What can we know and what should we believe about today's world? _What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues_ applies the concerns and techniques of epistemology to a wide variety of contemporary issues. Questions about what we can know-and what we _should_ believe-are first addressed through an explicit consideration of the practicalities of working these issues out at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Coady calls for an 'applied turn' in epistemology, a process he likens to the applied (...) turn that transformed the study of ethics in the early 1970s. Subjects dealt with include: Experts-how can we recognize them? And when should we trust them? Rumors-should they _ever_ be believed? And can they, in fact, be a source of knowledge? Conspiracy theories-when, if ever, should they be believed, and can they be known to be true? The blogosphere-how does it compare with traditional media as a source of knowledge and justified belief? Timely, thought provoking, and controversial, _What to Believe Now _offers a wealth of insights into a branch of philosophy of growing importance-and increasing relevance-in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

I describe two concepts of epistemic injustice. The first of these concepts is explained through a critique of Alvin Goldman's veritistic social epistemology. The second is closely based on Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is a tension between these two forms of epistemic injustice and tentatively suggest some ways of resolving the tension.

Abstract It is widely believed that to be a conspiracy theorist is to suffer from a form of irrationality. After considering the merits and defects of a variety of accounts of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, I draw three conclusions. One, on the best definitions of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. Two, there may be occasions on which we should settle for an inferior definition which (...) entails that conspiracy theorists are after all irrational. Three, if and when we do this, we should recognise that conspiracy theorists so understood are at one end of a spectrum, and the really worrying form of irrationality is at the other end. (shrink)

Conspiracy theories have a bad reputation. This is especially true in the academy and in the media. Within these institutions, to describe someone as a conspiracy theorist is often to imply that his or her views should not be taken seriously. Perhaps this accounts for the fact that philosophers have tended to ignore the topic, despite the enduring appeal of conspiracy theories in popular culture. Recently, however, some philosophers have at least treated conspiracy theorists respectfully enough to try to articulate (...) where they go wrong.I begin this paper by clarifying the nature of conspiracy theories. I then argue against some recent critiques of conspiracy theories. Many criticisms of conspiracy theories are unfounded. I also argue that unwillingness to entertain conspiracy theories is an intellectual and moral failing. I end by suggesting an Aristotelian approach to the issue, according to which the intellectual virtue of realism is a golden mean between the intellectual vices of paranoia and naivety. (shrink)

I describe two concepts of epistemic injustice. The first of these concepts is explained through a critique of Alvin Goldman's veritistic social epistemology. The second is closely based on Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is a tension between these two forms of epistemic injustice and tentatively suggest some ways of resolving the tension.

Scholarly treatments of conspiracy theories and of rumours tend to follow a similar pattern. In both cases they usually begin by presupposing that the phenomena in question (conspiracy theories or rumours) should not be believed. They then seek to explain the puzzling fact that many people (though not of course the author or reader) are nonetheless inclined to believe them. I will argue that this is all wrong. Neither rumours nor conspiracy theories deserve their bad reputation. I will also argue (...) that rumours and conspiracy theories have a bad reputation because of a certain kind of propaganda. Not all propaganda is objectionable, but this propaganda is objectionable, because it is anti-democratic propaganda. (shrink)

Alvin Goldman has criticized the idea that, when evaluating the opinions of experts who disagree, a novice should “go by the numbers”. Although Goldman is right that this is often a bad idea, his argument involves an appeal to a principle, which I call the non-independence principle, which is not in general true. Goldman's formal argument for this principle depends on an illegitimate assumption, and the examples he uses to make it seem intuitively plausible are not convincing. The failure of (...) this principle has significant implications, not only for the issue Goldman is directly addressing, but also for the epistemology of rumors, and for our understanding of the value of epistemic independence. I conclude by using the economics literature on information cascades to highlight an important truth which Goldman's principle gestures toward, and by mounting a qualified defense of the practice of going by the numbers. (shrink)

Conspiracy theories have a bad reputation. In the past, most philosophers have ignored the topic, vaguely supposing that conspiracy theories are obviously irrational and that they can be easily dismissed. The current philosophical interest in the subject results from a realisation that this is not so. Some philosophers have taken up the challenge of identifying and explaining the flaws of conspiracy theories. Other philosophers have argued that conspiracy theories do not deserve their bad reputation, and that conspiracy theorists do not (...) deserve their reputation for irrationality. This book represents both sides of this important debate. Aimed at a broad philosophical community, including epistemologists, political philosophers, and philosophers of history. It represents a significant contribution to the growing interdisciplinary debate about conspiracy theories. (shrink)

Alvin Goldman has criticized the idea that, when evaluating the opinions of experts who disagree, a novice should “go by the numbers”. Although Goldman is right that this is often a bad idea, his argument involves an appeal to a principle, which I call the non-independence principle, which is not in general true. Goldman's formal argument for this principle depends on an illegitimate assumption, and the examples he uses to make it seem intuitively plausible are not convincing. The failure of (...) this principle has significant implications, not only for the issue Goldman is directly addressing, but also for the epistemology of rumors, and for our understanding of the value of epistemic independence. I conclude by using the economics literature on information cascades to highlight an important truth which Goldman's principle gestures toward, and by mounting a qualified defense of the practice of going by the numbers. (shrink)

While applied epistemology has been neglected for much of the twentieth century, it has seen emerging interest in recent years, with key thinkers in the field helping to put it on the philosophical map. Although it is an old tradition, current technological and social developments have dramatically changed both the questions it faces and the methodology required to answer those questions. Recent developments also make it a particularly important and exciting area for research and teaching in the twenty-first century. The (...) Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology is an outstanding reference source to this exciting subject and the first collection of its kind. Comprising entries by a team of international contributors, the Handbook is divided into six main parts: The Internet Politics Science Epistemic institutions Individual investigators Theory and practice in philosophy. Within these sections, the core topics and debates are presented, analyzed, and set into broader historical and disciplinary contexts. The central topics covered include: the prehistory of applied epistemology, expertise and scientific authority, epistemic aspects of political and social philosophy, epistemology and the law, and epistemology and medicine. Essential reading for students and researchers in epistemology, political philosophy, and applied ethics the Handbook will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as law, sociology, and politics. (shrink)

Two kinds of philosophical questions are raised by the current public debate about climate change; epistemic questions (Whom should I believe? Is climate science a genuine science?), and ethical questions (Who should bear the burden? Must I sacrifice if others do not?). Although the former have been central to this debate, professional philosophers have dealt almost exclusively with the latter. This book is the first to address both the epistemic and ethical questions raised by the climate change debate and examine (...) the relationship between them. (shrink)

Conspiracy theories have historically had a bad reputation, with many philosophers dismissing the topic as irrational. Current philosophical debate has challenged this stance, suggesting that these theories do not deserve their bad reputation. This book represents both sides of the debate. Aimed at a broad philosophical community, including epistemologists, political philosophers, and philosophers of history, this book is a significant contribution to the growing interest in conspiracy theories.

Alvin Goldman claims that the conventional media is in decline as a result of competition from the blogosphere, and that this is a threat to our epistemic wellbeing and, as a result, a threat to good democratic decision-making. He supports this claim with three common complaints about the blogosphere: first, that it is undermining professional journalism, second, that, unlike the conventional media, it lacks ‘balance’, and finally that it is a parasite on the conventional media. I defend the blogosphere against (...) these charges. I argue that the blogosphere has benefited us epistemically and improved our democratic practices, and that there is every reason to expect that it will continue to do so. (shrink)

Rumours are widely held to be both epistemically and morally suspect. This article concentrates on the epistemic arguments against rumours, since the moral arguments tend to be dependent on them. I conclude that the usual arguments against believing rumours and engaging in rumour-mongering are extremely weak. I compare the epistemic status of rumours to the epistemic status of some rival methods of acquiring information, and conclude that rumours are an important and irreplaceable source of justified belief and knowledge.

There has been a lively philosophical debate about the nature of conspiracy theories and their epistemic status going on for some years now. This debate has shed light, not only on conspiracy theories themselves, but also, in the process, on a variety of issues in social epistemology, political philosophy, and the philosophy of religion.