.
    In “The Uses of Argument” Toulmin introduces a number of concepts that have become popular in argumentation theory, such as data, claim, warrant, backing, force, field, and, most fundamentally, the concept of a “logical type”. Toulmin never defines the concept of a logical type or a field very clearly, and different interpretations can be found in the literature, either reconstructing what Toulmin has in mind, or revising his concepts to suit other concerns. A natural history of these concepts is not (...)
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  26.  5
    Probability and Rational Choice.David Botting - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (1):01.