William James is frequently considered one of America's most important philosophers, as well as a foundational thinker for the study of religion. Despite his reputation as the founder of pragmatism, he is rarely considered a serious philosopher or religious thinker. In this new interpretation David Lamberth argues that James's major contribution was to develop a systematic metaphysics of experience integrally related to his developing pluralistic and social religious ideas. Lamberth systematically interprets James's radically empiricist world-view and argues for an (...) early dating for his commitment to the metaphysics of radical empiricism. He offers a close reading of Varieties of Religious Experience; and concludes by connecting James's ideas about experience, pluralism and truth to current debates in philosophy, the philosophy of religion, and theology, suggesting James's functional, experiential metaphysics as a conceptual aid in bridging the social and interpretive with the immediate and concrete while avoiding naive realism. (shrink)

Kin selection is a core aspect of social evolution theory, but a small number of critics have recently challenged it. Here I address these criticisms and show that kin selection remains an important explanation for much social evolution. I show how many of the criticisms rest on historical idiosyncrasies of the way the field happened to develop, rather than on the real logic and evidence.

The mammalian pineal gland contains two types of N‐acetyltransferases which act on aromatic amines. One type preferentially acetylates arylamines such as phenetidine and aniline, whereas the other preferentially acetylates arylalkylamines such as tryptamine and phenylethylamine. The two enzymes can be distinguished by (1) molecular size, (2) regulation, and (3) inactivation characteristics. Arylalkylamine N‐acetyltransferase is involved in the regulation of melatonin synthesis in the pineal gland. A specific function of pineal arylamine N‐acetyltransferase has not been established; it may function as a (...) nonspecific detoxification mechanism. (shrink)

In this work David Durst explores the development of modernism in the philosophy, politics, and culture of the first German Republic between 1918 and 1933. Through a reasoned critique of various Weimar intellectual figures such as Ernst Bloch, Martin Heidegger, and Theodor Adorno, Durst offers clarity and insight into the various aesthetic postures of the interwar period. From the cultural vibrancy of the early Weimar period to the eventual decay towards fascism and Nazi rule,Weimar Modernism provides a new and (...) coherent way to examine this important era, which has often been presented in a fragmented manner. (shrink)

This is the first book-length study of the development of civility in Chinese societies. Although some social scientists and political philosophers have discussed civility, none has defined it as an analytical tool to systematically measure attitudes and behavior, and few have applied it to a non-Western society. By comparing the development of civility in mainland China and Taiwan, Civility and Its Development: The Experiences of China and Taiwan analyzes the social conditions needed for civility to become established in a society. (...) Schak argues that the attempts to impose civility top-down from the state are ineffective. Civility appeared in Taiwan only after state efforts to impose it ceased at the end of the 1980s when Taiwan began to democratize, and the PRC government civility campaigns have so far had only limited success. The book concludes with an examination of various differences between Taiwan and the PRC relevant to Taiwan’s having become a society with civility while the PRC still encounters difficulties in doing so. The essential factor in developing civility in Taiwan, Schak contends, was its evolution from a place composed of myriad small, inward-looking communities to a society in which everyone shares a strong identity and civic consciousness, and people consider others as fellow members, not anonymous strangers. “This book represents the most thorough review of what social scientists once called ‘the civilizing process’ in Chinese society. David C. Schak builds on the earlier studies on this issue and goes well beyond the established literature.” —James Watson, Fairbank Professor of Chinese Society and Professor of Anthropology, Emeritus, Harvard University “This is a topic that people talk about all the time, and David C. Schak draws a lot of material together in a systematic and comprehensive way that can stimulate important discussions beyond the academy.” —Thomas Gold, Professor of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley. (shrink)

The Supreme Court frequently uses two tools to gather information about which cases to hear following a petition for writ of certiorari: the call for response and the call for the views of the Solicitor General. To date, there has been no empirical analysis of how the Supreme Court deploys these tools and little qualitative study. This Article fills in basic gaps in the literature by providing concrete answers to common questions regarding these two tools and offers detailed analysis of (...) how and why states, private parties, and the United States (through the Solicitor General) respond to petitions. In addition, the Article provides much-needed data for litigators and litigants to be able to estimate the probability of their case being heard by the Court, and provides insight on how to react when the Court calls for a response or calls for the views of the Solicitor General. To reach these conclusions, the Article relies on detailed, quantitative analysis of a novel, 30,000-petition dataset, as well as interviews with top Supreme Court litigators, former Supreme Court clerks, and former staff of the Clerk’s office. (shrink)

Discusses the strong points and the limitations of Ajdukiewicz' approach to grammar.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME, THE CAUSAL PRINCIPLE, AN'D KEMP SMITH When we say of a proposition that it is possible, we sometimes mean no more than that it is logically possible, that is, consistent with itself. A proposition can be possible in stronger senses than this, but not in any weaker one. For a sense of "p is possible" that did not entail "p is self-consistent, "would have to be a sense (...) of "p is possible" which was consistent with "p is self-inconsistent" And it is obvious that there can be no such sense as that. One of the stronger senses in which a proposition can be possible is this: consistent (with itself and in addition) with every observation-statement. (I mean by an observationstatement, a proposition which, if it were true, could in principle be discovered by experience to be true.) If a proposition? is contingent, (that is, neither necessarily true??t necessarily false), then its negation (its contradictory) not-p is contingent too; and since contingent, not necessarily false; and since not necessarily false, consistent with itself. So, given any contingent propositions, its falsity is among those propositions which are possible in the first and weak sense mentioned above. If a proposition? is not only contingent but unverifiable,(that is, not deducible from any observation- statement), then not-p is consistent both with itself and with every observation -statement. So, given any unverifiable contingent proposition, its falsity is among those propositions which are possible in the second and stronger sense mentioned above. Some stock examples. "Whatever is a raven is black" is contingent, and its falsity therefore possible in the first sense; so too is its contradictory "There are such things as non-black ravens" contingent, and its falsity possible in the first sense. But the latter proposition is not unverifiable, since there are observation-statements from which it is deducible. ("There are such things as green ravens", for example; or "A green raven was in captivity at Taronga Park Zoo in January 31st 1975".) The former proposition, on the other hand, is not only contingent but unverifiable; since there are no observation -statements from which it is deducible. Hence, "whatever is a raven is black" is a proposition the falsity of which is possible both in the first and in the second sense noticed above. A third and still stronger sense in which a proposition can be possible is the following:? is possible if and only if (p is consistent with itself,every observation-statement is consistent with p, and in addition)? is neither more nor less probable in relation to the conjunction of e and n, where e is any observation-statement and? any necessary truth, than it is in relation to? alone. The last condition may be expressed, symbolically, as "P(p/n.e) » P(p/n) for all necessarily true? and all observation-statements e"; or in Carnap' s phrase as, "every observation- statement is initially irrelevant to p." Some examples will quickly make the idea of initial irrelevance, and its opposite, more familiar; and hence will make the third sense of "p is possible" more familiar. Let? be any necessary truth and e any observation-statement. Now let? be, for- example,some necessarily false proposition; then, since P(p/n) « o = P(p/n.e), e is initially irrelevant to p. Or let? be necessarily true; then, since P(p/n) ¦ 1 = P(p/n.e), e is again initially irrelevant to p. Again, let? be "Whatever is a raven is black": then some observation- statements e are initially relevant to p. For if e is "This raven is black," for example, P(p/n.e)>P(p/n) ; or at any rate, that is what we think if we are not inductive sceptic?. Again, if? is "The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son", it is at least very plausible to say that every observational e is initially irrelevant to p; since there appears to be no observational e such that P(p/n.e)>P(p/n), or P(p/n.e). (shrink)

God providentially guided the ancient classical authors into the perception of truths and the unmasking of errors. Even the errors they never caught are instructive. For Calvin, the only proper response to this rich intellectual heritage for a devout Christian people called to love God with their minds as well as with their hearts must always remain profound gratitude.

Unit 4. Goodman, D.C. God and nature in the philosophy of Descartes. --Unit 5. Brooke, J.H. Newton and the mechanistic universe.

I rettspraksis er det eksempler på at individualpreventive hensyn har begrunnet til dels betydelig straffereduksjon for lovbrytere i en ekstraordinært vanskelig livssituasjon. Artikkelen drøfter hvorvidt slik straffnedsettelse utfordrer skyldprinsippet og prinsippet om likhet for loven. I artikkelen utvikles et argument for at alvorlig sosial deprivasjon hos lovbryteren kan påvirke vår forståelse av lovbruddet, slik at lovbruddet kan fremstå mindre krenkende enn det ville gjort i et normaltilfelle. Dermed kan mindre enn normal mengde straff være riktig for å uttrykke en passende (...) reaksjon på lovbruddet. Hvis så er tilfellet, vil ikke skyldprinsippet og likhetsprinsippet utfordres, fordi det vil dreie seg om et relevant ulikt lovbrudd. (shrink)